Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

LAWS increase the risk of war and encourages militaries to kill civilians

Payne 16

(This CRS report was written by Thomas B. Payne, U.S. Air Force Fellow. 4-14-2016, Congressional Research Service, "Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for Congress," https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44466.html#_Toc448405890//mb24)

Likelihood of War/Jus Ad Bellum A common concern regarding the development of LAWS is that it will encourage inappropriate aggression.86 The justification for initiating armed conflict is generally described by the concept of jus ad bellum, or Just War theory.87 However, although sometimes couched as such, the concern that LAWS will lead to more warfare is not actually a legal one, since use of LAWS does not affect the legal evaluation of the propriety of war initiation.88 Rather, the argument is that LAWS would create a moral hazard for national leadership. This presupposes that current or future leaders are willing and desire to engage in unlawful war-making but are inhibited by the likelihood that it will result in military casualties, either for moral reasons or because of spin-off effects of those casualties.89 If these suppositions are accurate, then LAWS would appear to increase the likelihood that leaders would engage in unlawful aggression since it would minimize these casualties. Some argue, however, that this objection seems excessively generic.90 They contend that any weapon system that minimizes casualties, or gives a substantial advantage to one side in armed conflict, would trigger this same moral hazard.91 Uncontrolled Arms Race Another potential risk to the development of LAWS that has been noted is that it will trigger wider arms races.92 This argument takes two forms. First, that because of the tremendous tactical advantage associated with the development of LAWS, peer and near-peer competitors will be forced to develop autonomous capabilities for their own weapon systems.93 Second, asymmetric competitors, such as international terrorist organizations, would have access to the technology once it becomes widely used in warfare.94 For both of these versions of an "arms race," one harm contemplated, in addition to the inherent instability associated with arms race dynamics95, is that competitors will have either less incentive or less capacity to control the behavior of LAWS, resulting in development or fielding of LAWS that fail to comply with the laws of war (generally, this is conceived as competitors developing indiscriminate LAWS, since automation is far easier to accomplish than discrimination or ethical decision-making).96 A number of counterpoints have been presented to this risk. First, many contend that an arms race is already in progress, with peer and near-peer competitors currently developing autonomous weapon systems—regardless of U.S. development of these systems.97 It is argued these nations would refuse to adopt, or successfully evade enforcement of, any potential multilateral ban.98 Second, it is argued that asymmetric competitors may be capable of taking advantage of technological development, particularly civilian sector advancements, even if not actively developed for military purposes by nation-states.99 Under this argument, once the basics of autonomy in machines are developed for civilian purposes, weaponization of these autonomous systems is relatively trivial.100 Asymmetric Warfare Another risk associated by some with the development of LAWS is an increased likelihood of attacks on civilian targets, particularly in the United States itself.101 The argument is that the development of LAWS will result in the absence of U.S. soldiers from the war zone. Enemies of the United States, it is argued, will see no political/strategic benefit in attempting to fight, or carry out attacks on autonomous weapon systems if the United States is not suffering human casualties. The opponent, under this argument, is therefore incentivized to carry out attacks on civilian rather than military targets.102 Counter-arguments presented by others include at least one made against the discussion in the "Likelihood of War/Jus Ad Bellum" section above, in that any generic technological advantage that makes U.S. service-members less susceptible to enemy attack appears to create the same risk.103 In the same vein, a DOD analyst has noted that this argument essentially "blames the victim," by discouraging protection of soldiers because of the enemy's presumed willingness to violate the laws of war by assaulting civilians.104 Finally, it has been pointed out, considering the history of nuclear strategy as well as terrorist targeting, that both peers and asymmetric opponents are not generally reluctant to place civilians in jeopardy if it serves strategic ends, and therefore the presence or absence of U.S. casualties away from the battlefield is irrelevant.105

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.