Adversaries lack motive and capability to hack NC3 AND the US can easily counter attacks
Borghard and Lonergan 19. Erica D. Borghard is an Adjunct Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science. She is also a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Shawn W. Lonergan is a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Shawn holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Shawn is also a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, where, from 2014-2017, he served as an Assistant Professor in the Academy’s Department of Social Sciences and Chief Research Scientist in the Army Cyber Institute.; “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation”; Fall 2019; Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 3 (FALL 2019), pp. 122-145; https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26760131.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa99f8dadc6cb38b533342229ac7a6605&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1 //BY
Key features of cyber operations—the role of access, nonuniversal lethality of offensive cyber capabilities, and the temporal nature of access and capability development and maintenance—may dramatically circumscribe the escalatory options available to states through cyber means during a time of crisis. First, escalatory cyber response options may simply not be available to a state because it lacks access to an appropriate set of targets against which to deliver an escalatory response. This is because offensive cyber operations deliver effects against targets through exploiting a vulnerability to gain access (through an attack vector) to a target’s network or system and deliver a payload that is activated by communicating back with a host or triggered by a command order written into the code.13 Absent the right access to deploy a capability, the latter might as well not exist.14 While critical to the success of offensive operations, the initial penetration of a target network or system can be resource intensive and net unpredictable results, which is why the employment of cyber capabilities that rely on access to a targeted network require prior planning and resource allocation Indeed, according to Chris Inglis, the planning staff at US Cyber Command during the 2009–10 period assessed that “the first 90 percent of cyber reconnaissance (i.e., ISR), cyber defense, and cyberattack consisted of the common work of finding and fixing a target of interest in cyberspace.”15 Therefore, rather than occurring at lightning speed, cyber operations have crucial aspects that take time and significant resource investments, even if at the tactical level a line of code can indeed be executed at “network speed.”16 Considering means of access and types of targets reveal the various aspects of gaining access that limit potential cyber escalatory responses at a given time. Table 2, Mainstream means of gaining access, depicts various common access methods and evaluates them along a spectrum of cost, risk, and reliability.17 The broadest distinction between means of access is remote (e.g., using the Internet) versus close (e.g., gaining access through a human agent or supply chain interdiction). Most of the low-cost and low-risk means of gaining access to a target (such as through various social engineering mechanisms) are not readily applicable against more hardened (and therefore more strategically valuable) targets, such as the air-gapped networks common in critical infrastructure systems and some military and defense systems. Conversely, the most reliable type of access, physical access through a human intermediary on the ground, is also the riskiest and costliest. The nature of the targeted network or system also shapes access requirements and consequent level of difficulty. For instance, gaining access to operational technology (OT) is typically more difficult than to information technology (IT), although this may be changing as IT and OT systems converge.18 OT networks tend to be closed (they do not touch the global Internet) and run unique protocols used to control highly specific processes and systems.19 Typically, these characteristics also mean that these networks require specific knowledge because the programs they run are customized to those systems and the networking protocols they employ may not be widely proliferated. Additionally, the simple fact of “gaining access” to a target network does not guarantee that an attacker has gained access at the requisite network layer from which to launch an offensive operation.20 Thus, most access operations are followed by operations that enable persistence through access escalation prior to the employment of any cyber weapon. Finally, gaining access to a target via a hardware implant— the actual physical components of a computer (e.g., motherboard, USB and other flash memory devices, routers, etc.)—is appreciably costlier and more difficult than gaining access to software (all of the digital programs on a computer, from the operating system to applications such as Microsoft Word).
