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Investment solves attacker advantage

Alperovitch et al. 18. Dmitri Alperovitch is a computer security industry executive. He is co-founder and former chief technology officer of CrowdStrike; “Building a Defensible Cyberspace”; 2018; New York Cyber Task Force; https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/3668_SIPA%20Defensible%20Cyberspace-WEB.PDF //BY

In a little over 20 years, the percent of the global population with access to the Internet (and the larger cyberspace of connected devices and information, terms this report will use interchangeably) has gone from less than one to about 40, over 3.595 billion people.2 In the United States alone, the Internet sector makes up an estimated six percent of GDP; the “mobile internet and app services” subsector alone has a “contribution to the US GDP [of] approximately 3.11%, putting it at approximately the same size as the Automotive industry.”3 Yet, as the reach and benefits of the Internet have increased, so too have the economic costs. A 2015 study indicated that cybersecurity costs were likely to rise above $1.2 trillion by 2030 costing a total of roughly $20 trillion over those 15 years.4 The costs are high because attackers in cyberspace have for decades held fundamental advantages over defenders. The Internet was designed to be flexible and open, not secure. For years, nearly every device and piece of code added to cyberspace has reiterated this pattern: “minimum viable products” are rushed to market with security slapped on afterward as a band-aid, rather than built in. All this complexity has multiplied the costs and challenges of mounting a successful defense. Still, defense is possible. This report builds on an increasingly rich set of cybersecurity research on creating a “defense advantage” that raises costs to attackers and enables cost-effective risk management. Some of these ideas, such as to allow the least privileges or to failsafe in a secure manner, date back to the 1970s.5 Other work, especially in the business community, has centered on the return on investment of defensive innovations. Inspired by military tactics, others have sought to raise costs to attackers by making their task harder or actively disrupting their operations. The NY Cyber Task Force, through the experience of our members and interviews with other experts, has tried to combine these three perspectives. Our task force started by asking, “what technological, operational, and policy innovations have had the greatest impact in thwarting attackers?” We found that the highest-impact innovations shared two key traits: • Defense advantage: Any innovation by defenders must impose far greater costs on attackers. A “dollar of defense” (or hour or other measure of input) should yield not merely a “dollar of attack,” but should force attackers to spend considerably more to defeat it. • Hyperscale: The innovation must easily, even automatically, work across enterprises or cyberspace as a whole. The task force members and the colleagues we interviewed consistently agreed on the past innovations with the highest scale and leverage over attackers: strong encryption, software that updates automatically with little or no user intervention, and software that is secure because it was designed that way (rather than having security bolted on afterwards), among others. Importantly, the most transformative innovations have come not only from technology. Some of the greatest advances in defense advantage and hyperscale arose from improvements in organization, such as the creation of the first Computer Emergency Response Teams in the 1980s, and governance, such as the development of C-suite cybersecurity experts (e.g., Chief Information Security Officers) in the 1990s. Other successes have come from process innovations, like the “cyber kill chain” and “intelligence-driven operations.” And, better mapping and analysis of the way attackers intrude into systems has led to better strategies to keep them out. Policy actions, such as issuing legal indictments and threatening governmental sanctions, seem to have fostered bilateral norms and reduced the volume of espionage operations, particularly from China. In 2013, the White House set a new policy instructing   Building a Defensible Cyberspace: Report of the NY Cyber Task Force | 5 the US government to tell companies if it detects data breaches in their systems.6 Largely because of this policy (barely 200 words long), notification from law enforcement is now one of the most common ways companies learn of intruders. This public-private cooperation means faster responses, limiting the disruption attackers can cause.7 In each of these cases, the solution (while not necessarily cheap in hours or dollars invested) reaped benefits that significantly outweighed costs. This kind of leverage can make cyberspace more defensible for a company, a sector, a nation, and the world as a whole. Having carefully assessed a variety of innovations, we have concluded that defenders should adopt innovations that have the highest return. This, of course, requires that we assess each innovation for its benefits and costs, an analysis that seems obvious, but is not commonly employed today. The task force also identified several innovations with potentially large impact, such as reaching a consensus between policymakers and technology leaders to build a defensible cyberspace, promoting more secure cloudbased technologies, and improving authentication by finally dispensing with passwords. Certain innovations we assessed were controversial among the members of the task force, such as imposing regulations on network service providers and holding software and hardware makers liable for products with known but unpatched vulnerabilities. These and other approaches might deliver significant leverage, but would certainly be met with fierce resistance and potentially impose significant hurdles to innovation. Some solutions can be implemented easily; others will be more difficult because they create clear winners and losers. All members of the task force agree that the best solutions rely on leverage and are necessary now to avoid far more intrusive ones later. Text Box 1, below, summarizes the steps needed. Below we summarize certain of our key findings regarding steps needed. Taken together, these steps will help build a more defensible cyberspace

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