Proliferation causes extinction.
Dr. Andrew Futter 21. Professor of International Politics at the University of Leicester; Samuel I. Watson, Associate Professor at the University of Warwick; Peter J. Chilton, Research Fellow at the University of Birmingham. "Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Ages.” In The Politics of Nuclear Weapons: New, updated and completely revised. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. pp. 71-78. 2021. Springer. //EM edited for errors.
In the Second Nuclear Age, the greatest risk no longer appears to be from a large-scale conflict between major powers (although this possibility always remains) but instead from regional instability in the Middle East, South or Northeast Asia, or even a non-state actor armed with a nuclear weapon (see Chap. 9).18 This threat has been exacerbated by the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction technology, and particularly the combination of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities to new actors across the globe. Ultimately, the central theme of the Second Nuclear Age is that the spread of the bomb, along with the means to build and deliver nuclear weapons, to new actors has changed the central dynamics of the global nuclear order, and consequently we may no longer be able to rely on the nuclear thinking and toolkit that helped us to survive the First Nuclear Age. In the words of Fred Ikle, writing in 1996:
Half a century after it began, the nuclear drama has reached the conclusion of its first act—a rather happy ending in spite of the gloomy prospects for civilization that darkened the stage at the outset. Tis respite, though, is not a lasting redemption from the dangers of nuclear warfare.19
The Nuclear Proliferation Debate: Optimists and Pessimists
The thinking that led to a conceptualization of nuclear history into two distinct nuclear ages is also reflective of the broader debate about the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. In essence, the relative stability, or at least the lack of major interstate war, of the First Nuclear Age gave rise to the notion that nuclear weapons had helped to “keep the peace” during the Cold War, and that horizontal nuclear proliferation might therefore be stabilizing. This is based on the theory of the nuclear revolution (discussed in the next chapter) and specifically the notion that the advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed warfare, because no rational actor would want to risk attacking an adversary if they could retaliate with nuclear weapons. Thus, a certain level of stability might be achieved between nuclear-armed states that might not otherwise exist. However, this view of nuclear history, and of the stabilizing potential of nuclear weapons, is challenged by those who believe that vertical nuclear proliferation and a reliance on rationality and luck are not a good basis for international politics and security. They also question the post-hoc view that nuclear weapons were the main reason that the Cold War didn’t turn hot and warn against using this potentially flawed analogy today.
The concern that nuclear weapons will spread to new actors that characterize the Second Nuclear Age has provided the backdrop for the nuclear proliferation debate. The question at the heart of this debate is whether nuclear proliferation to new actors will stabilize or destabilize international politics and whether nuclear proliferation makes inter-state, and possibly nuclear, war more or less likely. This subject is at the center of a discussion between two political scientists, Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan. The debate can be succinctly explained as follows:
Kenneth Waltz argues that fear of the spread of nuclear weapons is exaggerated: “More may be better” since new nuclear states will use their weapons to deter others from attacking them. Scott Sagan argues that the spread of nuclear weapons will make the world less stable: “more will be worse” since some new nuclear states will engage in preventive wars, fail to build survivable forces, or have serious nuclear weapons accidents.20
We can think of this debate as being split between proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists and centering on the wisdom and reliability of Mutual Assured Destruction as a mechanism for stability and security (see Chap. 5). Kenneth Waltz is seen as the champion of the nuclear proliferation optimists, and Scott Sagan for the pessimists. The central tenets of these two positions are explained below:
The proliferation optimists hold that horizontal nuclear proliferation should not necessarily be viewed as automatically destabilizing. As Kenneth Waltz explained in 1981:
Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self-control than the old ones have been. … Such fears have proved unfounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many reasons for believing that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future.21
This is partly because:
New nuclear states will confront the possibilities and feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been.22
Ultimately, this viewpoint believes that “Nuclear weapons reasonably used make wars hard to start.”23 As such, the spread of nuclear weapons—in certain circumstances—should actually be welcomed, and retaliatory nuclear deterrence and MAD does and should remain the bedrock of global nuclear relations.
