Funneling more resources and responsibility to CYBERCOM gives it unprecedented autonomy, spurring separation from the NSA.
Jon R. Lindsay 20, assistant professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, 10/30/2020, “Cyber conflict vs. Cyber Command: hidden dangers in the American military solution to a large-scale intelligence problem,” Intelligence and National Security 36(2), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1840746, cc
Classic organization theory stresses that bureaucratic organizations seek resources, autonomy, and control, guided by their historical cultural heritage or essential identity.64 For military organizations this translates into a predilection for offensive doctrines, often described as ‘the cult of the offensive,’ because they require expensive capabilities, necessitate authority for independent operations, reduce uncertainty by setting the operational tempo, and are consistent with a warrior ethos.65 The institution of the U.S. Air Force is an instructive example in this regard. Even when the Air Corps was formally part of the U.S. Army, airmen developed an ambitious new doctrine – strategic bombing – that advertised the ability to deliver victory independently of the other services.66 The ideology of strategic bombing served the Air Force well in interservice competition during its formative years as an independent service, even if the theory often proved disappointing in practice.67 A doctrine of independent strategic effects helped to bolster the legitimacy of a newly independent command. The newly autonomous U.S. Space Force tends to advance similar arguments, cribbed from classic airpower theory, about the unique strategic importance of the space domain and the specialized technical skills needed to exploit it.68
From this perspective, CYBERCOM’s doctrine of persistent engagement plays a similar institutional role as strategic bombing did for the early Air Force. New ideas about cyber campaigns, and accompanying authorities to carry them out, are supposed to enable CYBERCOM to create meaningful strategic effects. CYBERCOM advertises its intention to act beneath the threshold of war to influence strategic adversaries. Persistent engagement, from this perspective, might be described as a nonlethal version of strategic bombing. Much as the Air Force seeks to attack critical nodes in an enemy target system, using technology to create strategic effects, cyber campaigns target critical information nodes in the adversary’s computer network to shape its behavior. The comparison to the Air Force experience may be more than metaphorical. As Sarah White notes in her study of U.S. military cyber subcultures, ‘By the end of 2007, the Air Force had emerged as the recognized service leader in cyberspace. While the other services were engaged in the patchwork pursuit of various cyberspacerelated initiatives, neither the Army nor the Navy had the level of decisive senior leader engagement or senior leader direction that existed in the Air Force in 2007.’69 The Air Force approach, which has been influential in CYBERCOM’s doctrinal ruminations, was ‘marked by the firm distinction of cyberspace as a warfighting domain, the increasingly aggressive pursuit of autonomy in cyberspace operations and organizations, and the creation of a dedicated cyberspace career field.’70
Questions of strategic validity notwithstanding, CYBERCOM’s new doctrine is instrumentally useful for enhancing bureaucratic identity, control, autonomy, and resources. A supposed technological imperative to ‘defend forward’ in the ‘cyber domain’ provides an intellectual justification for a military organization like CYBERCOM to do what is inclined to do anyway, namely conduct autonomous offensive operations to create strategic effects. Proactive campaigning to influence or disrupt the adversary’s networks is consistent with the offensive warrior ethos of military institutions. Offensive operations, rather than reactive defense, also enables CYBERCOM to assert control in a highly uncertain environment. Expanded authorities for peacetime operations provide some autonomy from other services, as well as the intelligence community. To ‘man, train, and equip’ the cyber mission forces that will implement the new doctrine, finally, CYBERCOM needs plans, budget allocations, and personnel. It is also helpful to use the same language that other military commands use to explain how and why cyber warriors should be included in joint task forces.
A crowded house CYBERCOM needs to do two things to persuade decisionmakers throughout the Department of Defense and the Executive and Legislative branches to provide the authorities and resources it needs to pursue its preferred course of action. First, CYBERCOM needs to make itself comparable to other services by arguing that it performs familiar categories of military operations – command, intelligence, fire, maneuver, protection, sustainment – in a warfighting domain just like other military services. Second, it must also distinguish itself from its former homes in U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as superficially similar organizations like U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
CYBERCOM was formally created in 2010 as a sub-unified command under STRATCOM and became a fully-fledged unified military command in 2018. It incorporated elements that had previously functioned under STRATCOM such as, on the offensive side, Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare, and on defense, Joint Task Force Global Network Operations.71 CYBERCOM’s defensive mission also overlaps with the network administrators at the Defense Information Systems Agency and the cryptographers at the NSA Central Security Service. As of early 2019, CYBERCOM had a full-time staff of ‘1,520 military and civilians, plus contractors’ together with ‘4,406 Service members and civilians in our Cyber Mission Force.’72
The service components each brought distinct organizational cultures and institutional histories to CYBERCOM.73 The Air Force articulated an early vision of cyber power as strategic airpower but then struggled to find its cyber warriors a permanent home, resulting in a split between the air intelligence and cyber communities. Army cyber personnel were initially split across different branch baronies before being consolidated in Army Cyber Command, which had a notably more tactical focus, with some friction between the military intelligence and signals (network administration) communities. The Navy approach to cyber was dominated by cryptologists, who enjoyed a long and close working relationship with NSA, under the umbrella of a vague new construct of maritime information dominance. With so much institutional diversity in its ranks, CYBERCOM has strong incentives to articulate common doctrinal concepts to coordinate and control other organizations’ resources.