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Flawed Epistemology

Securitization theory is based on the racist concept of the social contract and cites authors who either justify racism or ignore it

Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19 --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

In this section, we describe how civilizationist thought underpins securitization theory’s concepts of politics and security. Civilizationism is a term used to describe racist (theoretical) perspectives that contain three assumptions: (1) Civilizations can, and ought to, advance, and some (Western) civilizations are more ‘advanced’; (2) civilizational progress is not only technological and material, but political and moral; and (3) the ‘underdevelopment’ of certain civilizations represents a problem for, or threat to, developed ones. Drawing on a broad canon of civilizationist political philosophy, canonical securitization theory texts develop a narrative of world-historical progress in which civilizational advancement beyond the violence of ‘primal anarchy’ involves curtailing securitization through the instantiation of civilized ‘normal politics’. Classic securitization theory frequently and favorably cites Samuel Huntington’s racist () ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (: 36, 53, 112, 125) and Robert Kaplan (: 221, 252; : 47, 54, 69–70, 112, 127), infamous for his theory of ‘the coming anarchy’, his warnings of the danger of ‘tribalism’, his neo-Malthusian arguments about ‘overpopulation’ in the global South (, ), and his defense of ‘tempered imperialism’ (). Social theorists such as Durkheim, who built his theory of society on racist anthropological distinctions between civilized men and savages (), also feature (: 67). Perhaps more fundamentally, securitization theory draws on social contract thinkers such as Hobbes (see : 69, 209; : 54) for their ‘state of nature’ concept (Sbisà in : 121). has convincingly argued that racism is integral, not incidental, to social contract theory, which typically casts the social contract as an achievement of Western civilization and locates the contrasting ‘state of nature’ in African ‘tribes’ or indigenous ‘savages’ (: 13). Securitization theory extends social contract theory to cast ‘normal politics’ (and the curbing of securitization) as an achievement of civilization. ‘Primal anarchy’ and the ‘state of nature’ act as the foils to this ‘normal politics’ in a teleological hierarchy of civilizational advancement from securitization towards politicization (: 53, 69). Following Hobbes, securitization theory locates this supposed progress in the West, particularly Europe: It perhaps begins with the construction of the Hobbesian state in the eighteenth century. The creation of the Leviathan was aimed at opening a sphere of public economic and political life, and this could not be done without pushing the use of force back into a contained space controlled by the state. Under the Leviathan, citizens could not draw swords over economic grievances or political disagreements, which were to be handled by the rule of law and the market. The logic of existential threat and the right to use force … were reserved to the state and thus were largely desecuritized among the citizens. (: 209, emphasis added) The social contract, for securitization theory, is an (18th-century, white, European, liberal) feat of desecuritization, both within nation-states and among them (: 51). Securitization theory, then, does not merely replicate social contract theory and civilizationist thought: it develops it. By introducing a constructivist methodology, securitization theory places politicization (the instantiation of ‘normal politics’ or social contracts) and minimizing securitization as integral to civilizational progress. Admittedly, securitization theory is an eclectic theory. In addition to thinkers easily identified as civilizationist, it also draws on apparently more critical theorists, notably Arendt. Responding to Foucauldian critiques that describe securitization theory’s conceptualization of security as the exception to politics as Schmittian, : 470) argues that these critics have misunderstood: ‘it is wrong to claim … that securitization theory involves a “Schmittian” concept of politics – the theory has a Schmittian concept of security and an Arendtian concept of politics’, further clarifying that: The concept of security is Schmittian, because it defines security in terms of exception, emergency, and a decision (although not by a singular will, but among people in a political situation). This does not in itself make securitization theory’s concept of politics Schmittian, because the place of security in the theory is as an anti-politics or the politically constituted limit to politics. This general politics is inspired by Hannah Arendt. (: 478) Elsewhere, : 122) summarizes Arendt’s concept of politics: ‘politics takes place among people, in-between us, because power only emerges when people act together, it basically consists of action directed to and dependent on the reaction of others, not doing things directly’. Here, he adverts to Arendt’s distinction between power (Macht) and violence (Gewalt), which securitization theory mirrors by dividing politicization from securitization. Arendt drew on racist German anthropology that distinguished between (uncivilized) ‘nature people’ (Naturvölker) and (civilized) ‘cultured people’ (Kulturvölker) (; ) to divide the world into communities with history, language, and political institutions, and those without (: 396). She cast the former as (morally and politically) superior and warned that the latter’s ‘primitivism’ posed a threat to political freedom and democracy. When securitization theory adopts Arendt’s concept of politics, it does not dispense with her civilizationism but replicates and develops it, conceptualizing ‘normal politics’ as the achievement of civilized people capable of resisting violence (securitization) through reasoned dialogue (politicization). Securitization theory also replicates Arendt’s evacuation of violence from politics. Arendt built her idea of power (Macht) on an idealized vision of the Athenian polis, ignoring the ‘raw materials’ of ancient Athenian democracy – slave labor and women’s unpaid reproductive labor (: 249f). She similarly idealized the American republic (; ; ; ). Although in her famous ‘boomerang thesis’ located the origins of Nazism in European racism and colonialism, she asserted that the USA had never been guilty of imperialism or indigenous genocide (see ; ). Though she spoke out against Nazi white supremacy in Europe, she insisted US racism was merely a social phenomenon, not a political structure (: 253; ), even though Nazi policies were explicitly inspired by US settler-colonial genocide, the reservation system, and Jim Crow segregation (; ; ; ). In praising ancient Athens and contemporary America, Arendt actively minimized the imperial, racialized, and gendered violence structuring these ‘civilized’ democracies (; , ; ; ; ).

