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Only a strictly defensive posture solves---traditional deterrence fails in the cyber realm

Schneider 18. Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Her research focuses on the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cybersecurity, unmanned technologies, and Northeast Asia; “Cyber and Cross Domain Deterrence: Deterring Within and From Cyberspace”; 2018; https://www.academia.edu/30652154/Cyber_and_Cross_Domain_Deterrence_Deterring_Within_and_From_Cyberspace //BY

III. Cross-Domain Deterrence of Cyberspace Operations. Cross-domain deterrence of cyberspace operations involves the use of punishment and denial across domains of warfighting and foreign policy in order to deter adversaries from utilizing cyberspace operations to create virtual or physical effects. In general, the major underlying debate for all arguments about cyberspace and deterrence is whether or not cyberspace is unique to conventional and nuclear models of deterrence. Advocates of cyberspace’s unique characteristics (Libicki 2009, Philbin 2013, Jensen 2012, Elliott 2011, Sterner 2011) argue that the technical qualities of cyberspace affect attribution, signaling, capabilities, and actors in a way that fundamentally negates how we traditionally view successful deterrence. These authors argue that it is uniquely difficult to attribute in a timely fashion, to signal capabilities overtly, to anticipate cyberspace effects, to use cyberspace weapons repeatedly, and to limit the amount of actors you need to deter. Taken in conjunction with the unique interdependence of military and civilian cyber infrastructures, the perceived asymmetries in vulnerabilities between the U.S. and its enemies, and the lack of existing norms, these critics argue that the U.S. cannot rely on retaliatory deterrence strategies or mutually assured vulnerability for effective deterrence of cyberspace operations. Advocates of cyberspace’s unique qualities recommend policies that are strategically ambiguous, focused on defense and resiliency, and that invest in attribution technologies over retaliatory measures.

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