Offensive cyber posture is expensive, trading-off with defensive measures.
Jason Healey 22, Senior Research Scholar and adjunct faculty at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs and president of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 6/24/2022, “The Cyber Budget Shows What the U.S. Values—And It Isn’t Defense,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-budget-shows-what-us-values%E2%80%94and-it-isnt-defense, Marsh
The most obvious implication for national security is that more could be done to reduce America’s significant cyber vulnerabilities. Defense through offense may be a promising experiment or operational concept, but it may not be fully developed as a strategy. The government, both the executive and legislative branches, must work to rebalance these efforts with significantly more funding for federal cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, information sharing and a wide range of other defensive priorities.
The Cyberspace Solarium Commission noted that within the Homeland Security budget, only 15 percent is “committed to initiatives supporting the private sector.” Overall, that is perhaps 1 percent of Defense Department funding. This percentage must increase many times over, targeted at embracing those innovations that give defenders the greatest advantages over attackers at the greatest scale and least cost; working toward major political goals, such as getting to zero botnets; creating new organizations to directly collaborate on response and not just share information; and countless other critical civilian cyber tasks. The U.S. strategy should place non-state actors, with their unique agility and capabilities, at the center of defense and help fund them accordingly.
Just as serious is the misconception in U.S. strategic thinking that sees U.S. moves as beneficial and stabilizing but our adversaries’ as dangerous militarizing escalations. Brazen, reckless attacks like WannaCry and NotPetya are destabilizing and nothing like more precise U.S. operations. We must recognize that adversaries are responding in part to U.S. actions—like Stuxnet and those revealed by Snowden—and perceived U.S. actions—such as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s belief that the Panama Papers were a U.S. covert action aimed at him.
While the budget comparisons I have presented may come as a surprise to some Lawfare readers, they will not surprise most U.S. adversaries, who have long feared U.S. cyber power. Recognizing the true U.S. priorities may help us recognize a more balanced perspective.
Moreover, as I wrote on Lawfare last year, there are tremendous risks when a “fearsome offense [is] paired with a weak defense.” If adversaries feel a war with the United States may be coming, our having “a more fearsome cyber offense makes it more likely they will [get in a sucker punch] on the U.S. before Cyber Command can bring its big guns to bear.”
While the Defense Department needs significant funding for its essential cyber missions, this money will not make the United States significantly more secure in cyberspace. If the U.S. government truly believes the top priority is defense—and that it is not militarizing cyberspace—then its budget for civilian cyber defense must be drastically increased to align more closely with these values.