Cybernetics isn’t conclusive---war machine isn’t a direct result of cybernetics
Hagmann 17 [Jonas Hagmann, 2017, “Security in the Society of Control: The Politics and Practices of Securing Urban Spaces,” International Political Sociology (2017)]\\pairie
Fourth and finally, the control society is associated with implicit and potential political projects and/or drivers. There is a widespread understanding that the perfection of control is fueled by neoliberal politics, the privatization of services, technological advances, and alarmist threat discourses—fear of terrorism especially (Munro 2002; Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth 2009). These elements stimulate an expansion of security dispositives that is uncontrolled and organized at the same time. Security instruments are seen growing horizontally in rhizomatic ways and with little strategic coherence (Rose 2000, 321–322), yet the advent of the control system is nonetheless deemed systematic and thus top-down overall (Coleman and Agnew 2007).2 And indeed, capitalism is recurrently identified as the one authority that, albeit rarely subjected to popular approval, orchestrates the control society and its apparatuses of security, which is why they are often associated with an implicit neoliberal agenda (Reid 2014).3 This political agenda is not the only one possible, of course, and following diagnoses of security dispositives encroaching on democratic politics, it is also not deemed desirable. That is to say that the comprehensiveness, exclusionary practices, totalizing aspirations, and implicit neoliberal inspirations of current security dispositives motivate scholars to critically engage the new control ensembles. Indeed, calls to problematize, resist, or even reject the new control systems abound in the literature (Lacy 2008). And although the components of such strategies or tactics are rarely specified in the scholarly literature (as opposed to activist writings elsewhere; see The Invisible Committee 2009), it is clear from the literature that followed the Postscript that new security dispositives should be met with resistant activities of some sort (Newman 2009; Deseriis 2011; Lundborg 2016). Taken together, it seems no exaggeration to state that with these analytical components, the Deleuzian control thesis advances an impressively rich, integrative, and topical research agenda. Even if the postulation of a neat paradigm shift from “discipline” to “control” seems overstated (Poster 2009)4—the control thesis directs attention to evolving varieties of functionally diverse security actors, the continuing recomposition of material and immaterial security assemblages, the multiple and evolving linkages between security and democratic politics writ large, and novel deterritorialization processes, as well as normative dimensions inherent in 2 It goes without saying that the postulation of a rhizomatic, yet systematic, expansion of security dispositives makes it difficult to identify the precise drivers of the latter process. Deseriis (2011) considers this challenge, to whose clarification Deleuzian scholarship contributed little, to reflect a deeper ambivalence in Marxist theorizing, namely the core question of whether capitalism organizes itself (a rhizomatic perspective set out in Marx’s Grundrisse) or whether it is orchestrated by a “capitalist general” (a systemic reading suggested in Das Kapital). 3 Seemingly, it is also the globalized nature of capitalism that motivates Deleuzian scholars to conclude a global control system—thus confusing characteristics of a driver of control with the nature of security dispositives’ own operation. 4 Since some “Deleuzian elements” had been anticipated or called for by Foucault already, such as the necessity to overcome institution-centric analyses of societal steering (Foucault 2004, 116-118, on the “crisis of disciplinary societies”; also Foucault 1978). Overall, and with the exception of Deleuze’s more explicit concerns with digitalism, privatization, and society’s ability to influence security dispositives perhaps, it thus seems useful to conceive of “control” more as an intensification and spatial expansion of the security arrangements set out by Foucault. Control is not a fundamental rejection of discipline, even if it is defined in relation to the latter. contemporary security management. Doing so, the Deleuzian framework advances a fairly integrative “critical” perspective on the interrelations between security dispositives, democratic politics, and emancipatory practices—indeed, more holistic maybe than the division of academic labor between Foucaultian/Bourdieuan, Arendtian, and Marxist approaches to security research (“Paris, Copenhagen, Aberystwyth”) allows. As important, the control framework allows a variety of highly current empirical observations to be engaged: Deleuzian control studies can address concerns about societies becoming governed ever more intimately in the name of security and about security dispositives becoming more intrusive and ubiquitous (Valverde 2010). It can situate the evolution of such logics and dispositives in broader contemporary processes such as technological innovation (evolving “infrastructural powers”), globalization (the reconfiguration of enclosures and borders), and urbanization (the intensification of the Foucaultian problem of population, or “coexistence”)5; and it can examine these through interscalar lenses (Delaney and Leitner 1997; Brenner 1999), addressing the variegated ways in which international security narratives become localized and local security dispositives transnationalized. Seen this way, the control thesis empowers highly topical and comprehensive accounts of the interplay between security ensembles, democratic politics, and normative choices and allows decidedly empirical “genealogies of governmentality” (Bevir 2010; Joseph 2010) across clinical levels of analysis. This said, a look at the contributions made thus far suggests that the control oriented literature has, in its applications to security, not exploited this potential very systematically. While the literature has offered sophisticated case studies and played a pioneering role in popularizing the control framework in the first place, some of its analyses appear surprisingly incomplete and little differentiated, if not outright overdrawn. Whether security dispositives indeed came to draw so strongly on private agents, for instance, clearly deserves further enquiry (Coleman and Agnew 2007), and so does their alleged reliance on digital instruments and pronounced flexibility (Blomley 2007; Bonelli and Ragazzi 2014; Meiches 2015). Whether the new security ensembles might reformulate democratic politics (Loader and Walker 2007), as opposed to closing it down, has not been answered conclusively, seemingly because the authoritarian penchant of security is considered wellproven among control scholars. The purported presence of global control warrants further analysis—not only because of the mere grandiosity of this statement but also given the literature’s strong reliance on insights from the United Kingdom and North America (e.g., Newman 2009; Vlcek 2010; Hallsworth and Lea 2011), that is, its narrow empirical base. The postulated linearity of the described shifts is counterintuitive, considering the genealogical method and ethos on which Deleuzian work draws, and the emphasis on terrorism as the most immediate justification for new control arrangements points to an exceedingly rapid reduction of security affairs to 9/11 discourses. Whether resistant practices are still to come, finally, is also a point to explore further, for most security studies applications of Deleuze’s control argument derive such need from the technical intrusiveness of new security instruments, not from an empirically verified absence of opposition to control ensembles (Merlingen 2006).Considering these limitations, it is important to challenge the Deleuzian control literature for its selectivity, its merits notwithstanding (Valverde 2010). Instead of providing holistic and contextualized accounts of contemporary security management and its variation across time and space, as its analytical set-up would permit (Goldstein 2010), its empirical contributions still emphasize some actors, instruments, and processes and ignore others. Today, such partial engagement with evolving security assemblages is little conducive to fostering a grounded understanding.