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End of nuclear sharing with Germany causes extinction.

Rafael Loss 20, European Leadership Network, 2020, “A plea for realism in Germany’s nuclear sharing debate,” https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/a-plea-for-realism-in-germanys-nuclear-sharing-debate/

Dr Mützenich is mistaken. The removal of US nuclear weapons from German soil would undermine the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and, ultimately, increase the likelihood of war in Europe, including that of nuclear use. Exiting nuclear sharing would also raise concerns in the Baltics and Eastern Europe about Germany’s commitment to protect its immediate neighbourhood, end Germany’s influence over launching nuclear strikes, render German preferences less relevant for US policy, remove a geostrategic barrier to Russian armament and unduly jeopardise the already strained relations with Moscow.

To be sure, the pace of nuclear disarmament has slowed since the 1990s. This liberal interlude saw the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the nuclear powers have also cut their nuclear arsenals by some 75% since the mid-1980s, an estimated 13,355 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of nine countries today. This reduction contains an important unilateral component; the United States and Russia, which possess the vast majority of global warheads, have reduced mostly very expensive, excess stockpiles.

But the pace of disarmament has slowed due to dramatic changes in the international security environment. If in the 1990s, Russia appeared to be a strategic partner for the West, then Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which led to its demise, are only the latest indicators for Russia’s re-emergence as a geopolitical competitor. President Putin’s 2005 state of the union speech, in which he ‘described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”’, announced this shift in Moscow’s strategic thinking. Moscow judged that Western hegemony denied Russia its rightful great-power status. A more disruptive Russian foreign policy based on power politics, zero-sum games and spheres of influence was more suitable for recalibrating the global order to better accommodate Russian interests. As President Putin put it at the 2007 Munich Security Conference: ‘we must seriously think about the architecture of global security…[to achieve] a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue’.

The existing Western rules-based order is incompatible with Moscow’s stated objectives. Dr Mützenich’s claim that ‘we [the SPD] orient ourselves not only on our own, national interest, but also consider the interests of other countries, because we know that we can only be strong together’, is thus ideologically commendable but divorced from the geopolitical realities. Unilaterally exiting nuclear sharing is at odds with the SPD’s insistence that German foreign policy must be multilateral and in the European interest. It would prompt questions in the Baltics and Eastern Europe about Germany’s stated commitment to protect its immediate neighbourhood. And yes, Canada and Greece ended nuclear sharing in 1984 and 2001, respectively. But that is precisely why continuity is needed. As the US ambassadors to Poland and Germany warned, Germany’s exit from allied nuclear sharing would ‘diminish nuclear capability and weaken NATO’ by ‘eroding the solidarity that undergirds NATO’s nuclear deterrent’. Another unilateral weakening of the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture—whether through Russia’s violation of arms control agreements or the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from German territory—does not strengthen European security; it merely removes the legal and geostrategic barriers to Russian armament. An arms race could ensue, bringing volatility rather than predictability to European security. Volatility increases the risk of escalation, whether accidental or intentional, including the probability of a nuclear exchange. Instead of unilaterally removing an important element of the security architecture, the SPD should encourage measures to increase strategic stability.

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