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The alternative can make material change through a global resistance movement against ableist structures.

McRuer 18(McRuer, Robert. Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “Crip Times: Disability, Globalization, and Resistance.” NYU Press, 2018. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1pwt9nj. Accessed 14 Jul. 2022. ) //RB

This chapter examines disability in relation to a keyword drawn from the subtitle to this book: resistance. In this section, I consider how crip/ queer theorists have attended to the theoretical vicissitudes of this keyword; I position their theorizing as itself a tactic of resistance. Resistance has arguably had an uneven history of late in critical cultural theory, perhaps especially in queer theory. For a time, a certain foundational strand of queer theory indebted to the work of philosopher Michel Foucault has emphasized a theory of necessary or inevitable resistance. “Where there is power, there is resistance,” Foucault famously wrote. “And it is doubtless the strategic codification of those points of resistance that makes a revolution possible” (History 95, 96). As something called queer theory was congealing in the 1990s, David Halperin, in his book Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, was a key figure spelling out what Foucauldian (queer) resistance could mean. Detailing in particular the ways in which Foucault’s work makes possible an understanding of power not as always and everywhere repressive but as productive, Halperin insisted that “the aim of an oppositional politics is . . . not liberation but resistance” (18). For Foucault, in Halperin’s interpretation, dreams of “liberation” from “repression” posited or imagined spaces outside power and could not really grasp the insidious ways in which the very languages to which we are subjected (languages of “sexuality,” for example) materialize and secure specific ways of being and knowing and block inventiveness and creativity. “Does the expression ‘let us liberate our sexuality’ have a meaning?” Foucault asks. “Isn’t the problem rather to try to decide the practices of freedom through which we could determine what is sexual pleasure and what are our erotic, loving, passionate relationships with others?” (qtd. in Halperin 193– 194). The queer sociality that is Floyd’s topic would, in this understanding, not seek somehow to liberate an underlying essence or truth; it would, rather, inventively generate new (and resistant) forms of pleasure and relationality.

A focus on practices of freedom that generate inventive new forms of intimacy and indeed, “life” has likewise characterized disability studies work on resistance. The most foundational work in this vein, such as the essays collected in Shelley Tremain’s important edited collection Foucault and the Government of Disability, often pinpoints the ways in which the supposed “truth” of disabled lives is constituted diagnostically through the workings of what Foucault terms juridical power. Fixed with a diagnosis, disabled subjects are then reductively understood through, and always and everywhere made to speak the truth of, their pathology: this pathology and only this pathology, juridical power might say, is what disability looks like. Again, however, even as various forms of authority, especially medical authority, appear to be always and only negative or repressive, such encounters necessarily generate excessive subjects speaking otherwise. Tremain writes that “individuals and juridically constituted groups of individuals have responded to subjecting practices, which are connected in increasingly intimate and immediate ways to ‘life,’ by formulating needs and imperatives of that same ‘life’ as the basis for political counterdemands, that is, by turning them around into focuses of resistance” (7, emphasis in the original). Resistant practices of freedom echo across, or are made imperative in, virtually all the most famous slogans of disability movements globally. If juridically constituted groups of disabled individuals are objectified by medical authority, pitied by nondisabled others in and through that objectification, and perhaps even encouraged and assisted (in increasing numbers of locations) to end their own lives, those constituted as such respond collectively with assertions like “nothing about us without us,” “piss on pity,” and “assisted living, not assisted dying.” “This is what disability looks like” is here put forward as a resistant counterdemand, unfixing what would appear to be (in Tremain’s words) “that same ‘life.’

The urgency of such counterdemands, particularly as they individually and collectively reanimate those subjectified as disabled, underscores Halperin’s point that “such radicalism is not merely a radicalism for its own sake, a fashionable attachment to whatever may look new in the way of personal and political styles” (66). Nonetheless, as queer theory in particular has flourished in the two decades since Saint Foucault, achieving in the process a legible cachet and marketability in the academy and in academic publishing (which arguably thrives on that which “looks new” in relation to a range of intellectual and political styles), a certain congealing of resistance, that perhaps could be described as “radicalism for its own sake,” is evident. A well- intentioned critique of the mainstream lgbt movement’s incorporation into state and capital has as its flip side a longing for a somewhat innocent figure of “resistance.” In his study Under Bright Lights: Gay Manila and the Global Scene, Bobby Benedicto traces both sides of this conundrum in queer theory: Indeed, much of the work on what might be termed queer complicities has focused on how gay white men (or conflated figures of gayness and whiteness) are implicated in practices of exclusion and embedded in market capitalism. This is an important focus but I am wary of how it leads, directly or indirectly, to the conjuration of a list of abstracted, othered figures: the queer of color, the third- world queer, the disabled queer, the working- class queer, and the like that are invested with the potential for transgression by virtue of their exclusion and on whom faith is placed for a still radical politics. (13– 14, emphasis in the original) Benedicto’s important project thus attempts to pull back from abstraction, particularly removing the “third- world queer” (a figure based in the Philippines, in Benedicto’s anthropological study, but a figure who imagines himself as a citizen of a global gay network) from a space of innocence: “the third- world queer is not just the other but an other that makes his own others: ‘He’ is at the center of the city and at the margins of the world” (14). “His own others,” in the Manila of Under Bright Lights, are often haunting, disabled figures, “as when gay men drive around at night to head to the clubs, but are suddenly caught in standstill traffic and come face- to- face with the vagrants on the road: the old blind men and women with their plastic cups stretched out and their walking sticks tapping lightly on the wheels” (11). This passage, of course, arguably participates in exactly what it is critiquing, as blind men and women are objectified, made into others, through Benedicto’s staging of the scene; the very syntax of the passage performs what it purports to describe, as the colon points toward vagrants made into objects. Still, Benedicto’s larger point remains: if any queer theoretical location has invoked or produced the third- world queer as the figure “on whom faith is placed for a still radical politics,” such claims should always be subjected to scrutiny. Under Bright Lights, at its best, disallows any innocent investment in the third- world queer, and by extension any innocent investment in other abstracted figures.

