Their seemingly benign understanding of terror only regenerates masculine war-making.
Athanassiou 12
(Cerelia, PhD candidate at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) at the University of Bristol, UK. Her research is on conceptualisations of security post-9/11, focusing specifically on the discursive strategies used by the Obama administration to disempower the Global War on Terror., ‘Gutsy’ Decisions and Passive Processes ¶ THE WARRIOR DECISION-MAKER AFTER THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2014, Vol. 16, No. 1, 6–25, JKS)
Analytically, the exceptionality of the GWOT most usefully serves in high- lighting its continuities with ‘normal’ politics (see Grewal 2005: 197; Puar 2007: 76; Richter-Montpetit 2007: 40; Parpart and Zalewski 2008: 5). The effects of the Obama administration’s efforts to roll back the GWOT’s overt militarization with a ‘return to the rule of law’ do not signify change from the masculine ‘war machine’, but rather generate this ‘war machine’s’ very conditions of existence. It is, after all, the warrior’s logic that is privileged and channelled through every decision, and it is this logic that subordinates other, seemingly more passive, processes. The Washington Post editorial on the killing of Osama bin Laden quoted Senator Lindsey Graham’s rationaliz- ation of the decision to kill and not capture: ‘From a Navy Seal perspective, you had to believe that this guy [Osama bin Laden] was a walking IED [impro- vised explosive device]’ (Washington Post 2011). A militarized understanding and treatment of ‘national security’ continues to re-write itself into the ¶ workings of the State, enabling the hegemonic masculinity of the warrior decision-maker to keep privileging itself, preventing meaningful change from happening. If we heed Enloe’s (2000: 3) invaluable advice on the matter, we notice that these are exactly the workings of militarization, and through that, of a continuing GWOT: ‘The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal’. It is this veneration of militarism, and its associated gender and race hierarchies, that offer the clue on the lack of change. ¶ Obama’s insistence on reintroducing the rule of law went against the tra- ditional understanding of ‘security’ because masculine posturing, not feminine public negotiation, is traditionally seen as being most effective in protecting the nation-state and its ‘women and children’ (Enloe 2007: 60–1). However, articulations on the importance of the law also prop up the warrior’s agenda: Abdulmutallab’s prosecution is an aspect of an operation geared pre- cisely towards achieving the effects of the bin Laden episode (see Cohen 2011). With the most recent debates centring on the validity of extrajudicially killing US citizens, we are shown a system in which the status of the warrior has not diminished (see Holder 2012), despite the promise in 2008 that different atti- tudes might be prioritized. Carver (2008: 84) provides valuable support here, because he points to the overarching framework of international politics that ‘incorporates a myth of a unitary, unproblematic masculinised being – “warrior man”/“economic man” – whose world is not in fact bifurcated by a war/peace distinction, but is rather one world of competitive, aggressive, self- interested and somewhat paranoid strategic interaction’ (emphasis in original). In such a framework, the ‘rational decision-maker’ alone cannot deliver any meaningful change when he is so closely correlated to the ‘warrior’; this was demonstrated by Obama’s reintroduction of the ‘rule of law’ only to keep subor- dinating it to the demands of the GWOT’s framework of war. The hegemonic masculinity of the executive decision-maker clearly has to privilege warrior definitions of ‘toughness’ over dangerous forays into public deliberation and accountability; and that is the masculine reality of national security.