The proliferation pessimists contend that horizontal nuclear proliferation can only ever lead to an increase in nuclear dangers and the possibility of nuclear use. Pessimists point to a number of factors that make horizontal proliferation potentially dangerous: the growth of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear networks (see Chap. 8); the possibility of nuclear accidents; the difficulties of ensuring civilian control and safe and secure command and control of nuclear weapons (see Chap. 5); the specter of preventive war against aspirant nuclear states (see Chap. 8); the problem of building survivable second strike forces; and the fact that stability through proliferation rests on actors always behaving rationally at all times.24
Foremost amongst these however is a critique of the misplaced belief that nuclear weapons helped keep the peace during the First Nuclear Age. In the words of Sagan, writing in 2006:
Deterrence optimism is based on mistaken nostalgia and a faulty analogy. Although deterrence did work with the [United States and] the Soviet Union and China, there were many close calls; maintaining nuclear peace during the Cold War was far more difficult and uncertain than US officials and the American public seem to remember today.25
Proliferation pessimists focus on the problems of organizational culture and the fact that new nuclear actors are perhaps more likely to experience nuclear accidents. As Scott Sagan explains, “professional military organizations— because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests—display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental nuclear war”.26 Newly armed nuclear states might also be less likely to be able to prevent unauthorized use because they lack the positive mechanisms of strong civilian control.27 Consequently, pessimists argue that retaliatory nuclear deterrence (and MAD) may not represent the panacea that it is held to be by proliferation optimists. We can compare and contrast these views in Table 4.5 below:
Nuclear Latency and Virtual Nuclear Arsenals
While only a small number of states have taken the decision to build nuclear weapons, (and the vast majority have decided not to) the peculiarities of nuclear technology means that there exist a number of states theoretically capable of building nuclear weapons at short notice should they chose to, but which are not currently considered to be nuclear armed states. These states
[[TABLE 4.5 OMITTED]]
possess their own civilian nuclear programs, often including the ability to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium 239 and have a relatively advanced military infrastructure that could be used to develop a nuclear weapon (for more on this see Chap. 11). While these states may not be able to build a working bomb overnight (or in total secrecy), they could probably do so in a relatively short space of time should they choose to—although estimates of this vary from case to case and amongst experts. These states are known as virtual nuclear weapons states or threshold nuclear weapons states because they adopt a position referred to as nuclear latency. As Anver Cohen and Joseph Pilat explain:
Virtual weapons are indeed a reality of physics and cannot be ignored, because knowledge, experience, materials and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread. A continuum of virtual capabilities exists, ranging from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear weapons capabilities.28
Nuclear latency remains one of the biggest proliferation challenges facing the international community today.
The complication with nuclear latency stems from the fact that the technology needed for a civilian nuclear power program is very similar to that needed to produce fissile material for a bomb, and because some military hardware designed for non-nuclear weapons systems can be modified to deliver nuclear weapons (aircraft or missiles for example). The problem is compounded by the central bargain of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty whereby all states that have signed the Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States have a right to produce their own civilian nuclear energy (for more on the NPT see Chap. 8). As a result, states can move fairly close to acquiring a nuclear “breakout” capability without actually undermining the NPT or breaking international law (this is at the heart of the current controversy over Iran’s civilian nuclear program and whether or not that is being used as a cover to develop nuclear weapons). With hundreds of civilian nuclear facilities and powerplants operating in dozens of countries worldwide,29 the challenge of nuclear latency is ever present. According to the then Director of the Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei in 2010:
Some estimates indicate that 40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, which means that if they have the required fissile material—high enriched uranium or plutonium—we are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries.30
While ElBaradei’s statement should not necessarily be interpreted as meaning that all of these states will or could easily build nuclear weapons, it does underline the importance of this challenge. Indeed, and despite the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan and the decision taken by Germany in 2011 to phase out civilian nuclear power,31 the global trend could be toward more rather than less nuclear power generation in the future (for the implications of this see Chap. 11).
