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There are too many problems with the BWC for it to solve – funding, cooperation, and more are issues that it is dealing with right now

Kathryn Millett., 06-01-17, "Financial Woes Spell Trouble for the Biological Weapons Convention," Health Security, https://www-liebertpub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1089/hs.2017.0030

Strong stewardship is critical to the enduring health and strength of international disarmament treaties and the norms they uphold. Such stewardship involves significant investment of both political will and financial capital. Currently, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)—a cornerstone of the web of international efforts to ensure and protect global health security—seems to have neither, and the ramifications are significant. In November 2016, states parties to the BWC gathered together for the 5-year review of the operation of the convention. Such review conferences are opportunities to assess the health of the treaty and take decisions and recommendations to further strengthen its effectiveness and improve its implementation. Key issues requiring urgent action by states parties in 2016 included the modalities of cooperation and assistance efforts in responding to deliberate disease events, enhanced reassurance on treaty compliance, and a regular scientific and technological review process to ensure the treaty keeps pace with the rapid developments in the life sciences. Despite considerable preparatory effort by states parties, the review conference failed to reach consensus on any substantive issues or agree an intersessional work program. The sole outcome of over a year's hard work was agreement that the treaty would continue to function as before, while a Meeting of States Parties (MSP) would be held in December 2017 that would “seek to make progress on issues of substance and process for the period before the next Review Conference, with a view to reaching consensus on an intersessional process.” While the majority of attention focused on efforts to reach consensus on substantive issues—and the continuing disappointment of the failure to do so—another issue rumbled largely ignored in the background. Just prior to the review conference—and for the first time in the treaty's history—the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) distributed a document prepared by the Financial Resources Management Service (FRMS) of the United Nations Office at Geneva detailing the status of states parties' financial contributions to the convention. This document demonstrated that 62% of states parties owed a combined total of US$596,519 to the treaty over the period 2001 to 2016 in unpaid assessed contributions. Concurrently, a number of presentations by the UN FRMS made during the review conference explicitly spelled out the consequences to states parties of the roll-out of the UN enterprise resource planning system, dubbed “Umoja”: under UN financial procedures, funds must be available before staff contracts can be renewed and meetings held; if there are insufficient funds, meetings cannot be convened and staff cannot be recruited or have their contracts renewed. Umoja does not permit crossing budget lines to make up shortfalls in other areas. In the run-up to a meeting, a review process will take place where a go/no-go decision will be taken 3 months ahead of the proposed meeting dates based on funding. While the implementation of the financial rules are causing havoc across a number of disarmament treaties (eg, the 5th Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons [CCW] was almost brought to a screeching halt in 2016, and all remaining scheduled meetings for 2017 are facing cancellation), these rules possess a greater significance for the BWC ISU than other similar treaty support agencies: Since the ISU is merely hosted by the UN and is not itself a UN body, it cannot draw on the regular budget of the UN and is thus dependent solely on the annual assessed contributions of its states parties. The ISU's financial instability is further compounded by the fact that its current funding arrangements do not permit recruitment of temporary staff to cover gaps in the ISU due to maternity leave or illness. Amid this new focus on finances came an extraordinary move from the BWC depository states (the Russian Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom). In March 2017, the BWC depository states called on all states parties to pay their assessed financial contributions to the treaty and settle their arrears “without further delay,” warning that failure to do so could result in staff losses in the BWC ISU and cancellation of the forthcoming meeting of states parties in December. While a number of states responded rapidly to this urgent call and consequently enabled renewal of ISU staff contracts, as of the latest FRMS report of April 31, 2017, there remains –$473,195 in outstanding contributions shared by 114 (or 64% of) states parties covering the years 2001 to 2017. While a significant proportion of arrears reflects late payments of assessed contributions for the year 2017 (–$141,195), 4 states have not paid their assessed contributions since 2001 and another 8 have not paid any contributions over the past 5 years. One state party alone owns 63% of all debts owed to the BWC, accrued over the period 2001 to 2017. Conversely, several states have overpaid the BWC, the most notable among them being the United States's overpayment of around a quarter of a million dollars. However, the BWC still possesses a deficit of –$114,344: not enough to cover the meeting costs for 2017. With the planned 2017 meeting of states parties being the sole forum for making any progress on agreement of a substantive intersessional work program prior to the next review conference scheduled for 2021, it is of the utmost importance that states parties dig deep and make sure that there are sufficient funds to allow the meeting to be held. Of equal importance are measures to ensure financial sustainability of the convention