Alternatives are worse.
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard 21, assistant professor of political science at the University of Oslo, member of the Oslo Nuclear Project, 8/23/2021, " Anti-Nuclear Sentiment and the Continuing Relevance of Nuclear Deterrence," Policy Roundtable: The Future of Trans-Atlantic Nuclear Deterrence, Chapter 5, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-trans-atlantic-nuclear-deterrence/, RMax
This past January, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, after 50 states ratified it.83 This disarmament treaty is unlikely to contribute to reducing nuclear arsenals, given that no nuclear weapons state has expressed any interest in joining it. But the treaty does capture a contemporary sentiment among many non-nuclear NATO member states: that nuclear deterrence is unfashionable, untenable, and out of date. Civil society movements and political youth parties in Europe are pushing the treaty’s agenda hard.84 Nuclear deterrence, to them, has run its course.
The humanitarian rationale for never employing nuclear weapons is compelling and a key reason for the popularity of this anti-nuclear sentiment across Europe.85 It remains a fact that nuclear weapons can bring existential destruction to humanity. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock concludes that we are closer than ever to midnight.86
But the security policy rationale for discarding nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence without thoroughly assessing their alternative is much less compelling. The argument that nuclear deterrence is outdated is detached from the rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons: to enhance states security. It disregards contemporary risks of great-power confrontation. Most critically, it fails to consider what alternative security measures states are likely to take in the absence of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Weapons and the Pursuit of Security
States that have, or aspire to have, nuclear capabilities do so because of a perceived security need. There is a reason nuclear weapons remain “the absolute weapon.” The potential of nuclear weapons to shape the behavior of other states is simply unique, as characterized by Bernard Brodie.87 The nine states that have acquired nuclear weapons have done so to provide security against what they perceive to be the most pressing threats they are facing, whether nuclear or conventional.
The latter point is important. Not all nuclear weapons states have pursued nuclear capability to match or deter a nuclear threat. Some states seek to influence a conventionally superior or geographically dominant enemy. The utility of nuclear weapons is not universal across nuclear weapons states. Each state’s needs differ, including in relation to other available options they have for preserving their own security. For Pakistan, for example, nuclear weapons remain an essential tool for influencing a conventionally superior India. The states that derive security from nuclear weapons, through their own possession of those weapons or through security guarantees from other nuclear states, will have to pursue that security by other means in the absence of nuclear weapons. This must inform our analysis of the consequences of prohibiting them.
Renewed Great-Power Competition and the Risk of Conflict
The idea that nuclear deterrence is outdated is out of sync with the contemporary security policy context. International relations today are deeply colored by renewed great-power competition between the United States, Russia, and China. The changing distribution of power may produce less peaceful outcomes than what we have seen over the past 70 years. U.S. think tanks keep churning out reports on how the United States should best compete against China.88 China’s leaders remain convinced that the United States is determined to prevent its inevitable rise. Russia is determined to remain a great power, while the United States depicts Russia as a declining power and displays little interest in considering Russian security concerns.
To all these great powers, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain a critical security guarantee. Of the three, Russia seems to rely the most on its nuclear weapons. But the United States also relies on nuclear weapons to deter and manage potential crises with either of the other two countries. Its nuclear arsenal is being modernized to fit this bill.89 Some argue nuclear weapons play a lesser role in Chinese strategy as compared to U.S. and Russian nuclear strategies,90 but recent changes in Chinese nuclear policy raise renewed concerns about Chinese nuclear intentions.91
How nuclear weapons influence the risk of conflict is contested. Many argue that nuclear weapons contribute to deterring great-power conflict and point to the fact that the Cold War remained cold.92 Although this claim is difficult to prove, we do know that nuclear weapons contributed to significantly shaping superpower behavior in this era. Moreover, nuclear weapons states clearly have faith in this logic. On the other hand, one could argue that nuclear weapons pose a significant and growing risk in the event of a conflict. Any conflict in which the great powers perceive that their vital national interests are at stake would likely go nuclear, unless one side were to concede to the other’s demands. Many point to novel risks of entanglement because of an increased commingling of nuclear and conventional strike systems.93 Other emerging technologies may also reduce crisis stability and increase the risk of nuclear escalation.94
What Are the Alternatives?
So, should we trade known risks for unknown ones? We do not know how the partial or full absence of nuclear weapons would affect relations among the great powers. This raises two critical questions. The first is whether conventional weapons can serve to deter nuclear threats. The second is what a conventionalized deterrence landscape would look like.
Consider a world in which more states sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, including some NATO allies, but in which the nuclear weapons states remain reluctant to engage. Putting aside questions about whether it would be possible to remain a NATO member while in the treaty,95 or whether NATO as an alliance would survive this, treaty proponents argue that NATO members that choose to sign the treaty should rely on conventional capabilities to deter nuclear threats. But is this viable?
Most scholars argue that conventional weapons are less effective deterrent tools than nuclear weapons.96 The rapid and unprecedented destruction caused by nuclear weapons sets them apart. Making the threat of conventional denial or punishment credible requires more than nuclear threats: Conventional weapons inflict less damage than do nuclear weapons and can be easier to defend against than nuclear weapons. For these reasons, a larger amount of conventional precision-strike munitions are needed to deter nuclear threats as compared to nuclear weapons.97 The potential of conventional missiles is untested in a contested environment. Sustained arms racing also serves to undermine the deterrent effect of conventional weapons. States that rely on conventional deterrence may have to demonstrate their conventional capabilities on a more regular basis, which could increase the rate and intensity of conflicts.
A partly or fully conventionalized deterrence landscape could be less stable and more conflict prone than the current one. The increased U.S. reliance on conventional deterrence has not led others to follow suit. Instead, U.S. conventional preponderance has produced an increased adversary emphasis on nuclear threats.98 Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has promised nuclear first use in response to the conventional counterforce threat from U.S. precision-guided munitions. These Russian nuclear threats to go first have now produced a changed U.S. deterrence strategy with expanded nuclear options.99 Nuclear weapons remain the only credible deterrent of nuclear employment. Although China seemingly relies more on conventional than nuclear deterrence, its nuclear deterrent remains oriented toward the potential threat from U.S. nuclear first use in a large-scale conflict. For China, U.S. conventional capabilities to deny China its objectives in the Asian-Pacific theater are potentially of diminishing concern. U.S. nuclear capabilities to target the Chinese homeland are seemingly not.
U.S. nuclear weapons are likely one factor inhibiting even more aggressive Chinese and Russian policies in their respective neighborhoods. A world without nuclear weapons could produce more frequent albeit less destructive wars. These could cause destruction and devastation of a kind that we have not seen since the last world war. Although we cannot know, it may be that nuclear weapons will contribute to preserving the peace among great powers. The consequences of removing them from deliberations over the costs of aggression are unknown.
The idea of nuclear deterrence is old, even old-fashioned. However, the security threats nuclear weapons continue to mitigate are as pressing as ever. Although the idea of abolishing these weapons may seem attractive to publics and politicians alike, the implications of their abolition are complex and uncertain. Reducing this uncertainty through a more thorough debate over how states will take measures to secure themselves, absent nuclear weapons, is critical. That discussion is fundamental to determine whether a world without nuclear weapons would be a more peaceful one.