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No prolif impact

John Mueller 16, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies; Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 6/5/16, “Embracing Threatlessness: US Military Spending, Newt Gingrich, and the Costa Rica Option,” http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/CNArestraintCato16.pdf

For decades there has been almost wall-to-wall alarm about the dangers supposedly inherent in nuclear proliferation.

However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than has been commonly predicted over the decades primarily because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their possessor.

And, more importantly, the effect of the proliferation that has taken place has been substantially benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats.67 The holds even for the proliferation of the weapons to large, important countries run by unchallenged monsters who at the time they acquired the bombs were certifiably deranged: Josef Stalin who in 1949 was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong who in 1964 had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that had resulted in artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished.68

Despite this experience, an aversion to nuclear proliferation continues to impel alarmed concern, and it was a chief motivator of the Iraq War which essentially was a militarized antiproliferation effort. The war proved to be a necessary cause of the deaths of more people than were inflicted at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.69

The subsequent and consequent Iraq syndrome strongly suggests there will be little incentive to apply military force to prevent, or to deal with, further putative proliferation. Thus, despite nearly continuous concern—even at times hysteria—about nuclear developments in North Korea and Iran, proposals to use military force (particularly boots on the ground) to deal with these developments have been persistently undercut. The invasion of Iraq presumably did prevent that country from going nuclear—assuming it ever would have been able to put together the effort.70 However, it scarcely seems likely that there will be much sympathy for repeating that disastrous experience. Thus, maintaining huge forces-in-being to deal with the proliferation problem scarcely seems sensible, even though almost everybody still considers proliferation to be major security concern. What seems to be required in these cases, as generally with the devils du jour of the Cold War era, is judicious, watchful, and wary patience.

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