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21 Software vulnerabilities are relatively easier to detect and to patch, and manufacturers routinely disseminate information about known vulnerabilities and remediation protocols.22 Second, in addition to being dependent on access, offensive cyber capabilities lack universal effectiveness. While nuclear or conventional munitions are target agnostic—in most cases, the same munition can be used to target an aircraft hangar, a massed enemy formation, a munitions factory, or a hospital—some cyber weapons must be tailored to a specific target set or type.23 As Martin Libicki notes, “A piece of malware that brings one system down may have absolutely no effect on another. The difference between the two may be as simple as which patch version of a piece of software each system runs.”24 The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack that wreaked billions of dollars in damage and was attributed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, for instance, targeted hundreds of thousands of computers around the world across a range of industries that were running an older version of Windows.25 The widespread damage belies the highly specific and targeted nature of the malware—almost all of the affected systems were running a version of Windows 7; the same strain of malware had no effect on computers running more up-to-date operating systems. Moreover, asset owners of targets of strategic significance—such as critical infrastructure—typically employ highly customized software and specific hardware with tailored configurations that are unique to those systems and usually only intimately understood by the original developers and manufacturers. It has been reported, for example, that the malware employed in the Stuxnet cyberattacks against the Iranian nuclear program was tailored to target the specific model of Siemens programmable logic controllers (PLC) used at the Natanz enrichment facility.26 Indeed, while Stuxnet was discovered in computers around the world, it delivered destructive effects only against the centrifuges in Natanz.27 The non-substitutability of entire classes of offensive capabilities by definition increases the cost of developing an arsenal of offensive cyber capabilities.28 Therefore, the time and resource requirements to gain access and develop specific offensive capabilities may render important escalatory response options infeasible or impractical at the desired time. Operational planning and execution must consider that a given capability may not be usable or even exist at a chosen time of employment.29 As the above discussion illustrates, many of the target sets that would represent strategic (and therefore escalatory) targets, such as a state’s critical infrastructure or nuclear command and control, demand extensive planning, pre-positioning, and capability development in advance of employing offensive capabilities. Therefore, the timing of a crisis plays a crucial role in decisions about cyber escalation responses. Specifically, the time required to develop access to hold strategic targets at risk means that, even if a state seeks to escalate against an adversary using cyber means, it may find itself limited by the accesses and capabilities it possesses at the moment a crisis occurs. Cyber response options may be limited to less decisive or more vulnerable target sets, rather than those that are more strategically significant. Third, these limitations become even more salient when we consider how strategic interactions are likely to play out over time during repeated crisis interactions. Because the virtual domain is changeable in a way that the physical world is not, actions taken by defenders in the context of a crisis can radically and unpredictably alter an attacker’s ability to deliver and sustain effects against a target over time.30 Access and capabilities are neither guaranteed nor indefinite—they have a shelf life.31 Footholds into a target’s network that were time intensive to develop can unexpectedly disappear as vulnerabilities in a network are patched. Exploits may have a short shelf life as revealing information about them enables targets to identify indicators of compromise (IOCs) and use these to prevent further damage from specific malware strains or quarantine malicious traffic using known malware signatures. An example of the latter is the US Cyber Command initiative, beginning in 2018, to share information about adversary malware by uploading samples to VirusTotal.32 Therefore, a target can “transition from vulnerability (to a particular attack) to invulnerability in, literally, minutes.”33 Third-party disclosure about software vulnerabilities by governments or private actors can also unintentionally precipitate the loss of access as exposure about vulnerability information enables network defenders to take measures to remedy them.34 For instance, the disclosures that began in 2016 by the group Shadow Brokers of purportedly pilfered US National Security Agency exploits and zero days ostensibly put US government accesses at risk.35 Put simply, a vulnerability upon which an access relies may in theory be only one update or disclosure away from being patched. Thus, in the context of an ongoing crisis interaction between an attacker and defender, the former’s operational tempo is likely to be interrupted by the latter’s behavior, forcing the attacker to devote additional time to find or acquire new vulnerabilities and exploits in the midst of an offensive operation or campaign. As Inglis notes, to succeed in an offensive cyber campaign that unfolds over time, attackers must be able to sustain “the efficacy of tools under varying conditions caused by the defender’s response and the natural variability and dynamism of cyberspace.”36 The ability to build or acquire new accesses and capabilities “in real time” during a crisis is highly limited.37 Indeed, General Paul Nakasone remarked in a January 2019 interview on the radical difference in shelf life between conventional and cyber capabilities: Compare the air and cyberspace domains. Weapons like JDAMs [ Joint Direct Attack Munitions] are an important armament for air operations. How long are those JDAMs good for? Perhaps 5, 10, or 15 years, sometimes longer given the adversary. When we buy a capability or tool for cyberspace . . . we rarely get a prolonged use we can measure in years. Our capabilities rarely last 6 months, let alone 6 years. This is a big difference in two important domains of future conflict.38 Therefore, as a 2013 Defense Science Board report notes, “offensive cyber will always be a fragile capability” when pitted against network defenders who are “continuously improving network defensive tools and techniques.”39