ST facilitates civilizationist beliefs by utilizing racist ideas of state failure and attributing normal politics to European civilization and securitization with a return to primal anarchy

Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19 --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

Classic securitization theory is civilizationist in that it believes that there are more or less politically and morally developed civilizations. It identifies ‘normal politics’ with (European) civilization and ‘securitization’ with a return to (racialized) primal anarchy. As a result, it depicts ‘underdeveloped’ civilizations as threats to supposedly more advanced ones. This becomes especially clear when examining securitization theory’s ideas about ‘state failure’. Securitization theory claims that in ‘developed’ states (: 28) a civilized political sphere generally fends off securitization, except when ‘securitization is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barbarian aggressor’ (: 29). By contrast, in ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ states securitization runs amok: ‘In well-developed states, armed forces and intelligence services are carefully separated from normal political life, and their use is subject to elaborate procedures of authorization. Where such separation is not in place, as in many weak states … much of normal politics is pushed into the security realm’ (: 28). This excessive securitization, in turn, leads to primal (or ‘Hobbesian’ or ‘Kaplanesque’) anarchy, wherein the state ‘fails to take root or spirals into disintegration. This situation can lead to prolonged periods of primal anarchy, as is currently the case in Afghanistan and various parts of Africa, in which the state is only a shadow and reality is one of rival warlords and gangs’ (: 50, emphasis added; for analysis of the colonial preoccupation with Afghan ‘tribes’, see ). Discourses of state failure are ‘irredeemably rooted in an imperial and racialized imagination’ (: 65; see also ; ; , ). While they may avoid overt reference to race, they operate within a lineage of racial discourse that emerged to justify colonialism and continuing trusteeship. This racial hierarchy is fully represented in securitization theory’s list of weak and failing states: Nigeria under Abacha, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, and ‘various parts of Africa’, the USSR under Stalin, Bosnia, Colombia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and so on (see : 28, 50, 69, 146). This is a racial discourse: ‘primal anarchy’ is primarily located in ‘brown’ (‘Afghanistan’) and ‘black’ (‘parts of Africa’) regions. Copenhagen School theorists sometimes seem to be aware of how this division falls. This does not lead them to question it. On the contrary, they warn against Western-centrism, but only in order to emphasize that it is in the West that ‘normal’ civilized politics exists: ‘if domestic and international were fixed, there would be a risk of generating a cozy Western view of politics: Domestic politics is normal and without security, whereas the extreme is relegated to the international space. In other parts of the world, domestic is not cozy’ (: 47n7). For securitization theory, primal anarchy exists, not only in the international realm, but also in non-Western ‘other parts of the world’, where a failure of normal politics leads to ‘“tribalist” forms of association’ (: 69). Securitization theory refuses to seriously consider the role of modern colonialism and ongoing imperial warfare in ‘failed states’. Such consideration might reveal the significance of Western colonial divide-and-rule policies, extraction of resources and labor, imposition of state borders, and military and covert intervention. Instead, securitization theory frames ‘failed states’ as evidence of a primal state of nature. Civilizationism is not just a collateral, detachable, part of securitization theory’s imaginary, or a sadly unattended-to implication of its Kaplanesque view of anarchy or its Arendtian model of politics. The idea that there has been (white) civilizational progress away from (racialized) primal anarchy is omnipresent in securitization theory because it is fundamental to securitization theory’s opposition between politicization and securitization. Ungrounded in the racist and civilizationist narrative that ‘normal politics’ emerged from ‘primal anarchy’, this opposition would look as arbitrary as it in fact is.

