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Overlaps in authority wreck NC3 defenses---but unity of command solves.

Morgan Dwyer 20, fellow in the International Security Program and deputy director for policy analysis in the DefenseIndustrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 10/15/2020, “Cross-domain Competition,” http://defense360.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Dwyer_NuclearNexus_Cross-domain-competition1.pdf, cc

When separate authority stovepipes intersect but values conflict, cooperation is challenging, even in the context of shared missions.43 In these circumstances, outside intervention is required to determine which organization is actually in charge. For example, in the traditional nuclear community—which not only includes the military services and Strategic Command but also the Department of Energy (DOE)—policymakers established the Nuclear Weapons Council.44 The authorities and responsibilities for council participants are specified by law, policy, and memorandums of agreement between DOD and DOE.45 Without a similar governance structure or single authority capable of compelling interorganizational change, it seems unlikely that DOD’s separate space or cyber institutions will poactively declassify any capabilities, even those which might help deter attacks on NC3.46

Separate authority stovepipes may also create barriers to employing offensive weapons. For example, if an adversary attacks the NC3 architecture in the cyber domain, and DOD does not wish to retaliate using a nuclear weapon,47 which combatant command is in charge of the response, Strategic or Cyber Command? DOD’s cyber doctrine specifies that Cyber Command’s role vis-à-vis the other combatant commands varies as a function of whether operations are local or global.48 Furthermore, it states that the support/supporting relationships between commands are established on a by-mission basis.49 These public statements, of course, leave the unanswered the question of which combatant command—Cyber or Strategic Command—is in charge of non-nuclear responses to cyberattacks on NC3.

Furthermore, what happens if attacks cross domains? How then should DOD integrate three separate authority stovepipes—in the Strategic, Space, and Cyber Commands—to effectively and efficiently respond? If DOD is to credibly threaten any response to space or cyber-based attacks on NC3, these basic unity of command questions deserve answers.50 To date, however, Vice Chairman John Hyten admits that DOD has not sufficiently addressed these questions, noting: “We just decided that we’d call each other combatant commands, and not put an adjective on the front.”51 By failing to specify a critically important adjective—whether a command is supporting or supported—DOD leaves unanswered the question of who is in charge when attacks cross domains.

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