Essentialist/narrow
Securitization is narrow – solely focused on dominant actors and threats to security
Šulovic, 10 --- BCSP Intern (Vladimir Šulovic, " Meaning of Security and the Theory of Securitization", 10/5/10, PDC, http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00006385/01/Security_Theory_Securitization.pdf)//EG
The securitization framework has been a useful tool to analysts who want to challenge the notion of the objectivity of security threats. The framework is elegant and has generated much academic interest and sparked the number of critiques and debates, aiming to broaden and further specify the framework in order to increase its logical coherence and explanatory power. However important and innovative contribution to our understanding of security may it be, the securitization framework is problematically narrow. First, the form of act constructing security is defined narrowly, with the main focus on the speech of dominant actors, usually political leaders, which encourages an interpretation that securitization is only happening when there are discursive interventions of those who are institutionally legitimate to speak on behalf of a particular political community (usually a state). This also excludes a focus on other forms of representations, such as images or material practices. (McDonald, 2008: 564). Thus, the focus is on the speech and its performative power to construct security. At the same time, the conceptual framework of securitization puts a special emphasis on the acceptance of the audience which is claimed to be essential in the successful securitization process. Contextual factors, which the Copenhagen school terms facilitating conditions, help explain why some securitizing moves are more likely to be accepted by the audience than the other. These facilitating conditions are taken as givens that either help or hinder securitization but are not conceptualized as constitutive of the speech acts, which is at odds with the claim that security is a social construction. There is tension between understanding securitization as a productive process by focusing on the performative power of the speech act, and as a constructed process by claiming that security is intersubjectively constituted. This tension gave rise to critique by the so-called Second Generation of securitization analysts who argue that securitization can not be properly understood outside historical and cultural context in which security discourse takes place. Thus, the very meaning of security is contextual. Finally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security (McDonald, 2008: 564). This claim is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Waever, 1995: 56). Sometimes it is more effective if security is conceptualized in terms of normative goals that should be achieved or expression of the core values that are in need of being protected, than if it is articulated only in terms of “from what and from whom it needs protection”. Thus, seeing security as something negative per se does not represent a logical imperative anymore.
Securitization’s focus on dominant voices silences marginal populations
McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG
To date I have focused on the ‘narrowness’ of the securitization framework in analytical terms, suggesting the possibility for strengthening the framework by drawing out important elements of context and different forms of representation, for example, while also pointing to the limits and tensions within the framework that might make this difficult. I have also suggested in these contexts that it is important to avoid viewing the framework as shorthand for the broader construction of security. The question of which actors’ representations are viewed as significant within this framework, however, entails important normative commitments and has important normative implications. Put simply, the securitization framework focuses on articulations capable of leading to change in practice, with the default position being a focus on the ‘securitizations’ of political leaders who are able to achieve a wide audience in their statements and interventions, and who are able to marshal the resources of the state to respond European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 574 to the existential threat. As Wæver (1995: 57) argues, ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’. Such a focus serves to marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics, presenting them at best as part of an audience that can collectively consent to or contest securitizing moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite discourses. In perhaps the clearest statement of this limitation, Lene Hansen (2000) has discussed the ways in which the focus on speech acts means contributing to the silencing of women, whose suffering and engagement with security discourses is neglected in a framework that focuses on the articulations of the powerful: of those whose voices can be heard and of those whose successful attempts at securitization can result in the enactment of emergency measures. Such a framework clearly has little to say about the plight of the most vulnerable in global politics and their experiences of — and engagement with — security and threat. Indeed for Hansen, the Copenhagen School does not simply neglect the experiences of women but in fact serves to further marginalize them. ‘If security is a speech act’, Hansen (2000: 306) suggests, ‘then it is simultaneously deeply implicated in the production of silence’. In many ways this focus on