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Realism isn’t inevitable, but their assertion is informed by masculinity—it assumes that each actor perceives its national identity in the same away, as separate from gender hierarchies that make states compete for survival in the first place.

Sjoberg 14

(Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science with an affiliation with the Center for Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Florida. Her research has focused on theoretical and empirical approaches to gender and security, including war theorizing and the study of women’s violence, Gender, War, and Conflict, Polity Press, JKS)

This discussion (albeit briefly) makes the case that a struc- tural gender order can be seen as reflected in state identities, state relative power, and processes of state interaction, the places where Waltz suggests structure shows. Most mainstream scholarship on the causes of war at the international system level comes from the tradition of structural realism (see Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). I argue that gender analysis has something to add both to neorealist system-level theories of war and to system-level theories that fall outside of the neorealist paradigm. In order to see the value-added of gender analysis, a brief discussion of those theories is necessary. Structural realists suggest that the international system structure (how it works) is anarchical - that there is no government among states, and that this anarchy is key in shaping how states behave (Waltz 1986). Drawing from political theory that suggests that, before government, life for people was "nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 1996 [1651]), realists contend that a similar reality currently rules in the inter- national system. Without a government to protect their rights, enforce rules, and defend their survival, states can only rely on and trust themselves (Waltz 1979). This creates an incentive to behave competitively with other states, since survival in anarchy is, in this interpretation, a game where one either kills or is killed (Waltz 1979). Some structural realists are called offensive realists - they suggest that states go out, find, and take resources in order to maximize their relative power (Elman 2004; Mearsheimer 2001). Others are defensive real- ists - they suggest that states amass resources to defend themselves in the event that other states attack them (Walt 1987; Taliaferro 2000/1). Both see states as fundamentally competitive, and that competition as deriving from the anarchical international system structure. They therefore see sur- vival as states' primary concern, and relative power as the way that states ensure survival. While neorealist approaches dominate system-level war theorizing, their critics also sometimes theorize the causes of war at the system level. Neoliberal system-level theorist David Lake (1996, 2009), for example, agrees with the realists that the international system anarchy causes conflict, but dis- agrees with the realist assertion that the resultant conflict is inevitable. Lake and other neoliberal war theorists suggest that the violence of anarchy can be tempered by positive state relationships and effective utilization of international law (e.g., Keohane 1986). Marxist theorists also sometimes see a system-level cause of war, but they locate it in what they have identified as the capitalist world-system, rather than interna- tional anarchy (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995; Wallerstein 1984). These theorists are arguing that the international system is not anarchic, but organized by global capitalist trade, and that it is that organization which inspires state competitiveness and (therefore) violence. All of these theories share the assumption that the international system struc- ture is gender-neutral; an assumption I argue is problem- atic. I suggest that gender order is part of the international system structure (see Sjoberg 2012 for an expansion of this argument). It is possible to use Waltz's properties of the international system to build an understanding of the ways that system is gendered. Waltz describes system anarchy as "invisible" (1979: 82) and suggests that the invisibility of the interna- tional structure is how observers know that it does not exist - that the system is anarchical. He then explains that, though no one can see anarchy, it has observable implications: a structure is the principle by which the system is ordered, the mechanism of specification of functions of different units within the system, and the distributor of capabilities across those units (Waltz 1979: 81). More accessibly, Waltz expects an international system (whether anarchy or government, which are in his mind the only possible structures) to be the logic by which states function, the determinant of what states do, and the distributor of relative power among them. Waltz sees anarchy as playing this role, where, because there is no government, states' logics prioritize survival, states become primarily providers of order and defense, and states' relative power is measured by military capability (Waltz 1959: 233). The biggest faulty assumption that Waltz and other sys- tem-level scholars of war make in this logic is that a structure must be visible to exist. In the discussions of women's and men's roles in wars in Chapters 2 and 3, gender analysis routinely confronted roles that people play in wars that are invisible in war narratives. It also revealed narrative limits on people's roles in wars that come from the invisible gendered logics of war. In other words, no one writes out wars' gen- dered scripts; wars have just come to function with those ideal-typical gender roles as a crucial element. While it is possible to see manifestations of gender orders everywhere - from women's economic inequalities to the ways men and women are expected to dress - it is not possible to see gender orders. Perhaps the international system contains a gender order that Waltz could not see? The evidence discussed above that gender hierarchy provides an ordering principle for the international system, specifies the functions of units, and distributes capabilities among them suggests the existence of such a gender order. Seeing a gender order as part of the international system structure has implications for ways to think about war and conflict. Structural IR theorists see international anarchy as a permissive cause of war - war is possible because there is no government between states. Though that may be true, other theorists (e.g., Suganami 1996) argue that there is nothing inherent in anarchy that necessitates the competition that we see between states. There is, however, something essential about structural gender hierarchy that necessitates (gendered) competition. Since gender-based traits are often measured relatively, structural gender hierarchy provides an incentive for not only competition but also competition for relative position along gender hierarchies - the very sort of competition that states engage in regularly in the interna- tional arena. Seeing gender hierarchy as a permissive cause of war, then, explains more about the possibility of war than seeing anarchy as the only system-structural principle.

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