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Military culture and cybersecurity are incompatible---meshing them risks war AND public-private incongruity.

Jon R. Lindsay 20, assistant professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, 10/30/2020, “Cyber conflict vs. Cyber Command: hidden dangers in the American military solution to a large-scale intelligence problem,” Intelligence and National Security 36(2), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1840746, cc

At the same time, the institutional characteristics that make military organizations so effective at scaling up operations also raise serious concerns when the operations in question are intelligence and covert action. These can be considered alongside the same three characteristics that define intelligence itself.

First, intelligence is deception. The essence of intelligence tradecraft is the abuse of trust to infiltrate the same institutions and infrastructures that enable cooperation in the target society. Whether secret vulnerabilities and accesses are leveraged to collect or inject information is a secondary distinction. Defenders can employ deception as well as attackers, which complicates and limits the strategic effectiveness of intelligence by any means. This is all second nature to intelligence professionals, but the subversion of trust stands in stark tension with martial ideals of open and heroic combat, even as stratagem has a long history in war. Feints and ambushes are one thing, but subversion and treachery are quite another. It is understandable why a military organization might resist thinking of itself as an intelligence organization, even setting aside the subordinate or supporting connotation that intelligence usually has in a military setting. CYBERCOM is an honorable military organization, but intelligence is at its core a duplicitous business. The mismatch between military culture and intelligence practice is also likely to complicate CYBERCOM’s efforts to recruit, retain, and manage the unconventional hackers it needs to subvert the most sophisticated trust networks humanity has ever constructed. This all raises an important ethical question: should the same militaries that openly man the ramparts also be digging through firewalls?

Second, intelligence is political. Secret statecraft is politically attractive because it promises to reduce the costs and risks of pursuing contested policy goals. Militaries are also political, of course, but in a very different way. Intelligence is organized deception to gain an information advantage. Militaries are organized force to gain a coercive advantage. Military forces can be employed to win battlefield contests, brandished to threaten punishment, or deployed to reassure allies. Intelligence, by contrast, is more preoccupied with lowering policy costs and risks on the sly, rather than increasing power and credibility in the open. The political logic of intelligence stands in stark tension with the noisy confrontation of battle or the deliberate signaling of deterrence. Intelligence can be used to make war more efficient in terms reducing force requirements while boosting capabilities, of course, but this sometimes comes at the expense of effectiveness in terms of power and credibility.87 Increasing military reliance on intelligence capabilities in space and cyberspace is only making these ‘cross domain’ tradeoffs more difficult.88 The tension between deceptive contestation and strategic stability lies at the root of contemporary concerns that CYBERCOM’s doctrine of ‘persistent engagement’ will lead to inadvertent escalation.89

The relative prioritization of power, credibility, or efficiency in any given situation is a profoundly political problem. Different leaders, parties, and organizations, furthermore, can be expected to have different opinions about the way it should be solved. The American military has internalized strong professional norms of apolitical service to the nation, of course, and CYBERCOM can be expected to carry on this Huntingtonian tradition. Yet military professionalism can also be leveraged for advantage in domestic politics, and it can distort political assessment or oversight of military operations.90 CYBERCOM will struggle to appear politically neutral in the very political controversies that its subversive activities enable. In general, the inherent political sensitivity of intelligence operations may not be a good fit for military preferences for operational autonomy. Professional intelligence agencies approach the problem of politicization differently, with varying levels of success, by nurturing close relationships with their political masters while hidden from the harsh light of public politics.91 As CYBERCOM scales up intelligence operations, whatever it decides to call them, this will likely exacerbate the complexity and controversy of political tussles over speech, privacy, and public safety, with CYBERCOM stuck in the middle.

Third, intelligence is increasingly civilian. One important implication for cybersecurity is that ‘cyberspace’ as such does not exist. Digital networks are the lifeblood of governance, finance, trade, industry, administration, and political activism in the twenty-first century, and cyber operations work by, with, and through these networks. Civilian firms build and operate most of the enabling infrastructure. Civilian cybersecurity firms play an important role in both offensive collection and influence and defensive counterintelligence, but their economic interests may not always align with public cybersecurity.92 Civil society actors, meanwhile, bear the brunt of much cyber conflict as the targets of political surveillance, disinformation, and information control. Cyber operations are deeply embedded within and constrained by all this civilian activity, but this poses serious challenges for military culture. Military organizations tend to neglect or only grudgingly perform missions like counterinsurgency and peacekeeping that require them to work by, with, and through civilian populations; militaries would rather prepare for major combat operations that allow for greater autonomy and are more consistent with warrior identities.93 Given that military interventions to stabilize and rebuild nations have so often proved controversial, how much more problematic are intelligence operations to subvert and protect the digital infrastructure of civil society itself? Efforts to combat foreign disinformation campaigns are especially fraught as they become, in effect, military interventions into democratic polities riven by political disagreement.

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