dominant voices in the construction of security is not a problem for the Copenhagen School alone. Traditional security proponents and some post-structuralists limit the number of actors deemed important in security terms in focusing on either state policy or dominant discourses. While Copenhagen School proponents allow the possibility for security actors and ‘securitizers’ other that state political leaders (Buzan et al., 1998: 31–3), this move is ultimately closed off by the dual suggestions that security is ultimately about states (e.g. Wæver, 1989: 314; Wæver, 1995: 47–9) and that security is articulated from a position of institutional power (Wæver, 1995: 57; Buzan et al., 1998: 32–3). The default position here is therefore a focus on the political leaders of states and their designations of threat. The methodological focus on speech acts might also be seen as relevant to this bias. As Jennifer Milliken (1999: 243–5) has argued, the tendency to ignore subjugated knowledge or voices is a general inclination within discourse analytical approaches to international relations. In short, the focus only on dominant voices and their designation of security and threat is normatively problematic, contributing to the silencing of marginal voices and ignoring the ways in which such actors have attempted precisely to contest these security constructions. But it also has problematic implications analytically. First, and echoing criticisms noted above, it pays insufficient attention to the means through which particular articulations of security and threat become possible: how, for example, are marginal actors and their articulations of security silenced or marginalized? Focusing on these marginalized or subjugated actors could point to some of the ways in McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 575 which ‘securitization’ becomes possible, expanding the emphasis on ‘contexts’ noted in the previous section. Second, it arguably encourages the particular logic of security which the Copenhagen School embraces. A range of (often marginal) actors contest dominant logics or discourses of security and threat through articulating alternative (even emancipatory) discourses of security and threat rather than simply arguing for ‘desecuritization’. Amnesty International’s campaign on human rights violations against Kurdish populations in Turkey in the 1990s, for example, particularly questioned the justification of these violations on the grounds of ‘security’. This was reflected in the title of its publication, Turkey: No Security Without Human Rights. For such actors, security (defined in non-statist, non-exclusionary and non-militaristic ways) can be a means for — or site of — emancipatory change. For the so-called Welsh School of critical security studies, focusing on the marginalized and ‘voiceless’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 159) points to the ways in which potentially exclusionary, statist and militaristic security discourses can be challenged and replaced without simply giving up on security as a political category. Here, it could be argued that the choice within the Copenhagen School to ultimately limit attention to powerful actors and voices blinds its proponents to the role of security as a site of competing discourses or images of politics, and even potentially as a site for emancipation. Narrowness in this context has important normative implications that those using the framework would do well to reflect upon.
ST excludes social security from its analysis and ignores how normal politics facilitate racial violence
Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19 --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG
Normal politics: pro democracy and free market govs/ govs that arent securitizing
Securitization theory similarly occludes the racial violence of normal (liberal) politics. This is not just a conceptual problem: it results in major empirical oversights. For example, though it contains the word ‘security’, securitization theory places social security outside of its frame of analysis, as part of ‘normal politics’: ‘Although it shares some qualities with “social security,” or security as applied to various civilian guard or police functions, international security has its own distinctive, more extreme meaning. Unlike social security, which has strong links to matters of entitlement and social justice, international security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics’ (: 21). Securitization theory overlooks the power politics of social security and cannot see how Western welfare state social security systems support white (settler) heteropatriarchal forms of life, such as the nuclear family (; ; ; ), and disproportionately target racialized, indigenous, and poor communities for direct and violent interventions such as the removal of children from families through enslavement, the residential schools that formed part of the genocide of indigenous people, child welfare systems, migrant detention and removal, and so on. Closer to Copenhagen: Denmark now uses socialized daycare as a means for removing and assimilating Muslim children (). Social and national security are imbricated. For example, current Islamophobic counter-terrorism programs often use social and health services to identify suspected ‘terrorists’ (; ; ). Social security only entails ‘entitlement and social justice’ for those privileged by whiteness, heterosexuality, citizenship, and/or class status. Securitization theory’s civilizationist idealization of ‘normal politics’ occludes these dynamics.
