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Desecuritization fails

Desecuritization fails – foundations laid will always be replaced by new threats

Maas, 13 --- Matthijs Maas is a postdoctoral research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER), University of Cambridge. (Matthijs Maas, "Desecurity Will Not Save Us: Securitization Studies, the Problem of 'Normal / Democratic' Politics, and the Limits of Desecuritization as Normative-Political Panacea", 16/8/13, The University of Edinburgh, https://www.academia.edu/8086735/Desecurity_Will_Not_Save_Us_Securitization_Studies_the_Problem_of_Normal_Democratic_Politics_and_the_Limits_of_Desecuritization_as_Normative-Political_Panacea)//EG

Briefly returning to the ‘operational’ critique which we touched upon previously, it is possible to also unpack this question of the ‘limits’ of desecuritization in a second, ‘strong’ sense—as indicative of a more general political irreducibility of ‘security’, which would have the rather significant implication that there is a structural impossibility—or at least, ‘net’ futility—to any strategy seeking to meaningfully ‘unmake’ security. While there have been a fair number of theorists (cf. Aras & Polat, 2008; Bilgin, 2006; Kim & Lee, 2010) who have traced instances of the desecuritization of one issue being intrinsically tied up with—or even predicated on—the shifting of the ‘security agenda’ to new threats in other sections, this line of argument has been taken the furthest in Behnke’s post-structuralist [2006] argument. The key claim he makes is that the ‘replacement’ of de-securitized issues with other, new securitisations is not coincidental and occasional, but in fact inevitable in the context of a level-one political ‘ontotheology’ [ibid] that is irredeemably constituted by the logic of security. Drawing on Campbell’s (1998) argument that states can only maintain ontological security, order, and national identity in contradistinction to an excluded ‘outside’ (or Other), Behnke argues that constant (re)production of a Schmittian (securitizing) logic is a necessary ingredient in all political community [2006:650], which implies that meaningful desecuritization cannot really happen (Behnke, 2007:109). We cannot, as it were, ‘gain ground’ against security, as every such attempt might merely be laying the foundations for the next security move. ‘Replacement’, while obviously not a ‘strategy of desecuritization’ (indeed, if anything it is the opposite), is nonetheless of key interest for the significant analytical and normative implications it has. In a straightforward sense, it should make analysts more suspicious of cases that on the surface appear to be straightforward examples of successful 31 desecuritization—but which on closer examination reveal the complex machinery of security at work, suggesting that this ‘desecuritization’ in one sector might perhaps be more accurately understood as merely the side-product of a counter-securitisation—or even a meta- securitization—in another sector (cf. Williams, 2003, 2011]. Furthermore, ‘replacement’ obviously has tremendous ramifications for the practical limits of desecuritization—and hence for the normative limits of both the CS, as well as that of many of its critics, as it suggests that even if desecuritization is achievable within specific cases and contexts, no political sphere is- or can be completely ‘de-securitized’. Nevertheless, even if are to concede the political irreducibility of security, and accept that desecuritization will at best leave state elites with a temporary ‘threat deficit problem’ [Buzan, 2006:6], it seems a stretch to conclude from this that desecuritization is entirely ‘meaningless’ politically. Instead, as also noted by Hansen (2012:541-542), we might take this opportunity to interrogate the differential effects of different forms of ‘otherness’, and whether trading in one securitisation for another, even if it fails to maintain ‘normal politics’, will only involve a substantive realignment of ‘threats’ within a self-same ‘war logic’, or whether the transfer could even be a desirable, qualitative one, towards a more reflexive or ‘stable’ securitisation.65

Desecuritization fails – wipes issues off the political agenda which undermines democratic decision making and marginalizes subjects

Maas, 13 --- Matthijs Maas is a postdoctoral research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER), University of Cambridge. (Matthijs Maas, "Desecurity Will Not Save Us: Securitization Studies, the Problem of 'Normal / Democratic' Politics, and the Limits of Desecuritization as Normative-Political Panacea", 16/8/13, The University of Edinburgh, https://www.academia.edu/8086735/Desecurity_Will_Not_Save_Us_Securitization_Studies_the_Problem_of_Normal_Democratic_Politics_and_the_Limits_of_Desecuritization_as_Normative-Political_Panacea)//EG

