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Biotech fails to empower disabled folk.

Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1461444816642754, 4/19/16, Buck)

In the many formulations of digital media, Internet, or new media studies, “critical cyberculture studies” is notable for its attempt to put “cultural difference—human elements of race and ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, and disability … front and center, informing our research questions, frameworks, and findings” (Silver, 2006: 8). Despite such rhetoric, disability was marginalized by cyberculture studies and other strands of Internet studies in their first decade, either through its use as metaphor or through its invisibility. In much of these literatures, disability has been a concretizing metaphor, used to illustrate abstract theories and not interrogated for its own political baggage and relation to lived experiences and identities. This recalls what literary and disability scholars David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder (2001) have argued about the use of disability in fiction, where it serves as a “narrative prosthesis,” a motivating malady that drives further storytelling. In both cases, disability is abstracted and used to advance other ideas. The clearest example of such metaphorical use of disability lies in cyborg theory, where it appeared “only as example, not as critical category” (Kafer, 2013: 105). As described in Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto,” the cyborg represented the increasingly blurred boundaries between human and animal, human and machine, in postmodernity. Haraway (1991) invoked disability to describe the pleasures of blending the human and the other, suggesting that “perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization with other communication devices,” and that “machines can be prosthetic devices, intimate components, friendly selves” (p. 154). Similarly, Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (1991) opened their anthology by suggesting that “the highly developed technoculture of the handicapped” would be important for the development of cyborg theory (p. xvi); this possibility was, however, unrealized in their anthology. Incorporation of actual experiences with prosthetics could have offered depth to these speculative cyborg futures, but it could also have troubled them, as lived experiences of disability and assistive technology are often frustrating, painful, or stigmatizing rather than politically liberating. In the few cases in which scholars considered experiences of disability in concert with cyborg theory, their findings were mixed. For instance, d/Deaf individuals who received cochlear implants did not experience this as an empowering cyborg identity but as a troubling of their community identity and sense of self (Cherney, 1999). The invisibility of disability in Internet studies is evident when we turn a critical eye to the case of Joan. Although numerous scholars took up this case in relation to gender, sexuality, postmodern identity, and online disembodiment, analysis through the lens of disability was sorely lacking. Turkle focused on the boundaries between identity play as a healthy form of experimentation and identity deception as betrayal. Howard Rheingold invoked this story as part of a larger discussion of online communities’ experiences of trust and deception. O’Brien used the story to argue the importance of gender in organizing interpersonal interactions online and offline. For Mark Poster, as well, the case was one of gender deception, demonstrating how gender could be reinscribed online. In Roseanne Allucquère Stone’s chapter, “The Cross-Dressing Psychiatrist,” she presented this story as an illustration of the flexibility of postmodern identity, an argument that both renders disability invisible as a lived phenomenon and treats it metaphorically. Such appearances—but analytic irrelevance—of disability in Internet studies led Gerard Goggin and Christopher Newell (2003) to suggest that Internet studies and related fields retained a conceptualization of disability as deficiency that obscured its function as identity and experience (p. 115). In their analysis of Joan, and related literature in cyberculture studies, Goggin and Newell provided a rare illustration of what disability studies could offer to scholars of Internet and new media culture. They wrote that Stone, in particular, “fails to identify the way in which [a medical discourse of disability] fundamentally shapes her own analysis and taken-for-granted views of … the disabled body” (Goggin and Newell, 2003: 113). While scholars readily explored the diverse personas adopted by online users in various contexts, Goggin and Newell (2003) noted reliance on a “fixed, reified identity position” (p. 114) regarding disability, an assumption that disability could only be performed in a limited fashion. The postmodern fluidity of cyberculture studies did not extend to disability, and the lived experiences of disability online were rarely analyzed, with metaphorical uses and uninterrogated anecdotes serving as the basis for theory. Goggin and Newell’s Digital Disability offered serious study of uses of the Internet by people with disabilities, the limitations of technology regarding disability access, and the formation of disability cultures online. It laid the groundwork for future studies of disability online, many of which have addressed both online cultures and the offline structures of power that shape technologies (Adam and Kreps, 2009; Ellcessor, 2016; Ellis and Kent, 2010; Goggin and Noonan, 2006; Jaeger, 2011; Moser, 2006). Although this literature has grown, its insights regarding the interplay of bodies, technologies, and cultural hierarchies of identity have not been widely incorporated into studies of online culture more broadly.

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