ST makes it impossible to understand how securitizations manifests in different contexts by not analyzing the position of the audience
McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG
Not the speech act that matters but the reaction – instead of critiquing the lang of the 1ac they should be analyzing reactions to it -
Related to the above focus on the role of linguistic practices, it is also possible to argue that the securitization framework is problematically narrow in McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 571 its focus on the speech act relative to the social and political context in which the act itself occurs. Indeed, this is a problem acknowledged (but not fundamentally redressed) in Buzan et al. (1998).12 Put simply, in developing a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through speech acts the Copenhagen School ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors — such as dominant narratives of identity — that condition both patterns of securitization and the broader construction of security. This is particularly curious given that Wæver has explored these contexts in detail elsewhere, linking security perspectives and actions to narratives of history and identity in European contexts (Wæver, 1996; Hansen and Wæver, 2001). To the extent that there is engagement with the context of the speech act in the Copenhagen School, it has come in three central forms. The first is to suggest that we can see dynamics of securitization playing out in different ‘sectors’. For these theorists, the designation of threat looks different in the context of military concerns than environmental ones, for example. Perhaps most prominent in these distinctions is that between societal and state sectors (Wæver et al., 1993), the former defined in terms of the preservation of preferred identities and the latter in terms of the preservation of sovereignty (usually defined as non-intervention). This draws an important analytical distinction between often conflated referents of nation and state. However, the division between sectors does not go far enough in recognizing context, focusing only on different dynamics of securitization across different issue areas rather than on the processes through which these security referents are themselves given meaning. And as Roxanne Lynn Doty argues (1998/9), drawing meaningful analytical distinctions between these sectors is sometimes difficult and often unhelpful. Political leaders can and do simultaneously invoke sovereignty and identity as that in need of preservation, and attempting to compartmentalize security dynamics can obscure broader forms of discursive continuity in approaches to issues as disparate as immigration, environmental change and traditional military practices in particular historical or social contexts.13 The second form of engagement with contextual factors concerns the role of so-called ‘facilitating conditions’, referring to those dynamics, developments and institutional contexts that enable ‘securitizing moves’ to become successful. Here, Ole Wæver (2000: 252–3), echoing the discussion in Buzan et al. (1998: 31–3), has identified the importance of the form of the speech act; the role of the securitizing actor; and the ‘conditions historically associated with that threat’. The recognition of the latter two of these conditions — most prominently the third — certainly moves towards addressing the role of context. The problem here is more simply that this potentially important insight — which takes us beyond a set of strict criteria to be met in terms of the act of securitizing — is not incorporated within the securitization European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 572 framework itself, which focuses overwhelmingly on the peformative role of the speech act rather than the conditions in which securitization itself becomes possible (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 72). It is not a coincidence that this dimension of the securitization framework remains under-theorized: examining historical ‘experiences’ with threat designation calls for a looser and highly interpretative approach to analysis which potentially conflicts with the development of a neat and coherent set of ‘requirements’ to be met for securitization. Finally, the securitization framework engages with contextual factors in acknowledging the role of audiences and the importance of security pronouncements being ‘backed up’. This recognition would seem to be central to the broader recognition of the importance of context in the designation of security and threat, but there are two limitations here. The first is that, quite simply, what being ‘backed up’ means, how we know when it happens and what the implications are when it does not are radically under-theorized in the Copenhagen School. While recognizing that security is inter-subjectively constructed, the focus on the speech act as performing security arguably paints security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation. Thierry Balzacq (2005) has suggested that the role of audiences is underspecified because of Wæver’s reliance on Austin’s theorization of language. Here, the work is done by the articulation itself rather than the result of a negotiation between the articulator and the audience at whom the articulation is