and the ISU. There are a number of financial solutions that have been adopted by similar treaties and agencies that could be adapted to suit the needs of the BWC. For example, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) maintains a working capital fund that it uses to cover temporary financial shortcomings, while the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Peaceful Uses Initiative solicits extrabudgetary contributions that supplement its other funds when the need arises. Both funds ensure that the agencies possess the financial flexibility to quickly respond to financial shortages, requests for additional activities by states parties, and any unexpected needs or unforeseen emergency events. Another option would be to consider the establishment of a voluntary revolving capital fund as adopted in January 2015 by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). UNIDIR's “stability fund” has a $1 million goal for which 1-time donations are received from participating states on a rotating annual basis, ensuring that the fund is replenished each year. Extrabudgetary funding for the BWC is not new. The ISU has often received voluntary contributions from states parties in a position to do so, but these contributions are usually given on a project-by-project basis to fund the convening of a certain meeting or similar activity. The most significant of these contributions is from the European Council, which has supported the BWC through the adoption of 2 council decisions and which provides financial contributions to UNODA for activities in support of the BWC, including costs for 2 UNODA staff to carry out activities mandated by the decisions. Further, the BWC administers a sponsorship program funded by voluntary contributions from states that enable participants from developing countries to attend BWC meetings. The creation of a voluntary and non-earmarked fund that the ISU could employ as needed to cover any shortfalls in meeting and staffing costs would provide the BWC with the flexibility needed to cover urgent costs that cannot be achieved under Umoja rules. Further, by channeling overpayments by states parties into a central reserve, the ongoing unpaid arrears of recalcitrant states would no longer be masked by any overpayments and more pressure could be brought to bear on them to resolve their debts in a timely fashion. But any such monies would need to be held outside the Umoja system, which may not be possible. The above options could also be supported by the adoption of sanctions against states in arrears that would deny voting or participatory rights to states until their debts are settled or an appropriate reduction in arrears has been effected. Such a system has long been in use by the UN. Under Article 19 of the Charter, a UN member state in arrears of an amount that equals or exceeds the contributions due for 2 preceding years can lose its vote in the general assembly. An exception is permitted if the member state can show that conditions beyond its control contributed to its inability to pay. As recently as May 2, 2017, the UN invoked Article 19 to withdraw Libya's voting rights in the general assembly until such time as it has made the necessary payments to reduce its arrears below the specified amount. The OPCW has the option to invoke a similar procedure under rule 35 of the rules of procedure of the executive council. However, financial woes are not the only issue to plague the BWC. States parties have consistently shown a lack of the necessary political will to strengthen the BWC. Participation in BWC meetings has historically been low when compared with other disarmament treaties, and states have regularly failed to overcome political differences and point-scoring to agree on necessary measures to strengthen implementation of the treaty. In fact, the planned 2017 MSP has yet to appoint a chair, meaning that critical preparations and discussions prior to the meeting cannot be undertaken. Measures instigated by states parties such as the cooperation and assistance database remain woefully under-used by both states offering assistance and those seeking assistance, and the request from the Seventh Review Conference in 2011 for “States Parties to provide at least biannually appropriate information on how they implement Article X of the Convention to the ISU” saw submissions from just 10 states parties, 1 regional organization, and 1 group of states during the intersessional period of 2012 to 2015. Perhaps the most obvious evidence of a general lack of political will or interest in the BWC can be found in the level of annual confidence-building measures (CBM) returns. Despite a number of programs and efforts to enhance participation, the number of confidence-building measures returns per year has never risen above 45% of states parties. In fact, a third of states parties have never submitted a return, and, when returns are submitted, the quality of the information provided is often sorely lacking. This is particularly significant in the BWC context as the confidence-building measures represent the sole means by which states parties more formally provide reassurance of compliance with the provisions and obligations of the BWC. All across the disarmament sphere, treaties are under financial pressure. The continued use and threats of use of conventional and nonconventional weapons by states and non-state actors puts international weapons norms at risk. States parties must act to positively reinforce the norms against the use of banned weapons. Upholding the life-saving norms enshrined in international disarmament treaties is a difficult and costly business—one that requires considerable political commitment and financial investment. When states fail to invest in ensuring that treaties remain strong and well-resourced, it is humanity that ultimately pays the price. If BWC states parties truly value the norms against the use of biology as a weapon, they need to demonstrate this by putting their money where their mouth is.

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