Significantly, if ‘securitisation’ can, in one sense, be understood as an ‘extreme version of politicization’ [Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998:23], it might be suggested that the inverse also holds—that is, extreme versions of ‘desecuritization’ may effectively entail the wholesale de-politicization of issues. This final and arguably most problematic form of desecuritization is found in the phenomenon of ‘silencing’ [Floyd, 2007; Mackenzie, 2009; Hansen, 2012], which is when a formerly securitised issue is moved out of the ‘security agenda’, but rather than becoming politicized, it is de-politicized, vanishing from political discourse as it is dropped below the public discursive radar (Hansen, 2012:544-545). Such a process has been demonstrated, amongst others, in Mackenzie’s (2009) study of the systematic and gendered ‘exclusion’ of former female soldiers from the post-conflict reintegration programs in Sierra Leone, which effectively “removed them from significant policy discourses’ [Mackenzie, 2009:257]. Similarly, in her study tracing the Bush-era ‘desecuritization’ of environmental security, Floyd (2007:347) identifies how certain forms 65 Say, replacing the threat of ‘migrants’ with ‘environment’; although such evaluations do seem implicitly to require substantive consideration [cf. Floyd, 2011]. 32 of desecuritization do not [re]politicize the issue, but rather wipe it off the political agenda altogether. As noted by Hansen, ‘desecuritization-as-silencing’ is, of all forms of desecuritization, the one “that stretches securitisation theory the most” [2012:545], both analytically, in that ‘silent desecuritizations’ cannot be studied within a framework grounded 66 but especially normatively. After all, whereas politicizing an issue allows for more democratic (and, in the CS view, more felicitous) decision-making, silencing actively yet covertly works as a ‘strategy of exclusion’ that marginalizes and obscures ‘potentially insecure subjects’ [ibid.2012:544-545], further disadvantaging them and denying them any political recognition. Such a move should be of obvious tactical interest as a ‘strategic time-out’ that enables political actors to “...depoliticise in ways that facilitate the long term goal of a political bargaining sphere” (ibid.535). However, as it is inherently anti-democratic, and as, by perpetuating the insecurity of marginalized but voiceless actors, it risks laying the foundations for future (re)- securitizations,67 ‘desecuritization-as-silencing’ appears, if anything, the ethical antithesis of ‘proper’ desecuritization, whether conceived in deontic or consequentialist terms.

Desecuritization seeks to promote the development of western society and create a white prescription for the world

Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19 --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

The normative goal of securitization theory is to protect ‘normal politics’ though civilized illocutionary action in favor of desecuritization, where desecuritization is constantly understood as synonymous with ‘progress attached to the development of Western international society’: Progress as desecuritization [has been] inherent in the liberals’ project since the nineteenth century…. This project has been taken the furthest in the ‘zone of peace’ that now characterizes Western international society…. With the demise of the Communist counterproject and the closed states and societies associated with it, the prospect exists for a more widespread dissolving of borders, desecuritizing most kinds of political, social, and economic interaction. This development is the most advanced within the EU, but it is also inherent in the shift from modern to postmodern states and from more closed to more open political constructions that is going on in many parts of the world. (: 209, emphasis added) To describe the 19th-century, golden age of European imperialism as a period of Western liberal progress is to dramatically misapprehend the historical record (see ; ; ). To equate the growth of Western imperialist hegemony with ‘desecuritization’ is even worse. It is not only to retroactively sanitize white supremacist imperialist history, but also to further insist that it ought to continue. In this sort of normative claim, securitization theory’s racism becomes operative, moving from a white methodology that describes the world from ‘a limited perspective – that deriving from White experience’ (), to a normatively white prescription for how the world ought to be.

Desecuritization’s depiction of security as a failure of normal politics serves the interests of those who benefit from negative depictions of threats and silences alternate visions of security

McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG

In the securitization framework, the study of security is ultimately the study of the designation of threat. In this framework, an issue is a security issue if European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 578 positioned as a threat to a particular political community. This commitment to the study of ‘threats’ is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Wæver, 1995: 56). Such a commitment is consistent also with the oppositional conception of identity in the securitization framework, wherein who we are is determined by the designation of (threatening) others.21 In short, we can learn all we need to know about the construction of security through studying the issues that are represented as existential threats. As Michael Williams (2003) has suggested, this oppositional view of the politics of security is related to the Copenhagen School’s indebtedness to the political theory of Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, politics in general is characterized by enmity and exclusion, with the sovereign’s designation of threatening ‘others’ central to political life and allowing the ‘exception’: the suspension of the normal rules of politics. For the securitization framework, such a vision of politics is particularly applicable to the realm of security, which is characterized by the articulation of threat and ‘emergency measures’ enabled by that articulation. The Copenhagen School suggests that this political dynamic captures something timeless about the logic of security itself, with the realm of security an arena of exclusion and ‘panic politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). This view of the logic of security has been central to their call for desecuritization, a point I will return to in a moment. Representations of threat — pivotal to Schmittian security politics — can of course be viewed as constitutive of security and identity. As Simon Dalby has argued, the designation of that from which we need to be protected is crucial in telling us ‘who we are, what we value and what we are prepared to countenance to protect our self-preferred identities’ (Dalby, 2002: xxx). But is this the only way in which security is constructed, and what do we miss through focusing only on the designation of threat? I suggest here that while central, a focus on the designation of threat alone risks missing much about the construction of security, especially through privileging the ‘content’ of security over its meaning in particular contexts. As noted, Roxanne Lynn Doty (1998/9) has suggested that radically different approaches to immigration can be understood in the context of different discourses of security. For Doty, changing approaches to the treatment of Haitian refugees by the US government in the 1990s can primarily — and contra the Copenhagen School — be understood as a change in the way security itself was understood. And I have suggested elsewhere (McDonald, 2003) that significant change in the Brazilian government’s approach to Amazonian deforestation in the late 1980s — from conceptualizing the intact rainforest as a threat to Brazil to positioning it as that in need of being protected as part of Brazil — can be better understood as a change in perceptions McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 579 or discourses of security rather than as an instance of ‘de-securitization’. Here, articulations of the values in need of being protected were more prominent — and I would suggest more politically significant — than articulations of ‘from what or whom we need protection’. The focus on the designation of threat alone therefore tells a partial story of how security is given meaning, marginalizing inclusive and non-statist definitions of ‘our values’ that tell us how security is understood in particular contexts.22 More problematically, the Copenhagen School image of security as acquiring meaning (or more accurately content) through the articulation of threat arguably works only to the extent that security is fixed in a Schmittian logic based on exclusion and exception.23 The ‘fixedness’ of the Copenhagen School’s logic of security has been taken up by ‘Welsh School’ critical security theorists, for whom the study of security should be geared towards recognizing and advancing opportunities for emancipation of the most vulnerable. Ken Booth (2005: 207) and Paul Williams (2004: 144), for example, have suggested that the securitization framework is parasitic upon traditional (Realist) discourses of security that are taken as indicative of a universal and timeless logic of security. This is evident, for these theorists, in the Copenhagen School’s commitment to strict boundaries of inclusion and exclusion; to the state and state political leaders’ centrality in defining (usually external) threats and responses to them; and to the association of security means and tools with the most significant of ‘emergency measures’: military action. This constitutes an important normative problem, arguably serving to reify and normalize these traditional statist, exclusionary and militaristic approaches to security. Indeed, the idea that the Copenhagen School’s logic of security is both relatively fixed and politically conservative is a feature of even sympathetic readings of the securitization framework (Huysmans, 1998: 500–1; Hansen, 2000: 286). In this context, key proponents of the Copenhagen School (Wæver, 1995; 2000: 253; 2004; Buzan et al., 1998: 204–9) have argued in favour of desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. While recognizing the possibility for securitization to be progressive (eg Wæver, 2000: 285), the general suggestion is that ‘it is better . . . to aim for desecuritization’ (Buzan and Wæver, 1998: 4). Here, the Schmittian logic of security can be avoided and issues returned to the open and deliberative realm of normal politics. Important issues surface again here about what constitutes normal politics and about the relatively simplistic distinction between ‘security’ and ‘politics’. Analytically, it is certainly possible to suggest that rather than constituting the opposite realm to that of politics, debates around what constitutes security and how ‘we’ should act to achieve or preserve it are particularly politically intense, even a form of ‘hyper-politics’. The logic of security upon which the securitization framework is based might be contested again here, 579 European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 580 most prominently the suggestion that security ‘speech acts’ can themselves take issues outside the political realm. But the suggestion that we should aim for ‘desecuritization’ is also normatively problematic. It depicts security as a failure of ‘normal politics’ rather than recognizing security as a site of contestation and therefore for (even emancipatory) change. This is especially important if security is still that most powerful of political categories — defining political priority, a community’s identity and its core values. The focus only on the negative designation of threat serves the interests of those who benefit from dominant negative and exclusionary articulations of threat in contemporary international politics, further silencing voices articulating alternative visions for what security means and how it might be realized.

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