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NATO cyber-deterrence backfires---triggers conflict with adversaries through miscalc and wrecks alliance unity

Jacobson 21. Jeppe T. Jacobsen is the Cyber Coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinates Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. Jacobsen holds a master’s degree in International Politics from School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, a master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Aarhus, Denmark, and is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities Get access Arrow”; May 10, 2021; International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 3, May 2021, Pages 703–720; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395 //BY

Deterring what? Much of the scholarly debate on NATO is preoccupied with the current strategic adaptation of the alliance and the renewed focus on deterring Russia.48 Only a few contributors to this debate have addressed the addition of offensive cyber capabilities in NATO force structure and response doctrine as an element in work to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence posture.49 Neither in these contributions nor among the former and current NATO employees who have publicly articulated this ambition is it clear what kind of activity the integration of cyber effects in NATO seeks to deter.50 Is it supposed to add to the classical deterrence (through the threat of punishment) of conventional Russian threats to the territorial integrity of eastern Europe? Or to the deterrence of hybrid activities—specifically cyber activities—against allied countries below the threshold of armed conflict? This section addresses each of these possibilities in turn. From Cold War deterrence and back NATO’s founding purpose was to maintain a sufficient military strength to deter aggression and attempts at coercion, to prepare for the eventuality of deterrence failing, and to ensure stability among European powers.51 During the Cold War, the debates over NATO deterrence posture largely centred on the role of nuclear weapons, and specifically whether the United States would retaliate with these weapons in the event of a Soviet conventional attack against allied states.52 In short, NATO deterrence was about credibly extending the US nuclear (as well as conventional force) deterrence to allies to discourage a Soviet military offensive into eastern Europe. While NATO and its member states adapted to the new security environment after the end of the Cold War by scaling down the military investments and presence in eastern Europe and by focusing more on crisis management,53 much of the Cold War deterrence language returned when the Russian–Ukrainian conflict broke out in 2014.54 What needs to be deterred today, much of the literature agrees, is not only a full-scale military invasion but to a larger extent the use and support of pro-Russian militant separatists who are willing to apply insurgency tactics in NATO’s post-Soviet member states.55 As a result, the allies’ military investments have been increasing again,56 a number of initiatives such as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland have been introduced,57 and the discussions—and disagreements—on the nuclear deterrence (of non-nuclear threats) have re-emerged.58 Such responses are often presented as a renewed attempt by NATO to reassert its deterrence and assurance posture by signalling strength, preparedness and willingness to punish ‘bad’ behaviour.59 At first sight, the introduction of CYOC seems to add to these deterrence efforts. NATO added an offensive cyber option to reinforce its ability to impose costs sufficient to dissuade adversaries from acting aggressively. On closer examination, however, it is not self-evident that requesting member states’ delivery of offensive cyber effects in NATO operations constitutes a necessary or even a substantial addition to credibly signalling the ability and willingness to punish an adversary. NATO’s conventional capabilities are clearly already far superior to Russia’s—with or without fully integrated cyber effects. Thus, a deterrence failure, resulting for example in a scenario in one of the Baltic states similar to that which occurred in eastern Ukraine, will not be the result of NATO’s lack of available cyber tools in its military toolbox; rather, if the Russian leadership were to consider it in its interest to pursue such a scenario, it would mean that Russia’s decision-makers did not believe in the credibility of NATO’s article 5 or in NATO’s ability to mobilize its forces. The capacity to integrate cyber effects would do nothing to change that. Furthermore, if the establishment of CYOC is an attempt to signal defensive strength and unity in cyberspace, it remains difficult to imagine that such signaling would dissuade adversaries from trying to penetrate NATO and allied systems. CYOC does not change the fact that NATO is not tasked to govern and secure national IT systems. In an operational setting, states might connect to each other through so-called federated mission networking; 60 but there is no tradition of ceding control of the deployed national networks to NATO during military operations. Hence, CYOC can only realistically seek to become a hub for cyber-threat information-sharing and to support states’ coordination and synchronization of various national responses to these threats. In other words, CYOC is unlikely to become an active defender in cyberspace that causes doubt in the adversary’s evaluation of its own cyber capabilities. This also means that even if CYOC’s coordination and information-sharing efforts manage to contribute to the denial of intrusions into allied systems, an adversary’s military is unlikely to be deterred from trying to hack these systems. In fact, actively articulating that CYOC is supposed to deter (through denial) a perceived adversary such as Russia from hacking NATO and allied operational systems creates