We take refuge in hybrid spaces, revel in the forbidden queer life that exists always already in between the lines – cyborg subjectivity is a process of queer technological assembly and reassembly that transcends the boundaries of normative international politics and identity constructions.
Carlson ’01 -- (Dennis Carlson, 2001, “Gay, Queer, and Cyborg: The performance of identity in a transglobal age,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 22:3, 297-309, DOI: 10.1080/01596300120094343, accessed 7-19-2022) -- nikki
To address that question, I want to turn to the metaphor of the cyborg queer, as suggested by the work of Donna Haraway (1991), an in uential postmodern philosopher of science. The cyborg is the creation of science fiction and fantasy, although, as Haraway observes, science ction always represents a projection of contemporary cultural myths. Throughout the modern era, the cyborg has fascinated the public consciousness, ever since Mary Shelley introduced Frankenstein’s monster, the part-hu- man, part-animal, part-machine who would be free. The cyborg is often treated in popular culture as a monster, or a robot with no autonomy or free will—like the Borg on Star Trek: the next generation. But this is not always the case. Haraway finds in some feminist science fiction novels, and in films such as Blade Runner, a model for a progressive type of cyborg, one who is struggling to be free, like Frankenstein’s monster, but is now living in a postmodern age. In this form, Haraway suggests, the cyborg myth is both a reflection of and constitutive of a new type of human or posthuman subject, no longer divisible into a ‘mind’ and a body, and no longer separable from the technologies that locate it on a worldwide information web and in cybernetic feedback loops, a cyborg who has carved out limited freedom in a borderland space. The postmodern cyborg moves back and forth across identity borders. The cyborg is a metaphor for ‘shapeshifting’ subjects who exist at the boundaries and interfaces between outside and inside, between subjectivity, body, and technology, able to adapt to a heterogeneous and rapidly changing environment. They have no authentic unity or identity and can only be said to exist as partial, always in ‘guises’, always in the process of being assembled and reassembled out of parts circulating on the worldwide web, always part of a continuous feedback loop that connects everything in a cybernetic, global information age. In Haraway’s language, the subject is ‘stitched together imperfectly’ and always being restitched, without a master plan. If this postmodern cyborg is still only a fantasy, only beginning to be made into reality, Haraway suggests it is the future for more and more of ‘us’. It is the ‘postmodern collective and personal self’ (p. 163). The education of the cyborg occurs at the borderlands, that new hybrid space being constructed around the major national boundaries that divide peoples and cultural identities. This is the land, she says, of the mestizo, the queer, the postcolonial. Postmodern cyborg subjects also inhabit a cultural landscape in which identities are blurred, multiple languages are spoken, and different cultural traditions and rituals rub up against one another. We might take Gloria Anzaldua’s writing in her influential book Borderlands (1987) as an example. For Anzaldua, a Chicana lesbian, marginalized from the white, middle class women’s movement, marginalized within a patriarchal Mexican culture, and marginalized as a lesbian in a heteronormative culture, the borderlands is a permanent place of residence. The geographical borderland Anzaldua inhabits is that which separates Mexico from the United States, marked by ‘this thin edge of barbwire’. If this barbwire is symbolic of cultural hegemony and violence, it is a barbwire that does not frighten some—in fact many—from crossing over or under it every day. Those who are border crossers learn to shift back and forth from one culture to the other, speaking in diverse tongues, surviving by interweaving and juxtaposing ideas, literary forms, linguistic styles, and identities. Who now lives in the borderlands? The ‘prohibited’ and the ‘forbidden’ find it their home. In short: ‘the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half dead’. This is a territory, in short, for those who ‘cross over, pass over, or go through the con nes of the “normal” ’ (p. 25). Cyborgs and mestizos are metaphors for a new form of postmodern subject who no longer, according to Haraway, is caught in the ‘spiral dance’, no longer needs an Other to define itself. Haraway borrows a phrase from the Vietnamese film maker and postcolonial theorist Trinh T. Minha-ha—‘inappropriate/d others’—to refer to the cyborg subject who does not engage in self-definition through reference to dominant categories of ‘self’ and ‘Other,’ the kinds of identities offered to the late modern subject by identity politics. To the extent that cyborgs define themselves by identity labels it is always for strategic purposes. Politically, cyborgs prefer a politics of personal communicative freedom and strategic political mobilizations to a politics of welfare state progressivism and reformism, forms of politics that allow cyborgs to ‘join with another, to see together without claiming to be another’ (Haraway, 1991, p. 193). Rather than view gender, class, race, and sexual identities as the basis for a progressive politics, Haraway