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There’s a clear separation between NSA and CYBERCOM jurisdiction---the plan intrudes on NSA territory.

Andrew Schoka 19, active duty Army cyber operations officer assigned to U.S. Cyber Command at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Distinguished Military Graduate of Virginia Tech with a bachelor’s degree in systems engineering, 4/03/2019, “CYBER COMMAND, THE NSA, AND OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE: TIME TO END THE DUAL HAT,” https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/cyber-command-the-nsa-and-operating-in-cyberspace-time-to-end-the-dual-hat/, cc

For every operation Cyber Command executes, joint leaders and operations planners must meticulously calculate and evaluate the risk associated with that particular operation. This is an exceedingly complicated task that requires detailed knowledge of the operations planning and approval process, in addition to technical familiarity with the underlying technologies associated with the operation. In developing this process, Cyber Command has relied heavily on the experience of NSA, using similar processes to ensure that risk is minimized. In so doing, Cyber Command has inadvertently patterned its own appetite for risk after NSA’s. But while NSA’s operations are conducted with scrupulous operational security, intelligence collection is not the primary mission of Cyber Command. In the words of Gen. Paul Nakasone, Cyber Command’s primary mission is to impose costs on adversaries who have acted in the cyberspace domain without fear of retaliation. Imposing cost implies inflicting noticeable damage to a target in a manner that would typically be considered too noisy, risky, or noticeable in signals intelligence operations.

When conducting offensive cyberspace operations, there are essentially two ways to acquire access to a target system: using credentials to masquerade as a legitimate user, and using a vulnerability to exploit a system. In a masquerade, an attacker uses valid credentials, such as a username and password, to log in to the target system as an authorized user. Masquerade attacks are usually difficult to detect because they rely on the system behaving the way it’s supposed to. Conversely, an exploit relies on the existence of a technical vulnerability that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a system. Exploitation relies on a system functioning incorrectly, and is significantly more likely to produce alerts that can expose an attack.

To assess the risk associated with these types of operations, Cyber Command solicits approval from an array of staffs and reviewers. In part because Cyber Command has relied heavily on NSA training, support, and experience to establish these processes, exploitation operations — which by nature carry a greater risk of detection — are subject to increased standards of scrutiny. Likewise, operations that produce a noticeable effect, such as a denial-of-service attack, are typically viewed with aversion. This is detrimental to Cyber Command’s execution of its mission, as producing the desired outcomes against an adversary requires assuming more risk. In reality, the operations approval structure of Cyber Command is set up to prioritize the security of operations above all else, and is extremely risk-averse. Cyber Command’s mission is fundamentally different than NSA’s, and rather than copying approval processes used in intelligence operations, it ought to employ a structure more typical of a military command. However, as long as it relies on NSA tradecraft and expertise Cyber Command will continue to use a paradoxical operations process that is fundamentally opposed to the exact type of mission it is charged with conducting.

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