directed. More specifically, the power of the speech act would appear to be undermined by the full incorporation of the idea that the act itself is only one part of the securitizing process: that it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies. There are certainly opportunities here for counter-readings on this point. While retaining an emphasis on the productive nature of speech, Judith Butler (1997), for example, has suggested that Austin’s conception of the speech act implies the possibility that they can be either ‘perlocutionary’ (necessary for enabling particular actions) or ‘illocutionary’ (performing a function at the moment of speech). Allowing the possibility that speech acts are perlocutionary potentially enables greater attention to audiences who might either consent to particular actions suggested through speech or engage in contesting the terms of the speech act or the actions suggested in response to it (Butler, 1997: 15). An alternative interpretation of the speech act might be that it serves to construct or produce the audience itself.14 Further, it might be suggested that the role audiences play is in helping to constitute speech communities in which particular forms of representation are intelligible and legitimate and others unintelligible and illegitimate (e.g. Fierke, 1997). These are all particular readings of the ‘speech act’ that at some level constitute attempts to come to terms with the production–construction distinction, McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 573 what Holger Stritzel (2007) has defined as an ‘internalist–externalist’ distinction. The challenge for the securitization framework in this sense is that the above are quite different in their conception of what speech acts are and how they relate to audiences. There is a clear need to clarify the position on the above points to draw the role of audiences into the framework more coherently, but in doing so the Copenhagen School will almost certainly need to downplay either the performative effects of the speech act or the inter-subjective nature of security.15 Ultimately, those interested in the construction of security must pay attention to the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security (even those defined narrowly in terms of the designation and articulation of threat) become possible. Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization? To what extent is political possibility defined by the target audience of speech acts? How are some voices empowered or marginalized to define security and threat? These highly contextual factors, I would suggest, are central to understanding how security works in different contexts, but are ultimately given short shrift in the securitization framework. The appeal of universalism in the development of a conceptual framework goes some way towards explaining the neglect of contextual factors, but the failure also to draw out the ways in which securitizing actors and audiences interact beyond the broad and amorphous recognition of ‘facilitating conditions’ and being ‘backed up’ by relevant audiences is unsatisfying.
ST’s focus on threats only tells a partial story of how security gets meaning and is based on a logic of exclusion which reifys statis and militaristic approaches to security
McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG
In the securitization framework, the study of security is ultimately the study of the designation of threat. In this framework, an issue is a security issue if European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 578 positioned as a threat to a particular political community. This commitment to the study of ‘threats’ is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Wæver, 1995: 56). Such a commitment is consistent also with the oppositional conception of identity in the securitization framework, wherein who we are is determined by the designation of (threatening) others.21 In short, we can learn all we need to know about the construction of security through studying the issues that are represented as existential threats. As Michael Williams (2003) has suggested, this oppositional view of the politics of security is related to the Copenhagen School’s indebtedness to the political theory of Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, politics in general is characterized by enmity and exclusion, with the sovereign’s designation of threatening ‘others’ central to political life and allowing the ‘exception’: the suspension of the normal rules of politics. For the securitization framework, such a vision of politics is particularly applicable to the realm of security, which is characterized by the articulation of threat and ‘emergency measures’ enabled by that articulation. The Copenhagen School suggests that this political dynamic captures something timeless about the logic of security itself, with the realm of security an arena of exclusion and ‘panic politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). This view of the logic of security has been central to their call for desecuritization, a point I will return to in a moment. Representations of threat — pivotal to Schmittian security politics — can of course be viewed as constitutive of security and identity. As Simon Dalby has argued, the designation of that from which we need to be