and other postmodern feminists seek to liberate us from the taken-for-granted character of identity categories. The cyborg subject is not accustomed to thinking about ‘race’ or ‘gender’ or ‘class’ or ‘sexual orientation’ as if these were naturally given and meaningful categories. In the subversion of identity in the new borderlands of culture, Haraway sees the possibility for weaving together a new hybrid identity, linked to a new affinity politics that draws people together based on common interest and lifestyle and that dissolves again when it is no longer useful. Affinity politics is the only kind of politics that makes sense in a postmodern world, according to Haraway, in which ‘none of “us” have any longer the symbolic or material capability of dictating the shape of reality to any of “them” ’ (p. 157). This all sounds very appealing and very liberating—to cast off the mask and shield of identity, to be free agents at last, engaged in constructing and reconstructing ourselves outside of the binary logic of dominant identity categories. Yet I remain somewhat suspicious of postmodern identity formation. We may live in a world in which borders are increasingly meaningless, and in which all identity is understood to be performance and representation. The worldwide information web and the global village may also now provide opportunities to build new kinds of uid, af nity-group communities and shapeshifting identities. At the same time, we cannot walk away from the historic struggles over power that still define class, race, gender, and sexual identity in the postmodern world. We are participants, wittingly or unwittingly, in historic struggles against oppression and invisibility, and to suggest that these ‘old’ modern era struggles are no longer relevant, that we are now free, if we want to be, to creatively engage in our own self-production outside of identity, outside of the dialectic between self and Other, is to engage in a fantasy we should not mistake for reality. In an essay on ‘The “Uncanny”’, Sigmund Freud tells a story about riding on a train, half-asleep in his compartment, when suddenly he was jolted awake as the washing-cabi- net door across from him swung open. As he sat up, Freud writes, ‘an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a traveling cap came in’. Freud assumed that the man had taken the wrong direction and come into his compartment by mistake. ‘Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own re ection in the looking-glass on the open door.’ What was uncanny about the situation, he observes, is that ‘I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance’ (Freud, 1958, p. 248). Freud provides, in this brief example, a representation of the myth of the ‘double’; a myth based on the metaphor of the looking-glass self. The Other is an exteriorization of our own subjectivity, a construction of our own ego, a projection of part of ourselves we would deny, exclude, and repress. So Freud projects upon the Other in the mirror a dislikeable appearance, af rming his own likeability. But he also means to imply that his own self-likeability is constructed on shaky ground, that it is dependent upon the dislikeability of the man in the mirror. Yet the man in the mirror is a re ection of himself. We cannot but fail to see ourselves in the negativity of the Other we have created. To bring issues of identity into education is to help young people recognize that the degree to which the Other has been represented as a ‘double’, an alter ego re ected in the mirror. Hegel and Marx, of course, based a whole narrative of history on the dialectic between self and Other, making it the driving force of history. From this standpoint, identity is constructed out of the relationship between master and slave, between independent and dependent consciousness. The destination of history is the recognition that we no longer need these identity categories to de ne ourselves, so that difference dissolves and truth is once more uni ed. This modernist mythology of history has been pretty well discredited in recent years, both because of its utopianism and because the promise of unity is itself inconsistent with commitments to difference and diversity. But postmodern theory may offer only the negativity of this modern myth, rather than a transformative new mythology. Whereas modernism understands identity as requiring an Other, postmodern identity seeks to de ne itself without the need for ‘Othering’ practices. Whereas modern forms of identity formation emphasize a movement towards the unity of all oppositions, postmodern identity formation offers only a movement towards the dispersal of all unities, a proliferation of differences that never comes together in any coherent cultural politics. I think one way to proceed is down a path suggested by Judith Butler (1999). As a leading postmodern theorist of the self, Butler understands identity as performance and believes that a progressive cultural politics is about troubling all essentialistic treatments of identity. This seems to imply a cultural politics that is organized around af nity groups rather than fixed and unidimensional identity groups. For to organize around identity is to participate in legitimating identity categories, even though these categories have served to oppress women, people of colour, gays and lesbians, and the ‘working class’. Still, Butler backs away from this extreme, post-identity position. She is