an incentive to do just that and thereby show that the alliance is incapable of doing what it says it seeks to do. However, the renewed concern about Russia’s intentions in NATO member states since 2014 is not confined to the need to deter hostile military invasions or paramilitary activity. It also encompasses a range of subversive, non-military activities that have become available and are often considered part of a broader Russian strategy of ‘hybrid warfare’.61 Can CYOC and the integration of cyber effects deter the non-military hybrid activities that have become possible with the new information and communication technologies? Deterring cyber activity below the threshold of collective defence ‘Hybrid’ has become a popular concept when describing the current threat environment. While discussions over the definition, novelty and usefulness of the concept continue, there seems to be agreement that, when used to qualify ‘threat’ or ‘warfare’, ‘hybrid’ refers to the blurring of the distinction between military and civilian, often in relation to the mixture of instruments used to obtain political objectives.62 NATO’s attempt to deter military and paramilitary instruments from being deployed has already been touched upon above. As a primarily military alliance, however, NATO is facing difficulty in addressing the instruments that are used deliberately to stay below the threshold of collective defence. NATO has not been able to deter the perpetration of random ransomware incidents, election interference and targeted propaganda campaigns through hacks and leaks, or industrial cyber espionage and intrusion into critical infrastructures. The alliance’s conventional capabilities are not credible (proportional) responses to such malicious cyber activity. Thus, it has responded only by ‘naming and shaming’, and by expressing encouragement to member states to enhance the resilience of their networks.63 These responses, however, have yet to prove effective in halting the malicious cyber activity conducted below the threshold of collective defence.64 And the introduction of SCEPVA is not likely to change that; the integration of cyber effects is tied to NATO military operations only. While NATO member states are already compelled to maintain a level of cooperation in collective defence (article 3), and to consult together whenever any of them feels that its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened (article 4), NATO—with or without integrated cyber effects—is not an alliance designed to deal with non-military threats from a peer competitor. The question then arises: does the lack of capacity to deter non-military hybrid cyber activities suggest that it is time for NATO to renegotiate the scope and substance of its collective defence clause?65 When it comes to cyberspace, the next section expresses scepticism about expanding NATO’s role. It addresses the escalation risk associated with having NATO, an organization that has refocused its attention on a more traditional military threat, become a more active player below the threshold of collective defence. It argues that a more active stance outside military confrontation risks undermining the intelligence norm that currently dominates in cyberspace—a norm whereby state activity in foreign networks is not considered escalatory. Escalation and the dominant intelligence norm The large overlap between intelligence collection and attack in cyberspace makes it difficult to send clear signals to adversaries, in terms of either capabilities or intentions. When a foreign entity is moving around in a network, is it then about to start a military operation? Is the activity part of a reconnaissance mission? Is it political or economic espionage? Is it active defence? The difficulty of answering these questions has created much nervousness among cyber-conflict experts. Ben Buchanan, for example, has shown how defensive hacking or intelligence-gathering in cyberspace is easily misinterpreted as aggressive behaviour.66 Why, then, have we not experienced serious misinterpretation and escalation in cyberspace? One way to explain this is through the existence and dominance of a largely unspoken but widely accepted norm. For decades, the predominant actors in cyberspace have been intelligence agencies; and the norms that characterize interactions between intelligence agencies are not primarily concerned with military concepts such as conflict escalation and deterrence.67 In the world of intelligence agencies, success is not about keeping a distance between oneself and the adversary by signalling one’s intentions and capabilities. It is about being able to outmanoeuvre adversaries in a space of constant contact.68 There are always risks, and the work usually takes place in legal grey zones where a clear distinction between war and peace is not the guiding principle. This is an arena where the opportunity to annoy, cheat and delay opponents is taken when it arises. In short, espionage and counter-espionage do not fit well with the thorough military operational planning that characterizes NATO operations. Intelligence operations, on the other hand, fit perfectly with a dynamic cyberspace where anonymity is easy to achieve and uncertainty a constant condition.69 The states that embrace cyberspace as a domain where the intelligence norm dominates are able to use a broader array of tools to pursue or respond to various foreign political objectives than only those that relate to military operations. In its 2018 ‘vision’, the US Cyber Command built implicitly on the dominant intelligence norm. Here, the objective is to become more agile and act as close to the adversary as possible (‘defend forward’).70 The United States considers ‘constant contact’ and ‘persistent engagement’ as the necessary guiding principles to achieve superiority in cyberspace and to take full advantage of the broader potential for pursuing its political objectives through cyberspace. During the 2018 US midterm elections, for