Ableist rhetoric feeds the project of the war machine as we march towards the horizon of a new Able-bodied world order. Rejecting attempts at “rehabilitation” is key to understanding debility as inherent to all bodies and deconstructing the project of the war machine.
Heathcote 18 – (Gina Heathcote is a feminist scholar working in the Centre for Gender Studies and the School of Law at SOAS, University of London, as well as a member at the Centre for Human Rights Law; War’s Perpetuity: Gina Heathcote (2018) War’s Perpetuity: Disabled Bodies of War and the Exoskeleton of Equality, Australian Feminist Law Journal, 44:1, 71-91,; Published online: 01 Aug 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2018.1470447) Dōgen
“[B]etween fixing and forgetting … [s]uccessful rehabilitation permitted the ‘formerly’ disabled body to be reintegrated into the nation’s significant social structures, such as work and family. Made ‘ordinary’ again, ‘identical’ to ‘normal’ citizens, the disabled would ‘disappear’”. 57 Jennifer James’ account of the relationship between the disabled body, black bodies in the US, and soldier/citizenship draws out the complicated structural history of soldier/citizens in the US. She argues for recognition of the history of blackness in the US to be understood as ‘synonymous with disability’ as ‘black men have envisaged military participation as an avenue toward liberation and citizenship, heeding the call for “able-bodied” men needed to fill military ranks’. 58 Through an analysis of the literary texts of Gwendolyn Brooks, James argues for the need for representation, rather than repression, of the injured and maimed black body returned from war. As such, James demonstrates the relationship between legal subjectivity, citizenship, and soldiering in the US. In arguing that military service might ‘undo’ the othering of the black male body in the US, James in effect acknowledges the white, masculine subject of law who need not act to gain full subjectivity. However, James also challenges the accuracy of ‘“ableists’” representations’ for ‘the act of representation, no matter how “authentic,” aids in this estrangement precisely because the disabled are mediated’. 59 The military mindset to repair and restore the returned soldier through assistive technologies likewise reproduces the expectation that the maimed body is not quite a full subject and that the restoring of the body is necessary to be a full citizen. This approach, argues James, ignores the constructed nature of the debility produced through warfare and thus reifies the notion that the body must always be restored from debility. Drawing on the work of Henri-Jacques Stiker,60 James writes: This cosmetic fix allows the inequalities created by political, social and ideological practices that relegate certain bodies to economic, gender, sex and physical (racial) alterity to conveniently recede from view … through ‘naturalizing’ socially produced disability, naming all difference ‘disability’ and claiming all ‘disabled’ capable of ‘rehabilitation,’ preventative measures are judged unnecessary.61 James’ argument recognises not only the socially constructed nature of disability resultant from armed conflict, but also the social construction of ‘the poor to the unemployed’ as Other and in need of rehabilitative interventions by the state, rather than recognition of any need to transform structural inequalities. However, James’ approach also highlights the ‘socially constructed’ nature of disability which, I argue, might have two meanings.62 First, as James writes, drawing on Stiker, a host of differences become marked as ‘disabled’ in a manner that requires individual interventions over structural change. Second, thinking through the disabled body returning from combat, the body is twice constructed as damaged, initially through the risk contained in a political decision to send armed forces to combat situations which is, in essence, a constructed risk and then through the need to ‘restore’ the body of the soldier, rather than care or accept differences associated with disability. For individuals who are thus framed as disabled, whether as the consequence of political decisions, political apathy, or from chronic, genetic, or other medical conditions, the focus remains on the rehabilitation to become ablebodied rather than a recognition that all bodies carry debilities, risk debility, and are debilitated. Likewise, there is a failure to see how compulsory ablebodiedness is attributed to the imagined subject of law. The shift to honouring, accepting, and seeing debility as integral to subjectivity thus frames subjectivity differently and, potentially, accepts the interface of technology with any body as an aspect of subjectivity just as the entwined relationships with humanness and matter, environment and nonhuman animals have the potential to radically alter legal constructions and engagements with subjectivity. James goes on to remind us that the dismembered female form has a long history in Western iconography from the Venus de Milo to the cropped female body of contemporary Hollywood films: if women are reduced to ‘parts’, black women are split even further as they are asked to pry the signs of blackness from their bodies and as blackness is ripped from their bodies and reshaped into a myriad of cultural signifiers.63 The maimed body of war must therefore be restored in a way that female and black bodies can never be restored/completed, reinscribing white masculine histories into the project of assistive military technologies for returned soldiers. For Yasmin Gunaratnam, ‘[r]ace and gender, in other words, complicate the cultural presence of disability’. 64 Thinking forward, through these re-readings of the material and discursive effects of subject formation, borne through the experience of citizenship and its various dislocations, and invisibly carried through legal categorisation, demands new modes of understanding and representing subjectivity. An alternative framing of subjectivity might thus begin with the notion of debility and the body, acknowledging thus the interrelated othering of racial and gendered others in the construction of legal subjectivity endured by modern man. Debility thus frames the future interface with technology as not rehabilitative, or restorative, but rather akin to the already-interface between technology and humans: a process that has a history as old as human invention. The technology of fire, for example, fundamentally altered human existence, changed her needs, patterns, and consumptions. Moreover, the contemporary use of technology has starkly changed the understanding of humanness, how humans live, interact, survive. At the same time both technology and humans impact on the livelihoods of nonhuman animals and of earth. To shift toward the notion of intertwined existence – or subjectivities – the exoskeleton has inspired me to see the human body as body-never-whole-never-complete and as ordinary in its dependencies on others, including nonhuman animals, matter, and technologies. Thus, drawing on Donna Reeves, it is necessary to recognise: For people with impairments, the hybridisation of machine/human or animal/human is often synonymous with lived experience, particularly for those with physical or sensory impairments … Potential cyborg figures can be seen in the wheelchair user, the person with a cochlear implant, artificial leg or pacemaker, someone who uses an assistance dog.65 While Reeve acknowledges the differential cultural readings of different technologies, their gendered meanings, the economic privileges required for access, the dependencies, and the increased means of medical surveillance technologies invoked must also be heeded. Reeve argues, ‘[r]ather than seeing technology as “fixing” impaired people in normative ways (and therefore to be rejected), it is more productive to see the new ways of being in the world that emerge from living as cyborg’. 66 Thus, to see the debilitated body67 as motif for reimagining subjectivity requires recognition of the ways the conceptualisation of modernist man has always rendered the non-male, non-heterosexual/heteronormative body as not only othered but debilitated. Feminist theorising on subjectivity and feminist legal projects might thus take the othered body as the conceptual lens to engage the nonhuman, matter, and technology. Viva la Frida!