Resistance as it has congealed in some queer theoretical texts, for Benedicto is thus not necessarily something to aim for: “I want to suspend the academic desire to spot difference and resistance, and to acknowledge that local agency also works in the service of modernist aspirations, that it can be mobilized to reproduce the center in the margins, is constrained by the force of material environments, and remains animated by narratives of progress and modernity” (17). It’s worth pointing out, however, that simply spotting difference and resistance is already a compromise of Foucauldian resistance, as Halperin’s study makes clear. That is because spotting, identifying, and putting faith in a figure endows that figure with a substance or essence that is untrue to the ways power works in a Foucauldian sense. Spotting difference and resistance suggests that there is nothing left to do once it is found; it can, essentially, only be admired. Foucault himself, however, consistently turned away from the fantasy of simply spotting or naming that which was supposedly or inherently good (and, of course, thereby liberatory) or bad. In a famous quotation that would become Tremain’s epigraph for Foucault and the Government of Disability, he insists, “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do” (“Geneaology” 256; qtd. in Tremain front matter). In Foucault’s sense, since identifying/spotting the third- world queer would always be dangerous, acknowledging, as Benedicto does, “that local agency also works in the service of modernist aspirations,” is actually itself a resistant act. Moreover, writing a thorough anthropological study of how that complicit agency functions (including how it might function in relation to haunting crip figures who emerge in the margins of the text) is part of the “something to do” that always remains. This is not at all to undercut Benedicto’s aim of suspending the academic desire to spot difference and resistance; it is to point out that where that academic desire has conjured up innocent others over the past few decades it is not actually resistant in the ways that concept has been theorized by some commentators on Foucault such as Halperin or Tremain.

Nirmala Erevelles, like Benedicto, is cautious about the ways in which resistance in academic writing can become a mesmerizing but ineffective “transgression”: “Poststructuralism’s deconstructive potential along with its limitless possibilities for (re)imagining the transgressive body makes for seductive scholarship— a point not lost on disability studies scholars who have done radical work in retheorizing disability outside the constricting limits of dominant discourse” (12). Erevelles’s Disability and Difference in Global Contexts: Enabling a Transformative Body Politic, however, sustains a deep commitment to collective resistance: “At the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality, and disability, we will find that collective resistance is more fruitful than individualized forms of resistance” (120). Disability and Difference in Global Contexts is one of the defining texts in what might be understood as a “global turn” in disability studies; it is now indispensable for theorizing intersectionality in the field. As the subtitle suggests, “transformation” is prioritized by Erevelles over a ludic “transgression.” The book also furthers urgent conversations that remain underdeveloped in disability studies, considering in particular the ways in which disability is often caused by the devastations of capitalism, imperialism, and war. Throughout Disability and Difference in Global Contexts, Erevelles reaches for what she terms “a common platform of resistance” (130), and rightfully critiques theorists, including transnational feminist theorists, who do not or cannot incorporate a materialist analysis of disability into their work. Erevelles calls for a disability studies that consistently theorizes disability in relational, transnational contexts; her call particularly resonates for me, writing in and about a period when a compulsory common sense about austerity has been imposed (often forcefully) globally. As should be clear throughout Crip Times, I share both Erevelles’s critique of hegemonic forms of capitalist globalization and her sense that collective resistance remains urgent. I also agree with the implication that a poststructuralist theory imagining what she terms “limitless possibilities” would not be particularly resistant. Such a theory would also, however, not be particularly poststructuralist, as a rigorous poststructuralist attention to the instabilities of signification should certainly not translate into a world of limitless possibility but rather a world where the intertwined discursive and material construction of limits should be continually interrogated. In a slightly different context, Sara Ahmed reminds us that “the poststructuralist critique of language was that words are far from trustworthy . . . the poststructuralist turn begins with a suspicion of words as much as things” (34); the necessary suspicion Ahmed writes about is completely lost if poststructuralism is resignified (or fixed) as agentic, individualistic, and limitless.2 Erevelles’s characterization of poststructuralism as encouraging limitless possibility would essentially, in Judith Butler’s terms, “restore a figure of a choosing subject,” and ignore the ways in which the poststructuralist theory Erevelles derides actually encourages “collective disidentifications [which] can facilitate a reconceptualization of which bodies matter, and which bodies are yet to emerge as critical matters of concern” (Butler, Bodies x, 4). There is a difference between poststructuralist theory more generally and an academic marketplace which can indeed encourage writing that simply spots difference and transgression. The existence of that academic marketplace (about which both Benedicto and Erevelles are rightly wary) should not obscure the fact that there is far more common ground than her study acknowledges between a critical attention to textuality, discourse, and the slipperiness of signification and the Marxist materialism and collective resistance that Disability and Difference in Global Contexts puts forward.3