protected is crucial in telling us ‘who we are, what we value and what we are prepared to countenance to protect our self-preferred identities’ (Dalby, 2002: xxx). But is this the only way in which security is constructed, and what do we miss through focusing only on the designation of threat? I suggest here that while central, a focus on the designation of threat alone risks missing much about the construction of security, especially through privileging the ‘content’ of security over its meaning in particular contexts. As noted, Roxanne Lynn Doty (1998/9) has suggested that radically different approaches to immigration can be understood in the context of different discourses of security. For Doty, changing approaches to the treatment of Haitian refugees by the US government in the 1990s can primarily — and contra the Copenhagen School — be understood as a change in the way security itself was understood. And I have suggested elsewhere (McDonald, 2003) that significant change in the Brazilian government’s approach to Amazonian deforestation in the late 1980s — from conceptualizing the intact rainforest as a threat to Brazil to positioning it as that in need of being protected as part of Brazil — can be better understood as a change in perceptions McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 579 or discourses of security rather than as an instance of ‘de-securitization’. Here, articulations of the values in need of being protected were more prominent — and I would suggest more politically significant — than articulations of ‘from what or whom we need protection’. The focus on the designation of threat alone therefore tells a partial story of how security is given meaning, marginalizing inclusive and non-statist definitions of ‘our values’ that tell us how security is understood in particular contexts.22 More problematically, the Copenhagen School image of security as acquiring meaning (or more accurately content) through the articulation of threat arguably works only to the extent that security is fixed in a Schmittian logic based on exclusion and exception.23 The ‘fixedness’ of the Copenhagen School’s logic of security has been taken up by ‘Welsh School’ critical security theorists, for whom the study of security should be geared towards recognizing and advancing opportunities for emancipation of the most vulnerable. Ken Booth (2005: 207) and Paul Williams (2004: 144), for example, have suggested that the securitization framework is parasitic upon traditional (Realist) discourses of security that are taken as indicative of a universal and timeless logic of security. This is evident, for these theorists, in the Copenhagen School’s commitment to strict boundaries of inclusion and exclusion; to the state and state political leaders’ centrality in defining (usually external) threats and responses to them; and to the association of security means and tools with the most significant of ‘emergency measures’: military action. This constitutes an important normative problem, arguably serving to reify and normalize these traditional statist, exclusionary and militaristic approaches to security. Indeed, the idea that the Copenhagen School’s logic of security is both relatively fixed and politically conservative is a feature of even sympathetic readings of the securitization framework (Huysmans, 1998: 500–1; Hansen, 2000: 286). In this context, key proponents of the Copenhagen School (Wæver, 1995; 2000: 253; 2004; Buzan et al., 1998: 204–9) have argued in favour of desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. While recognizing the possibility for securitization to be progressive (eg Wæver, 2000: 285), the general suggestion is that ‘it is better . . . to aim for desecuritization’ (Buzan and Wæver, 1998: 4). Here, the Schmittian logic of security can be avoided and issues returned to the open and deliberative realm of normal politics. Important issues surface again here about what constitutes normal politics and about the relatively simplistic distinction between ‘security’ and ‘politics’. Analytically, it is certainly possible to suggest that rather than constituting the opposite realm to that of politics, debates around what constitutes security and how ‘we’ should act to achieve or preserve it are particularly politically intense, even a form of ‘hyper-politics’. The logic of security upon which the securitization framework is based might be contested again here, 579 European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 580 most prominently the suggestion that security ‘speech acts’ can themselves take issues outside the political realm. But the suggestion that we should aim for ‘desecuritization’ is also normatively problematic. It depicts security as a failure of ‘normal politics’ rather than recognizing security as a site of contestation and therefore for (even emancipatory) change. This is especially important if security is still that most powerful of political categories — defining political priority, a community’s identity and its core values. The focus only on the negative designation of threat serves the interests of those who benefit from dominant negative and exclusionary articulations of threat in contemporary international politics, further silencing voices articulating alternative visions for what security means and how it might be realized.