example, the US Cyber Command worked closely with the NSA to disrupt servers operated by the Russian Internet Research Agency aiming to spread fake news and stir up tension in the United States.71 More recently, the US Cyber Command responded with various cyber effects against Iran after the Iranian Revolutionary Guards apparently placed mines on ships in the Strait of Hormuz.72 These practices illustrate that, for the United States, cyber effects provide political options when one does not want to escalate existing tensions into military confrontation. Defensive coordination between allies through CYOC supports such defensive use of cyber effects, increasing the possibility that US Cyber Command will be allowed to ‘defend forward’ and work persistently through allied networks.73 A more cyber-active NATO, however, risks being counterproductive to the ambition to ‘defend forward’ through allied networks. Unintended conflict escalation from ongoing cyber activity is mainly a risk if military analysts—in a strategic environment with heightened attention to military confrontation—ignore the dominant intelligence norm. If that happens, it becomes more likely that ‘persistent engagement’ and active cyber defence will be misinterpreted as military preparation, armament or the initial phase of an attack. If NATO, an organization that has publicly returned to its original raison d’être of deterrence and collective defence, becomes the entity that coordinates cyber effects below the threshold of armed conflict, then the likelihood increases that Russia misinterprets these effects as escalatory and acts accordingly. In other words, a more active NATO in the current strategic environment increases the risk that the existing intelligence norm will be undermined and replaced by a more militarized norm. This does not mean that states that face hostile hybrid activities below the threshold of armed conflict will be left alone. Intelligence cooperation between allied countries does exist, and threat information is occasionally shared. In addition to the current political collaboration facilitated by NATO to improve network security and resilience, the EU is engaging in similar civilian activities, as well as developing and implementing a cyber-diplomatic toolbox to create a common basis for responding to a variety of malicious activities against member states. Further strengthening the political partnership between the EU and NATO is thus the most appropriate way forward to avoid further militarization of cyberspace. Sustaining the intelligence norm as the dominant norm is not without potential problems. Openly embracing the fact that cyberspace is a domain in which intelligence agencies are constrained only by domestic laws, and where takedowns of servers in foreign countries are not necessarily perceived as serious breaches of sovereignty, is likely to lead to an increase in the exploitation of IT vulnerabilities in commercial software used in both enemy and allied networks. For smaller states, this could increase the risk of retaliation by larger adversaries, and it could increase the risk of divisions between allies—divisions that are not aligned with the United States’ political ambition to use cyber coordination in NATO as part of its attempt to ‘defend forward’.74 More exploitation could also ultimately make cyberspace less free, less open and less secure, rendering civilian populations susceptible to cybercrime, surveillance and disruptions of everyday services.75 This is why some states, NGOs and private corporations such as Microsoft continue to promote norms that emphasize restraint on the part of states’ intelligence agencies and militaries in cyberspace, and why other states promote more sovereign control of cyberspace.76 Conclusion This article has pointed to several challenges to the integration of military cyber effects in NATO operations, and has argued that even if the integration is successful, it will not add to the alliance’s deterrence posture. Importantly, the fact that CYOC does not send a strong signal to adversaries such as Russia does not mean that it is a waste of time. Far from it. As both conventional militaries and paramilitary groups are increasingly dependent on civilian networked technologies, the ability of NATO to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy enemy networks through sovereign cyber effects—even if these amount only to temporary annoyances—will become more relevant in the years to come. This, of course, does not mean that conventional kinetic or electromagnetic capabilities will become redundant. Rather, cyber effects offer a substitute in case the intended target cannot be reached with conventional capabilities, and a supplement that works alongside conventional operations as persistent annoyances of enemy networked devices. The latter, however, demands an agile CYOC that provides member states with broad initial mandates and facilitates quick decision-making and rapid approval when member states stand ready to deliver even minor cyber annoyances. Furthermore, the article has argued that NATO and its CYOC should not seek to coordinate additional offensive cyber efforts to deter hybrid activities below the threshold of armed conflict. If an organization that is perceived by its main adversary primarily as a military organization engages in active cyber-defence measures and persistent cyber engagements outside of military confrontation, then the risk of escalation increases. This is because every potential NATO-initiated cyber activity in foreign networks is likely to be perceived through a military lens and thus to be (mis-)interpreted as an attack in the making. In fact, active cyber-defence measures in foreign networks and use of cyber means below the threshold of armed conflict to pursue political interests internationally are part of our current reality. Intelligence agencies know this to be a fact, and they live by it every day.

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