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Offensive operations are escalatory and fail.

Valeriano & Jensen 19 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University, serves as Senior Advisor for the Cyber Solarium Commission; Associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar‐​in‐​residence at American University’s School of International Service

Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint,” The CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 862, January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint

New policy options proposed by Cyber Command and the Trump administration risk exacerbating fear in other countries and creating a self-reinforcing spiral of tit-for-tat escalations that risk war even though each actor feels he is acting defensively—or, as it is called in the scholarly literature, a security dilemma.52 As shown above, most cyber operations to date have not resulted in escalation. The cyber domain has been a world of spies collecting valuable information and engaging in limited disruptions that substitute for, as well as complement, more conventional options. Shifting to a policy of preemptive offensive cyber warfare risks provoking fear and overreaction in other states and possibly producing conflict spirals. Even limited-objective cyber offensive action defined as “defending forward” can be misinterpreted and lead to inadvertent escalation.53 As the historian Cathal Nolan puts it, “intrusions into a state’s strategically important networks pose serious risks and are therefore inherently threatening.”54

More worryingly, with a more offensive posture, it will be increasingly difficult for states to differentiate between cyber espionage and more damaging degradation operations.55 What the United States calls defending forward, China and Russia will call preemptive strikes. Worse still, this posture will likely lead great powers to assume all network intrusions, including espionage, are preparing the environment for follow-on offensive strikes. According to cybersecurity scholar Ben Buchanan, “in the [aggressor] state’s own view, such moves are clearly defensive, merely ensuring that its military will have the strength and flexibility to meet whatever comes its way. Yet potential adversaries are unlikely to share this perspective.”56 The new strategy risks producing a “forever cyber war” prone to inadvertent escalation because it implies all cyber operations should be interpreted as escalatory by adversaries.57

The Myth of Decisive Cyber Victory

There is a tendency in the military profession, at least in the United States and Europe, to uphold the concept of decisive battle as central to the Western way of war.58 Often, disruptive technologies—from strategic bombers in the mid-20th century to cyber operations in the 21st century—are seen as providing decisive offensive advantages in crises. In the interwar period between the world wars, airpower enthusiasts argued that bombers would reliably reach their targets, forcing political leaders to end hostilities or face the prospect of destroyed cities and economic collapse.59

Yet the search for decisive battle is often an elusive, if not dangerous, temptation for military planners and policymakers. In a comparative historical treatment of major 19th- and 20th-century battles, Nolan argues that “often, war results in something clouded, neither triumph nor defeat. It is an arena of grey outcomes, partial and ambiguous resolution of disputes and causes that led to the choice of force as an instrument of policy in the first place.”60 Decisive victories in any one battle are rare. Adversaries can refuse to fight.61 They can even signal resolve through demonstrating their ability to endure pain.

Planning and Assessment Pathologies

The new policy framework for offensive cyber operations risks compounding common pathologies associated with strategic assessments and planning. 62 Removing interagency checks increases the risks that an operation will backfire on the attacker or compromise ongoing operations.

Misperception is pervasive in insulated decisionmaking processes for several reasons.63 First, small groups unchecked by bureaucracy tend to produce narrow plans prone to escalation during crises.64 Second, leaders often give guidance to planners during crises that reflects their political bias or personality traits rather than a rational assessment of threats and options.65 Third, offensive bias in planning may have little to do with the actual threat and more to do with a cult of the offensive and the desire of officers to ensure their autonomy and resources.66 Removing interagency checks therefore risks compounding fundamental attribution errors and other implicit biases. Cyber operations are too important to be left to the generals at Cyber Command alone.

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