Securitization theory neglects the political effects of colonialism and race in its analysis of the construction of threats – doesn’t account for consequences and the intrinsic violence of securitizing
Selister Gomes and Rodrigues Marques, 21 --- Mariana Selister Gomes is an associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences, of the Post-Graduation Program in Social Sciences and of the Post-Graduation Program in International Relations of the Federal University of Santa Maria. Collaborating Professor of the Post-Graduation Program in Sociology of the Federal University of Sergipe. Doctor in Sociology at the Lisbon University Institute. Master in Sociology by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and Bachelor in History by the same institution. Renata Rodrigues Marques is a teacher in International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM). Graduated in International Relations from the same institution. Member of the GIDH Extension Project - Gender, Intersectionality and Human Rights and of the Feminist and Decolonial Research Methodology Research Project. (Mariana Selister Gomes and Renata Rodrigues Marques, "Can securitization theory be saved from itself? A decolonial and feminist intervention", 10-26-2021, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)//EG
The relationship between ontological perceptions and definitions of threat has been a topic of discussion in security studies for at least two decades. At first, securitization theory was considered an innovation in this area, since it maintains that security issues are constructed as such not from the recognition of threats but from securitization acts themselves, through a ‘self-referential practice’ (: 204) related to intersubjective and shared understandings about security. When securitization theory has no ontological assumptions, its critical capacity enables reflections on power relations (for example, coloniality and gender) that are reflected in the ‘speech acts’ produced in the construction of a threat by a securitizing actor. However, some criticism has been voiced regarding the character of the theory and its possibilities as a critical perspective (; ). It has been argued that the concept of securitization itself presupposes power dynamics that underlie the very ability to securitize through speech acts, so it does not include the subaltern as an actor in security speech. We identify a problem of silence due to limited social representation, where people who are classified socially in relation to their race, gender and class are portrayed as objects to be protected or threats to be prevented, in a securitizing vocabulary. This is related to a social imaginary where they are portrayed as victims or transgressors (). This can be seen in empirical studies of the process of desecuritization of female combatants in the pacification of Sierra Leone () and in the finding, in a study that draws openly on the concept of intersectionality, that refugee women are constructed as vulnerable while male refugees are presented as a threat in the British media (). The silencing is not a failure of securitization theory per se. : 19) even claim that international security studies has a ‘history of Anglo-centric (and militaristic and patriarchal) bias’. Hence, our first argument is that the racist and patriarchal character of securitization theory also permeates security studies and the field of international relations (; ), because it permeates the production of knowledge as a whole. It is a product of coloniality and the perpetuation of whiteness (; ). Neglect of certain dimensions and categories of analysis (especially race and gender) is disguised as a supposed neutrality and as a methodological choice regarding the analysis of speech acts. Thus, desecuritized themes are banished to the sphere of so-called normal politics () without any recognition that this strategy does not take into account the intrinsic violence of normal politics (; ; ). Moreover, the Copenhagen School fails to realize that gender and race issues are not always related to the societal security sector and may be linked to the political security of states (). Critical security studies has advanced reflection on security problems regarding the exposure of groups of individuals in situations of insecurity and practices of (in)securitization (), and has introduced normative debates on the use of speech and/or practices to understand security (). Many of the contributions to securitization theory, especially in relation to the context and the audience of the securitization process (; ), have been put to good use in research that aims to analyze the social configurations of power in such processes. Accordingly, our concept of securitization starts from the understanding of the classical perspective – that a securitized problem is the intersubjective construction of an existential threat. However, we build on the basis of a ‘sociological’ turn in securitization studies that realizes that this process is established as an instrument of political disputes and government practices (; ). In this sense, we understand and endorse many of the epistemological criticisms of classical securitization theory, recognizing the perspective that characterizing non-Western cases as cases of securitization may constitute a simplification of more complex sociopolitical processes (). There are geopolitical limitations in the theoretical constructions that permeate the area of security studies, from its beginnings to contemporary times. We also realize that the ‘periphery’ of knowledge production () has not been included as a reflection on either side of recent debates (; ). Still, there is a critical potential to expand the analysis that considers the social classification of people in securitization studies, including its geopolitical dimensions. We want to emphasize that studies that use the concept of securitization to demonstrate inequalities of power in empirical processes have been conducted for some time (see ; ; ; ; ; ). Our concern is that these studies were intentionally ignored in the critique of ‘classical’ theory by , although much of the literature that adopts the concept of securitization generally recognizes its limitations and tries to overcome them, usually by modifying it, to the point that we can speak of ‘theories of securitization’ in the plural (). In a sense, at least the controversy over racism in securitization theory has brought the required attention of to this debate, where (in the long answer) they recognize some of the work that has been done in the field on race, racism and securitization. Having overcome the limitations of analyzing colonial structures and gender and race discourses, we recognize the potential for critical security studies of having securitization as a tool, while researchers have the possibility of politicizing securitization (: 35). Critical approaches can demonstrate that when we analyze government discourses in relation to groups of individuals, whether they are recognized as citizens or foreigners, to criminalize is to securitize. Securitization theory has neglected the political effects of colonialism and race as relevant categories to be analyzed in the construction of threats (). We understand social classification processes such as genderization and racialization should have a central role in the theory, since their insertion would complexify the understanding of power relations involved in the securitization process, as well as the consequences of being securitized – and of being marginalized – in that process. So far, however, coloniality, race, and gender have not had a prominent role in securitization theory.