Hegelian enough to believe that identity in Western culture has been and continues to be a dialectical production. Within the historical dialectic between dominant and subordinated groups, identity categories are more than categories of oppression. They are also categories used in the slave’s struggle for freedom. At this historical juncture at least, she writes, the subject requires an identity forged out of ‘a radical and constitutive relation to alterity’. This means that there are limits to the idea of moving beyond identity, at least as ‘the point of departure for politics’ (p. xiv). At the same time, identity is never xed or unidimensional. Various identity dialectics push the human subject towards continuous reconstruction. Butler observes that the self constantly nds itself outside itself, without the possibility of a ‘return to a former self’. No return is possible because there is no recovery from ‘self-loss’, the losing of who we have been, the lack of a stable foundation upon which to construct a stable identity (p. xv). The subject is always recognizing itself through identity. But the moment it nds itself is simultaneously the moment it begins to lose itself again, as identity is revealed as a mere representation, a performance, a re ection in the mirror. The moment that identity is used subversively, to afrm a liberatory politics, is also the moment it begins to be commercialized and stripped of its liberatory politics. Where does this leave progressive educators, scholars, and cultural workers? I think it leaves us trying to reconcile identity politics and post-identity politics rather than choosing one over the other. It means learning to afrm identity and troubling it simultaneously. For although identity may still be constructed as a relation between self and Other, the current categories of identity are not permanent fixtures on the cultural landscape, and self and Other can move toward a more equitable recognition. Given all this, it seems likely that sexual identity, along with gender, race, and class identities, will continue to play a part in constructing the postmodern self. Indeed, for all the talk about queer theory as a movement beyond identity, it may be appreciated as a new stage in an historic movement characterized by a heightened self-awareness regarding identities that were once largely taken for granted as naturally given. In some ways, gayness is even more rmly established as an axis of identity formation in the postmodern age, although its name and form keep changing. And lesbians and gay men, along with bisexual and transgendered people, are coming out, and thus afrming an identity, at a younger and younger age. One example of just how much things are changing is an event that took place in 1998, at a middle school in Falls Church, Virginia. David Grossman, the 13-year-old guest of honour, held a coming-out party one day after school, proudly af rming a gay identity before family and other gay teens (Steiner, 2001). If David’s story is not typical, it suggests that sexual identity is not going away, that gay/queer identity still serves a very important role in helping most homosexual and bisexual young people af rm their bodies and their desires, and also build an identity that is more than about sexuality, that involves solidarity with others and commitment to a cultural politics. At the same time, gay youth are still coming out into the margins, and the struggle against the commodi cation of sexual identity continues. Although the cyborg queer is a useful metaphor for a new phase in the conscious development of sexual identity at the margins, it is fraught with contradictions. The cyborg is a creature of the global web, the internet, and as we move into what Jean Baudrilliard (1983) has called a ‘hyperreal’ world, identity is increasingly hyperreal or virtual as well. We stitch a self-image together by cutting and pasting images and texts, by creating multiple personae. Virtual communities of identity replace ‘real’, geographical communities. Eugene Provenzo (1998) observes that these developments are for the most part progressive, that the worldwide web can provide a liberatory space for gay youth outside of the regulatory and normalizing power of the local community. The internet allows gay youth across America, even in remote rural areas, to participate in gay culture and build communities of af nity. But how liberatory, how politically aware, are these new virtual communities that we spend so much time inhabiting? As Darren Pascavage argues, ‘the Internet can quite literally keep gay youth “in their place”— speci cally, in front of the computer’ (2000, p. 9). And that place, as he notes, is increasingly commercialized. This means that the struggle over control of identity continues, as does the marginalization of gayness. The homecoming parade oat sponsored by the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Alliance at Miami University which I referred to at the beginning of this essay was performing queer identity in the belly of the beast, one might say. But it was a performance that still kept gayness in its place, isolated to one oat. The oat signi ed that there is now a limited space for gayness, so long as that space is still a separate space, so long as gay people continue to be the Other. In such a context, one must af rm identity and trouble it simultaneously, constructing and reconstructing self and Other in the process.