The disad reinforces a gendered understanding of Putin’s national identity, which turns the DA
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(Oleg Riabov & Tatiana Riabova (2014), Oleg Riabov is professor of philosophy and director of the Center for Ethnic and Nationalism Studies at Ivanovo State University, Russia. Tatiana Riabova is professor of sociology at Ivanovo State University The Remasculinization of Russia?, Problems of Post-Communism, 61:2, 23-35, DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216610202, JKS)
Representing Nations: Masculinizing Us, Feminizing Them
In addition to establishing Putin as a symbol of national masculinity, the remasculinization of Russia requires the attachment of masculine attributes to the image of the nation itself. Carol Cohn points out, “to be abstract, logical, or dispassionate is not simply to be those things but also to be manly. And to be manly is not simply to be manly but also to be in the more highly valued position in the discourse. In other words, to exhibit a trait on that list is not neutral—it is not simply displaying some basic human characteristics. It also positions you in a discourse of gender. It associates you with a particular gender, and also with a higher or lower valuation.”50 In examining the gender connotations of Russia’s new image, we focus on such characteristics as independence and strength. First, these characteristics are dominant components of masculinity in modern cultures. Second, they have become marked as really masculine in the post-Soviet period, as survey results show.51 Moreover, independence has a clear gender association, especially in contemporary Russia. In analyzing the customs of post-Soviet societies, Elena Gapova writes, when poor, women still remain women (and even feminine): they are women “by the virtue of their bodies,” and hardly anything can change this perception of what they are. Not so with men: manhood is not about their bodies (or not only about their bodies), and those lacking affluence lack a big part of what constitutes masculinity. I refer here to the social construction of normative masculinity, which explains why the man pays for dinner at the restaurant. The reverse would also be true, i.e., paying for dinner makes him a man.52 In the 1990s, Russia’s dependence on foreign aid was evaluated as evidence of the country’s lack of self-determination and hence nonmasculinity. The idea of “sovereign democracy” became an ideological cornerstone of Putin’s second term. Sovereignty is seen as an opportunity for Russia to decide its own fate, to render it less dependent on international financial organizations, to make it a subject rather than an object in world politics, to lay claim to a measure of self-sufficiency—these are precisely the things credited to Putin’s rule. The second essential trait of the new image of Russia is strength. One might even describe a cult of strength in Russia—whether applied to national military might, athletic achievements, or the fitness of national leaders. Meriting our attention are Putin’s comments on the terrorist attack in Beslan in September 2004: “We displayed weakness, and the weak are always beaten.”53 In 2012, Putin wrote in his preelection article, “we should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak.”54 The results of sociological surveys in Russia attest that these claims by Kremlin leaders reflect the opinion of many Russians. In 2003, one Russian sociological foundation asked respondents to complete the sentence “I would like the world to regard Russia as . . .” Forty-eight percent of respondents wished to represent the country as mighty or invincible; 22 percent chose wealthy or prosperous; and 9 percent picked independent. Only 6 percent preferred the perception of Russia as an educated or cultured nation, and 3 percent favored peaceful or friendly.55 The growing popularity of Russia’s “bear” image serves as an indirect confirmation of the trend toward cultivating strength as an attribute of Russians. This popularity, to be sure, has another source as well. It was generated by United Russia, whose logo is a polar bear. 56 At the same time, one should take into account that people of various political sympathies support this symbol. Its strength and ability to defend itself makes the bear the best symbol of the nation in the eyes of many Russians. As indicated by our sociological survey and interviews held in Russia (2009), strength is the primary trait associated with the bear as an allegory of Russia.57 Along with the “Russian bear,” the other image intended to demonstrate the country’s growing strength is “Russia rising from its knees,” which first appeared in Putin’s rhetoric in September 1999.58 This image, in fact, has served as one of most important means of legitimating power, especially in the 2012 presidential campaign.59 “Russia has once and for all risen from its knees. Now it is taking the next step: putting the rest of the world on its knees”—so journalists venomously commented on Dmitry Medvedev’s Foreign Policy Concept, proclaimed early in his presidency.60 As David Campbell points out, identity is constituted in relation to differences, while differences are constituted in relation to identity.61 Representations of the Other thus serve as a necessary part of an ideal image of Self. As social identity theory postulates, the desire for a positive identity, one of the basic needs of human beings, is realized not only by improving the image of the Self but also by worsening the image of the Other.62 The reverse side of remasculinization is demasculinizing Others, both external and internal, in mass-media discourse and political rhetoric. This symbolic demasculinization has been applied to the former “fraternal countries” of Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states—particularly those that have undergone color revolutions. Political opposition by these states to Russian interests is often attributed to U.S. influence, with the states themselves portrayed as lacking sovereignty and independence—hence masculinity. Metaphors and images further demasculinize the neighbors. The case of Ukraine serves as a good example. In the gas supply dispute of 2006, a Russian television program described Ukraine as a Mammonish kept woman, a “flighty Ukrainian mistress” (TVTS-Postskriptum, March 26, 2006). Protestors at a demonstration near the U.S. Embassy in Moscow held a poster with the slogan “A Gentleman Always Pays for His Girlfriend,” calling on the United States to pay off Ukraine’s debts to Russia. In criticizing the Ukrainian leaders’ politics during the next gas war in 2009, Putin compared transit counties with an overly picky girl: “They should have no illusions; the girls should have no illusions: the groom has other choices; they have to understand.”63 The other target of criticism is Poland, especially during Lech Kaczyński’s presidency. It is no wonder that the Polish professor Włodzimierz Marciniak considers the image of Poland as a prostitute the most widespread stereotype among Russians. In his opinion, this stereotype has its sources in Russians’ attitudes toward the world: they believe that only large states have a say; the rest can only sell themselves.64 Indeed, Russian newspaper articles often mention “sponsors of Poland,” and users of Internet forums frequently evoke the metaphor of prostitution.65 Furthermore, Poland’s military and political weakness is emphasized, especially in contrast to the strength of the Russian bear.66 The West traditionally serves as the most important Other for Russian identity. Analyzing the remarkable shift in Russians’ perceptions of Us and Them, Edward Lucas points out that in the mid-2000s, the West ceased to be an indisputable moral authority for Russia.67 The same point applies to gender issues. In the 1990s, Western masculinity—above all, American masculinity— was considered a model, while Western civilization was endowed with masculine characteristics (strength, rationality, independence, individualism). In the 2000s, the situation changed, as reflected in various types of discourse.