France umbrella goes nuclear – escalate-to-de-escalate posture and geography guarantee it
Christine Leah 17, former Chauncey Postdoctoral Associate at Yale University, 2/14/17, “A European Nuclear Deterrent?” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/14/a-european-nuclear-deterrent/
The point is that any country, such as France, that wishes to extend nuclear deterrence in the future would have to significantly change its current posture, which evolved without considering these issues. It could be, for example, that extended deterrence by its nature encourages larger arsenals. Is it reasonable to imagine that France would significantly expand and diversify its arsenal to ensure a second-strike capability not only for the purposes of central deterrence but for extended deterrence as well? Sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), for instance, have a crucial advantage in this respect, since they are less vulnerable to attack than land-based ICBMs and manned bombers. Would France send its force de frappe to sea in a big way? Could it?
Another important distinction is geography. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed vast acreage, making the notion of waging an initially limited nuclear war at least theoretically plausible. It was possible to imagine nuclear exchanges at the margins in defense of allies that left both homelands basically viable. France is probably too small for that, besides which, for that reason and perhaps others, French policymakers never accepted the notion of limited nuclear war, or riposte graduée. France instead relies on an ultime avertissement “ultimate warning,” which seems to rule out the concept of escalation control for the sake of starting-point credibility. The ability and willingness to escalate a small confrontation to higher levels of exchange is a critical component of the credibility of extended deterrence, and the ability and willingness to “fight” a nuclear war, both limited and full-scale, falls into that logic. These two elements—geography and the associated dynamics of both conventional and nuclear escalation—meant that the United States and the Soviet Union had more “time” compared to other potential nuclear dyads, both before and during a nuclear exchange. France doesn’t have these chops, and neither would Japan if it decides to go nuclear. India makes for an interesting question in this regard.
Still other issues beg attention. One is allied dialogue and communication on nuclear strategy. The NATO nuclear planning group and extended deterrence committees with South Korea and Japan since 2010 formally discuss these things. New suppliers of extended deterrence would have to establish such formal consultative bodies for their security guarantees to be credible. Communication, especially in the face of threats, is everything.
More specifically, American extended deterrence was shaped by the rigid structure of the Cold War in such a way that secondary and tertiary issues fell below the political threshold of nuclear threats and protections. In short, the number of triggers for a nuclear crisis was relatively small. But if the nuclear club in the Asia-Pacific were to grow robustly beyond North Korea, a host of new issues might multiply the number of triggers: strong emotional nationalism, territorial disputes, very asymmetric conventional and nuclear balances, the maritime context, and the vulnerability of “young” C3I systems among many.
Just as important, whereas the U.S.-Soviet engagement was both global and bipolar, engagement would be regional and multipolar, especially in Asia. Under such conditions, calculating deterrence sufficiency becomes very difficult. Smaller nuclear arsenals, too, are much more vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, and hence parties are more likely to adopt launch-on-warning or launch-on-attack postures. Each party’s nuclear doctrines, postures, and chains of command would not be clear to the other players. They might therefore be much more risk-averse, but risk aversion would probably be offset by doctrines of first-use, pre-delegation to forward-deployed and widely dispersed weapons, and geographical proximity.
The main point is that the general context of strategic interaction during the Cold War cannot be superimposed readily on other situations. Such a simple-minded superimposition was wrong when it was applied to Iraq before 2003. It was wrong when it was (and sometimes still is) applied to Iran or North Korea. And it is wrong when applied to France or Japan or any other would-be security provider.