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No escalation and cyber deterrence is fake

Rovner 19. Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Professor of International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, where he also serves as Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies; “CYBER WAR AS AN INTELLIGENCE CONTEST”; September 16, 2019; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/cyber-war-as-an-intelligence-contest/ //BY

The cyberspace competition is an intelligence contest in a technologically novel domain. It is a struggle to protect information, while corrupting and stealing information from rivals. Because it is not a test of overt military power, traditional strategic theories about force and war may not be our best guide.

Deterrence is mostly irrelevant in an intelligence contest. No combination of threats and promises will stop a rival intelligence service from collecting information. Nor is it easy to imagine what kind of signals would be strong enough to stop adversaries from influence activities such as those of Russia during the  in the United States. Covert action is inherently hard to deter if the responsible party remains hidden. And in other cases, states might tacitly tolerate one another’s covert campaigns as a  for war. Similarly, the coercive value of offensive cyber operations is likely to be modest at best. There is not much evidence that non-kinetic threats are enough to change anyone’s behavior.   suggests that the victims are surprisingly tolerant of cyber operations. Strategy is fundamentally about coercion, but cyberspace operations carry little coercive value.

There are some exceptions. It is possible to deter significant cyberspace operations against critical infrastructure, for instance, because such operations require a great deal of time, money, and organization. They would invite a ferocious response, making deterrent threats inherently credible. The language and logic of strategy is useful here.

But in most cases the logic of intelligence is more appropriate. It helps to explain why the balance of capabilities is hard to assess. Long-term intelligence contests are not easy to measure, not least because the contestants work in secret. The relative position of rival intelligence services does not lend itself to quantitative measures. Who is “winning” an intelligence contest at any given moment is rarely clear.

To understand why, imagine having unfettered access to all the intelligence collected by two great power rivals. In this idealized setting, it might be possible to judge which side had collected the most. It might also be possible to determine which side had penetrated more difficult targets. But even here it would still difficult to judge winners and losers, because possessing information is not the same as understanding it. Intelligence services struggle to interpret data, and the more they collect, the more they face the challenge of separating meaningful information from background noise. It is also difficult to put technical knowledge of adversary capabilities to use. It is one thing to steal intellectual property, for instance, and quite another to reverse engineer it. Finally, comparing the volume of intelligence says nothing about the quality of intelligence-policy relations. Intelligence services may perform admirably and still be ignored.

Looking through the intelligence lens puts the cyberspace competition in perspective, but it requires a willingness to live with ambiguity. Signs that one side seems to be winning may be misleading. Breathless headlines about the latest cyber penetration may exaggerate the extent to which one intelligence service is racing ahead, or whether it is able to translate successful cyberspace espionage into meaningful policy advantage. Viewing the competition as an intelligence contest puts alarming headlines about “ ” into context.

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