In theory, any country with an active civilian nuclear industry and a modern weapons program could build a nuclear bomb, although this would not be a straightforward task for any nation that decided to do so. The best-placed states to do this have full control of the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e. they can enrich the fuel for (uranium) and/or separate the by-products of nuclear fission (plutonium). States that operate a civilian nuclear power capability but have to buy nuclear fuel from abroad are far less of a proliferation risk, although because plutonium is a by-product of uranium fission (see Chap. 2) these civilian power plants must be closely monitored by the relevant international authorities, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, technological capabilities are only one dynamic of proliferation and must of course be matched with the political will required to build a bomb. Developing a nuclear warhead small enough to be placed on a missile and that can survive the pressures of fight and possibly atmospheric re-entry for example is a very difficult task, although by no means insurmountable for a modern state. In general, a nation wishing to move from latency to full nuclear weapons capability would meet significant challenges, not least keeping the program secret from the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (the world’s nuclear watchdog).
Below are a number of examples of states that we might consider as having various degrees of nuclear latency:
• Japan. Japan is usually held up as the model of a latent nuclear weapons state because it has an advanced civilian nuclear industry, the ability to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium (in addition to the large stockpiles it already has) and a modern military. Given the geopolitical tensions in Northeast Asia, the threat that Japan may decide to “go nuclear” is ever-present, although most observers suggest that there is little enthusiasm for such a move, and Japan remains a key member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, Japan could probably build a deliverable nuclear weapon if it chose to within a relatively short space of time (maybe less than a year).32 As Mark Fitzpatrick noted in 2019, “The biggest obstacles to a Japanese nuclear weapons program aren’t technical or logistic; they are political, legal, and cultural.”33
• South Korea. South Korea operates a number of civilian nuclear power plants and has expressed an interest in acquiring the technology necessary to control the nuclear fuel cycle (it can’t currently enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium).34 It also theoretically has the infrastructure and manufacturing base to support a nuclear weapons programme.35 Like Japan and Taiwan, South Korea sits in a potentially volatile region and future changes could drive the case for a bomb. South Korea also previously hosted US tactical nuclear weapons on its territory during the Cold War (until 1991) and is believed to have entertained the idea of a home-grown nuclear weapons effort in the past.36 The likelihood of a future nuclear-disarmed North Korea and the credibility of the US-extended guarantee are probably the key variables in any future move toward acquiring the bomb.37
• Taiwan. Taiwan is not a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty given its unique status in international society and has previously had an indigenous nuclear weapons programs in the 1970s. While it is not currently believed to have enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, Taiwan does have specific regional concerns that could lead to arguments for a nuclear weapons capability, but the costs of doing so are possibly too high for the time being (US opposition, international condemnation, or even a Chinese pre-emptive strike). Taiwan would probably also need to build a suitable missile and warhead.38 As Arthur Ding suggested in 2012, “Despite the logic that strategic logic might dictate the acquisition of a modest nuclear arsenal. Taiwan is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons.”39 But this could of course change in the future.
• Brazil. Brazil possesses all the major elements needed to produce fissile material for a bomb (from an indigenous supply of uranium ore to enrichment and the ability to fabricate nuclear fuel) but currently lacks the means to deliver nuclear weapons should it choose to build them, although it has previously had a nuclear bomb program (see Chap. 10). Brazil is also an active member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is seen as an unlikely future nuclear weapons state at the time of writing.40
• Iran. Iran is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it has long been suspected that its nuclear program could be designed for military purposes. Iran appears to be seeking to achieve full control of the nuclear fuel cycle, which would mean an ability to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and has a large military, including a relatively advanced ballistic missile program. Iran is perhaps the biggest concern for future proliferation due to its current geopolitical situation,41 and especially after the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018 (for more on Iran and the Iran Nuclear Deal see Chap. 7).
• Saudi Arabia. Sitting at the heart of a region with ever-changing security requirements—not least the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran on its doorstep, coupled with a perceived decline in US influence, and with an advanced infrastructure and burgeoning economy, Saudi Arabia represents a serious nuclear proliferation concern.42 Saudi Arabia has only a rudimentary civilian nuclear infrastructure, but it is rumored to have close nuclear ties with Pakistan and other Gulf Emirates states that do.43 It also has the resources to support a nuclear weapons program.