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Escalation is wrong---most comprehensive studies prove

Borghard and Lonergan 19. Erica D. Borghard is an Adjunct Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science. She is also a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Shawn W. Lonergan is a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Shawn holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Shawn is also a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, where, from 2014-2017, he served as an Assistant Professor in the Academy’s Department of Social Sciences and Chief Research Scientist in the Army Cyber Institute.; “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation”; Fall 2019; Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 3 (FALL 2019), pp. 122-145; https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26760131.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa99f8dadc6cb38b533342229ac7a6605&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1 //BY

There is a widespread view among practitioners and scholars that cyberspace is defined by an inherent potential for dangerous escalation dynamics between rivals.1 On the practitioner side, for example, senior US intelligence and military leaders expressed concerns about first-strike incentives leading to escalation in a 2017 joint statement to Congress, testifying that “adversaries equipped with [offensive cyber capabilities] could be prone to preemptive attack and rapid escalation in a future crisis, because both sides would have an incentive to strike first.”2 On the academic side, there is a palpable fear that cyberspace is an environment in which offense has advantages over defense and that this—coupled with factors such as problems of attribution, poor command and control, and the absence of meaningful thresholds or red lines—generates real risks of inadvertent escalation.3 Concerns about escalation grew even more passionate in the wake of the US Department of Defense’s release of its 2018 Cyber Strategy document, which articulates an operational concept of “defending forward” in which the DOD “disrupt[s] or halt[s] malicious cyber activity at its source.”4 However, there are important empirical reasons to suspect that the risks of cyber escalation may be exaggerated. Specifically, if cyberspace is in fact an environment that (perhaps even more so than others) generates severe escalation risks, why has cyber escalation not yet occurred? Most interactions between cyber rivals have been characterized by limited volleys that have not escalated beyond nuisance levels and have been largely contained below the use-of-force threshold.5 For example, in a survey of cyber incidents and responses between 2000 and 2014, Brandon Valeriano et al. find that “rivals tend to respond only to lower-level [cyber] incidents and the response tends to check the intrusion as opposed to seek escalation dominance. The majority of cyber escalation episodes are at a low severity threshold and are non-escalatory. These incidents are usually ‘tit-for-tat’ type responses within one step of the original incident.”6 Even in the two rare examples in which states employed kinetic force in response to adversary cyber operations—the US counter-ISIL drone campaign in 2015 and Israel’s airstrike against Hamas cyber operatives in 2019—the use of force was circumscribed and did not escalate the overall conflict (not to mention that force was used against nonstate adversaries with limited potential to meaningfully escalate in response to US or Israeli force).7 We posit that cyber escalation has not occurred because cyber operations are poor tools of escalation. In particular, we argue that this stems from key characteristics of offensive cyber capabilities that limit escalation through four mechanisms. First, retaliatory offensive cyber operations may not exist at the desired time of employment. Second, even under conditions where they may exist, their effects are uncertain and often relatively limited. Third, several attributes of offensive cyber operations generate important tradeoffs for decision-makers that may make them hesitant to employ capabilities in some circumstances. Finally, the alternative of cross-domain escalation—responding to a cyber incident with noncyber, kinetic instruments—is unlikely to be chosen except under rare circumstances, given the limited cost-generation potential of offensive cyber operations. In this article, we define cyber escalation and then explore the implications of the technical features and requirements for offensive cyber operations. We also consider potential alternative or critical responses to each of these logics. Finally, we evaluate the implications for US policy making.

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