3 -- Academic Politicization DA – debate as a political discipline is defined by the process of delineation between valorized and antagonized modes of knowledge production – resist the call of the negative to act as the procedural enforcer of counterinsurgency and embrace a queer interpretation of the resolution that calls into question the pervasion of state politics and its production of dominant ideological narratives.
Smith and Lee ’14 -- (Nicola J. Smith, Donna Lee, 1-20-2014, "What's Queer about Political Science?," Volume: 17 issue: 1, page(s): 49-63S, AGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-856X.12037, accessed 7-23-2022) -- nikki
As Laura Shepherd (2012) notes: ‘The idea of a discipline (noun), in the academic sense, clearly derives from the verb: both relate to establishing clear boundaries between what is right and good (behaviour/research) and what is wrong and bad (behaviour/research); both have ways to correct transgression when an uninitiated (or resistant) person strays [original emphasis]’. We would like to take this further and argue that it is through the very process of disciplining (verb) that an academic ‘discipline’ (noun) such as political science comes into being. That is, it is precisely through the construction, maintenance and policing of carefully-demarcated boundaries that political science becomes constituted as a discipline: the centre is not separate from the margins but is constituted in and through them (Doty 1997). Important here, then, is how political science has come to be defined as a field of study and, in particular, how ‘politics’ is seen to be the natural preserve of the state. Many of our students have undertaken A-levels in ‘Government and Politics’ and a number of political science departments in the UK and internationally currently feature ‘Government and Politics’ in the title.9 And one of the first—and most central—questions most first-year undergraduate students are asked to address is whether or not politics and government are synonymous (with the tacit message that, no, they are not the same but, yes, they do nevertheless ‘naturally’ go together, hence why the question is posed). A key problem regarding queer theory here is that it has not, as yet, had a great deal to say about the state (although see for instance Duggan 1994; Bernstein and Reimann 2001; Brandzel 2005). But it also reflects how states and bodies are nevertheless imagined to reside in different realms: the state is often seen as synonymous with the ‘public’ sphere of politics—a world of government, power and collectivity—whereas the body is frequently imagined to reside in the ‘private’ sphere—a world of intimacy, selfhood and individuality. Yet feminist scholarship has long sought to highlight how this supposedly straightforward division between states and bodies is, in fact, deeply gendered. Indeed, a central project for feminist theory has precisely been to reveal how the state itself is often coded as masculine: that is, it is associated with the public realm of political power and decision-making and, as such, with masculine influence and identity (Youngs 2000a). The body, in contrast, is frequently coded as feminine in its multiple associations with nature, emotions, sexuality, vulnerability, reproduction and the family (Hooper 2000). In so doing, feminists have sought to expose and challenge the complex ways in which ‘body politics’ become invisible, denied and erased (for a detailed discussion see Jenkins 2005). Charlotte Hooper (2000, 39), for instance, has explored how rational masculinity is organised around a series of gendered dualisms (including public/private, mind/body, and inside/outside) that include a ‘fantasy of disembodiment’ which ‘depends upon the apparent invisibility or absence of bodies in social discourse, so that masculine reason could be separate from and untainted from the body’. As such, feminists have sought to reveal the ‘problem of the missing body’ in social and political discourse in order to expose and challenge how this very invisibility is steeped in, and (re)productive of, power relations (Youngs 2000b, 1). In this way, feminists have also sought to show how bodies and politics are intertwined, for the body is: ... a place for political mobilization interconnected with other sites of resistance and political action ... bodies are not external to political processes but firmly enmeshed in them, even if they are not necessarily the defining site for action. The lived experience of the body, the identity and definitions attached to bodies, inform and are connected to all political struggles (Harcourt 2009, 23).10 Queer Theory and Political Science One of the most crucially important contributions of feminist political analysis, then, has precisely been to gender the state (for a review see Kantola 2006) but also, more fundamentally, to show how the personal is political and, consequently, to shift the focus from politics-as-government to politics-as-power. This latter notion is, of course, shared by many political scientists—indeed, to quote one of the aforementioned textbooks, Hay’s (2002, 168) Political Analysis states: ‘power specifies the sphere of the political: power is to political analysis what the economy is to economics [original emphases]’. What is interesting, though, is that although political science has a great deal to say about power, so too does queer theory. Queer theory is, in fact, centrally concerned with the (re)production of power relations; power is, in short, what queer theory is about. Although there is no one approach to power in queer studies—rather, power represents a key site of contestation within queer theorising—queer scholars frequently ask questions about power that ‘seek to expose the limitations, unstable foundations and power-laden assumptions of the “straight” political, psychological, cultural and economic discourses that govern us’ (Griffin 2011, 50). At the same time, while queer theory has much to say about power as it relates to sexuality, it can also denote ‘any form of research positioned within conceptual frameworks that highlight the instability of taken-for-granted meanings and resulting power relations’ (Browne and Nash 2010, 4).11 It is not (just) sexual norms but rather norms per se that a great deal of queer theory seeks to expose and destabilise. As Butler writes: ... power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms, including the subject position of the critic; and ... this implication of the terms of criticism in the field of power is not the advent of a nihilistic relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but, rather, the very precondition of a politically engaged critique. To establish a set of norms that are beyond power or force is itself a powerful and forceful conceptual practice that sublimates, disguises and extends its own power play through recourse to tropes of normative universality (Butler 1994, 6–7). Rather than being (only) interested in what truths are, then, queer theory (also) asks us to consider what ‘truths’ do—that is, it asks: ‘What gets to be constituted as “truth” and what are the material effects of this?’ So, for example, rather than asking a question such as ‘What does it mean to be “human”?’ (or, put differently, ‘What is the essence or truth of “the human”?’), queer theorists might ask a rather different question: ‘What gets to be constituted as “human”, and what doesn’t? Who gets to be included in “the human”, and who is left out? And what are the material effects of this, in terms of the ability of the “less-than-human” to live a fully liveable life?’ (for a detailed discussion see Butler 2001). An important purpose of social and political theory is thus to critique how specific appeals to ‘truth’ become presented as universal and timeless rather than as contingent and contestable and how this can in turn legitimise violence and disadvantage within and across particular political, economic and cultural contexts. Indeed, this is a further reason why queer theory is written out of political science— because it seeks to destabilise rather than to discover foundational truths, it is dismissed as therefore being apolitical (and even downright unethical—see for instance Martha Nussbaum’s outright condemnation of Butler’s work in Nussbaum (1999)). Yet, as we’ve noted above, queer theory is fundamentally concerned with questions of power and—far from rejecting ethical enquiry—instead aims to uncover and critique how particular moral orders become naturalised, necessitated and thus positioned as being beyond ethical scrutiny.12 Equally, what queer theory does is to encourage reflection on what it means for something to be ‘political’. What gets to be constituted as ‘political’ and what doesn’t? What gets to become an object of ‘politics’ in academic enquiry and, indeed, public deliberation more broadly? What gets to be studied, discussed, contested, written about, cited, lectured on, and what doesn’t? In short: what’s in and what’s out? More than this, queer theory also insists that what gets to be counted as ‘political’ is itself political—it is a product of the exercise of power, with real material effects. In this sense, queer theory seeks to politicise ‘the political’ itself.