The analysis of the securitization process doesn’t account for patriarchal and colonial power – can’t understand the dynamics of international security
Selister Gomes and Rodrigues Marques, 21 --- Mariana Selister Gomes is an associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences, of the Post-Graduation Program in Social Sciences and of the Post-Graduation Program in International Relations of the Federal University of Santa Maria. Collaborating Professor of the Post-Graduation Program in Sociology of the Federal University of Sergipe. Doctor in Sociology at the Lisbon University Institute. Master in Sociology by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and Bachelor in History by the same institution. Renata Rodrigues Marques is a teacher in International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM). Graduated in International Relations from the same institution. Member of the GIDH Extension Project - Gender, Intersectionality and Human Rights and of the Feminist and Decolonial Research Methodology Research Project. (Mariana Selister Gomes and Renata Rodrigues Marques, "Can securitization theory be saved from itself? A decolonial and feminist intervention", 10-26-2021, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)//EG
As : 57) has observed, the securitization process is related to power dynamics: mainly the power of elites to establish threats and objects to be referenced and protected. interpretation also recognizes that securitization is made possible by a situation in which the securitizing agent has the power to securitize; therefore it is hierarchical. This allows us to acknowledge the possibilities and limitations of securitization as a discourse and as a practice of power. Nevertheless, patriarchal () and colonial () power have not yet been incorporated as central elements in the analysis of securitization processes. Decolonial studies has been instrumental in exposing that traditional theorists understand power less well than they believe, since they obscure and exclude much of the existing power dynamics from analysis and ignore hierarchies. The decolonial turn recognizes that specific historical conditions are constituting processes that classify people and states socially and subjectively within world capitalism and colonial logic (). Similarly, gender is produced and propagated through speech, which in turn are causally related to the power relations between individuals, groups, and states, as well as the functioning of the capitalist production system and international security dynamics (). While the roots of security studies are intertwined with international relations, it is understood as bordering different disciplines, so it can potentially engage with other areas (). Consequently, it is possible to bring security studies closer to the discussions of coloniality as configurations of power. Although we have not found studies that used decolonial feminism to theorize about securitization or critical security studies, we realize that it has the potential to address many of the limitations we identify. The concept of intersectionality is essential for understanding the main structures of modern society – patriarchy, racism, and capitalism – that demarcate people’s lives and political processes, and, consequently, the dynamics of international security. These social structures that interact with each other create the categories of women, race, and class () that segregate and hierarchize social groups. In dialogue with intersectional theory, decolonial feminism () places these three dimensions in an international perspective, emphasizing the idea of coloniality. Thus, patriarchy, racism, and capitalism are the main social structures strongly demarcated by historical colonialism and its roots in the economy, politics and culture that persist to the present day, establishing what Lugones defines as the ‘colonial/modern gender system’. Although these concepts can lead to different paths of analysis, their epistemological common ground allows us to advocate that coloniality, racialization, and genderization are products of historical constructions, neither universal nor essential. Culturally and historically situated analysis of securitization processes has the capacity to incorporate social classification configurations such as racialization and genderization, although we do not see this happening very often. We intend to illustrate in the next section how the conduct of empirical research plays a decisive role in efforts to analyze the social configurations of power in securitization processes.