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SIGINT’s key to counterproliferation.

Phil Gurski 21, President and CEO of Borealis Threat and Risk Consulting Ltd. Phil is a 32-year veteran of CSE and CSIS and the author of six books on terrorism, 3/01/2021, “Do we need intelligence to stop nuclear weapons proliferation?,” https://borealisthreatandrisk.com/do-we-need-intelligence-to-stop-nuclear-weapons-proliferation/, cc

One of the reporting series I recall was that which had to do with states which were pursuing nuclear weapons programs. There were quite a few of them in the 1980s and 1990s: Libya, South Africa, Taiwan, North Korea, India and Pakistan. As we all know, only the last three have attained that capability (we’ll leave aside Israel for now: also, the so-called Permanent 5 UNSC members – the US, USSR/Russia/, the UK, France and the PRC – already had ‘the bomb’). Then there is Iran….more on that in a bit.

Back then, there was no Internet. There was no easy way to keep tabs openly on who was doing what. Thankfully, we had SIGINT to help us gain insight. Through the targeting, collection, processing and analysis of communications (verbal, written, imagery, telemetry, etc.) we could see which countries were making progress and suss out who were the key officials (scientists, civil servants) with the keys to this breakthrough. We learned a lot and were able to keep our political masters informed in ways which would have been impossible without intelligence.

Wow, what a difference a couple of decades make!

A proliferation of information

Now we have so much more information at our fingertips: the World Wide Web, social media platforms, even commercial imagery! As this recent article in The Economist noted: “Non-governmental organisations regularly unearth and publicise secret facilities using “open” sources—most notably images taken by satellites like those which researchers at MIIS (NB Middlebury Institute of International Studies) used to spot North Korea’s looming missile test and Saudi Arabia’s rocket plant.”

In other words, it is harder today to hide a nuclear weapons program. This does not obviate the need for intelligence: after all, there is nothing like a highly-placed human source that can be tasked and directed to find out specific information to determine exactly what a state’s intentions are. And only states can actually take steps to interfere with a nation’s quest for nuclear weapons, even if those steps are of dubious legality (hello assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, probably by Mossad, Israel’s foreign spy service: oh wait, Israel surreptitiously developed their own nuke capability didn’t they?).

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