ALT fails - The framework of ST problematically excludes images and physical act which maintains communications of security in the squo

McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG

For the Copenhagen School, issues become security issues (or more accurately threats) through language. It is language that positions specific actors or issues as existentially threatening to a particular political community, thus enabling (or indeed constituting, depending on interpretation) securitization. Indeed, rather than simply being one ‘site’ of security construction, Wæver (1995) located securitization itself in language theory, and particularly Austin’s articulation of the ‘speech act’. In this framework, language itself becomes security in the sense that particular forms of language — spoken or written in a particular context — constitute security. As Wæver argued (1995: 55), ‘the utterance itself is the act . . . by uttering “security”, a staterepresentative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it’. This reliance on language as the exclusive form of ‘securitizing move’ is problematic for two reasons. First, language is only one (albeit the most central) means through which meaning is communicated (Möller, 2007: 180). A range of authors in this context have suggested the need to take account of the role of images as potential forms of securitization. Second, an exclusive McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 569 focus on language is problematic in the sense that it can exclude forms of bureaucratic practices or physical action that do not merely follow from securitizing ‘speech acts’ but are part of the process through which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed. As noted, a range of authors have suggested that images or visual representations can be central to the construction of security generally or even securitization specifically. Michael Williams (2003) has suggested that television images of 11 September — and in particular those of the World Trade Center towers — were central to the development of dominant perceptions of security and threat in the American context. Frank Möller (2007) also discusses visual representations of the 11 September attacks — along with conflict in Iraq — in pointing to the ways in which photographic exhibitions are similarly able to communicate particular meanings of security and threat. Lene Hansen (2007), meanwhile, uses the example of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper in 2005 in pointing to the potentially central role of visual representations as forms of securitization. Extending the securitization framework to include these forms of representation (as Williams suggests) would certainly be more reflective of the range of forms through which meaning — including about security and threat — can be communicated. But such inclusion may not be as simple as it appears. At a general level, the centrality of Austin’s theory of language to the broader framework suggests the need for developing or building on an alternative theory of the performative role of security representations. More specifically, the challenge for the Copenhagen School here may be that visual representations raise difficult questions about agency, intentionality and the importance of contestation over meaning. While the classical application of the securitization framework has focused on the role of political leaders in the articulation and designation of threat, in the above examples of visual representation the key ‘securitizing actors’ are artists and the media. Incorporating visual representation into the securitization framework, therefore, may involve simultaneously rethinking the centrality that state political elite have in the framework itself. The role of intentionality is important in this context. Copenhagen School proponents portray a securitizing move as a highly intentional, strategic action. Buzan et al. (1998: 21) argue that the designation of ‘threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them’, further noting that the ‘invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force’ (my emphases). More directly, Wæver (1995: 63) has argued that ‘the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed’ is ‘among strategic actors imbued with intentionality’. Such an image of strategic actors seeking to justify emergency responses arguably fits poorly with the communication of visual images, undertaken by actors (such as the media) less likely to be seeking to engage European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 570 in particular emergency measures or in a position to undertake them. And as Möller (2007: 185) and Hansen (2007) have argued, images are ambiguous in meaning, making it harder to control the meaning others take away from them. This renders the strategic use of images more difficult, while also pointing to the importance of contestation over meaning central to security politics. An alternative argument concerning the ‘narrowness’ of the Copenhagen School’s exclusive focus on speech is advanced by Didier Bigo (2002) and the so-called ‘Paris School’.9 For these theorists, security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinized practices rather than only through specific speech acts that enable emergency measures. Practices of surveillance and border controls, for example, particularly as undertaken by bureaucrats or ‘professional managers of unease’ (Bigo, 2002: 65), are a central part of securitization, and are not simply those actions enabled by preceding speech acts. For these theorists, ‘to attend to the study of securitization is to focus on the creation of networks of professionals of (in)security, the systems of meaning they generate and the productive power of their practices’ (Case Collective, 2006: 458). This stands in opposition to the conception of security in the securitization framework, in which security practices follow speech acts and in which security is the realm of dramatic emergency measures. Recognizing the role of apparently mundane and everyday physical actions in the construction of security serves to question the speech-physical action sequence of the securitization framework and points to the multiple forms in which meaning can be communicated. The ‘everyday practices’ of the ‘managers of unease’, for example, would seem destined to be excluded from the securitization framework, reliant as it is on a conception of the politics– security relationship that emphasizes the extraordinary forms of action that follow from the construction of threats through speech. This maps on to criticisms raised by Hansen (2000: 300–1) and Wilkinson (2007) that the Copenhagen School framework problematically neglects physical action generally, action which can serve to communicate ideas about security in their own right.10 It is far more possible to envisage images and visual representation being drawn into the securitization framework as forms of ‘securitizing moves’, a project advocated and furthered by Williams (2003) and Hansen (2007) respectively.11 But even here there are challenges, not least of all related to the questions of ambiguity, intentionality and the traditional centrality of speech and the speech act to the framework itself.

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