Arguing that “we shall need a literary imagination” to supplement conventional forms of political resistance or revolution, Darieck Scott advances, in Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African American Literary Imagination, a reading of bodily and mental distress in the work of Frantz Fanon that both affirms the need for “a reservoir of resistance to the colonizer’s acts of subjugation and enslavement” and attempts to account for what is lost when the complex workings of language and textuality are discounted (94, 65). Scott’s analysis is not explicitly crip, and yet his attention to wounded bodies and minds (the bodies and minds Fanon tended during the Algerian revolution) has much to offer disability studies, especially in relation to resistance. Surveying the ways in which Fanon writes about his patients, Scott particularly attends to the ongoing metaphor of muscular tension. Fanon examines bodies that have been beaten down and broken by colonization and war and sees in those disabled bodies both the need for an active and ongoing resistance to colonization and the potential for that active resistance. Wounded, tense muscles, in Scott’s reading of Fanon, are indicative and anticipatory: they indicate what colonialism and war have done and anticipate an active resistance, by those same bodies, to colonial domination. Fanon can in some ways be aligned with Erevelles here, since— as I have indicated— she too focuses, more than fifty years later, on how disability is often caused by colonialism and capitalism. Like Fanon, moreover, Erevelles looks beyond language and textuality toward forms of active resistance that would counter those systems. Scott, however, while consistently acknowledging that “the need to continue this pursuit [of active resistance] is clear” (9), lingers over the language of abjection, blackness, and woundedness, discovering within it other forms of resistance. Paradoxically, Scott reanimates resistance in and through abjection. If Fanon moves quickly from literal and metaphorical broken bodies and tensed muscles to “the robust selfendorsement” that is ultimately a form of Black Power (9), Scott examines what is lost in a too hasty dismissal of the conviviality, in language, of abjection, blackness, and woundedness. Although it is not at all his intent, Scott excavates an ableism that is inherent to Fanon’s theory and by extension any theory that would conjure away the twisted contours of the literary imagination. Fanon’s postcolonial subject cannot locate value in woundedness and brokenness; resistance only emerges when that subject overcomes his linguistic relegation to abjection, blackness, and disability. Scott, however, pinpoints another form of resistance that is always in circulation around the resistance, power, and consciousness Fanon puts forward. The “fading scars,” to turn toward the title of O’Toole’s memoir, remain scars for Scott. O’Toole’s memoir might be understood as performing, in a different vein, what Scott theorizes, although she more explicitly combines Scott’s literary imagination with the (disability) materialism of Erevelles. O’Toole writes, “My scars define me. I have often wanted to host a Scar Camp where I can celebrate and mourn my scars with other disabled people, where being scarred is the norm. . . . Where we sing and paint and write and perform our scar stories. . . . Scars remind me that the traumas of my past will always accompany me, faded though they may be” (46– 47). Scott would likely argue that “Fanon does not value this form of resistance except as the sketchy lineaments of a figure yet to be fully realized.” Yet this scarred, wounded figure— a figure that is literally disabled but never named as such by Scott— “possesses an intriguing quality: defeated, working within and saturated by the defeat that constitutes its foundation and the limits of its effectiveness, yet not defeated, in such a way that it exceeds the defeat and takes on a powerfulness that the defeat does not quash or necessarily succeed in assimilating” (70– 71). Scott uses the phrase “extravagant abjection” to describe the resistance that is legible in brokenness, wounds, and scars (10). In the remainder of this chapter, I carry Scott’s (and O’Toole’s) theory of resistance to a selection of locations, articulating extravagant abjection to crip tactics that are pushing back against austerity.

Austerity arguably generates extravagant abjection, literally wounding bodies and minds and then metaphorically redoubling that woundedness by pointing to the faded scars and insisting that they merit austerity, as they have no value and supposedly generate no value. Crip/queer theorizing of resistance, I have implied here, is itself a crip tactic that opposes both such austere ways of thinking and austerity as an economic policy. In the rest of this chapter, turning toward what I identify as an excessive crip sociality in the United States, Chile, Spain, Greece, and the UK, I note the ways in which subjects in those locations collectively linger over scars, woundedness, and disability. In Scott’s sense, they take on a powerfulness that defeat does not quash or necessarily succeed in assimilating. The deconstructive potential of language and a desire to find value in abjection are at work in each of the remaining tactics in this chapter, alongside or in and through the more recognizable or legible, active collective resistance that is needed to counter austerity.

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