5. Our method of embodied politics is both mutually exclusive with, and a more ethical alternative to, the liberal security paradigm in which the AFF is embedded
Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP)
In (neo)liberal political discourses, the ideal subject is an independent homo oeconomicus, that is, a masculine, disembodied being, who is self-sufficient and self-caring, while knowingly making rational, utilitarian, and abstracted ethical choices for the common good of all. The liberal subject is an invulnerable individual, or at least well secured against any risks in life. He is never ill; he does not leak of bodily fluids (because he seems not to have a body); and he never ages. Or, in case he does age, he does so actively and “successfully”, in ways that his body’s care needs would never gain control of his life: the life of a subjective, rational Self. Feminist social and political theory argues that these conceptions of political subjectivity are non-realistic: Such disembodied subjects simply do not exist (cf. Bacchi and Beasley 2002; Beattie and Schick 2013; Cohn 2014; Fineman 2008; Grosz 1994; Hoppania and Vaittinen 2015; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990; Shildrick 2002; 2012; Tronto 1993; Vaittinen 2015; forthcoming)
While vulnerable embodiment is discursively associated merely with women, children, and the weak, the truth is that as human beings we all are bodies, and as such vulnerable, relational and dependent. As political subjects we are perhaps meant to “own” our bodies, to be in control of them and our lives. Yet, the bodies that our subjectivity inhabits may in fact both pre-exist and outlive the subjective “I”. We are intercorporeal: conceived, born, raised, and sustained by other bodies. We live _and die _in concrete relations with others. Thus, as opposed to being the self-caring ideal subjects of (neo)liberal politics, as bodies we are dependent, fleshy, and irrational. We are vulnerable, sometimes sick and dis/abled, every day in contact with our own bodily fluids _and frequently also with those of others. We are made of and sometimes governed by the fluids, bacteria and hormones that move within, without, and between our bodies (cf. Fishel 2015; Irni 2013; Preciado 2013). Our lives are inherently frail. We start ageing and decaying the moment we are born.
In other words, the fact of embodiment makes the liberal understanding of subjectivity ultimately an illusion. Nevertheless, global politics and its security policies and practices continue to build on the liberal conceptions of life. In other words, the contemporary security policies and practices tend to build on an illusion. In this chapter, I challenge these illusionary yet prevailing understandings of security through different accounts of embodied in/security. I begin the chapter with a discussion of feminist analysis of vulnerability. Here, I rely on accounts that emerge from the feminist ethics of care tradition (e.g. Robinson 1999; 2011), as well as Carol Cohn’s (2014) recent interrogation of vulnerability in international security discourses.
Feminist conceptions of vulnerability and care challenge conventional security practices, and reveal them as unrealistic, by foregrounding the human beings’ existential dependency on each other for survival (e.g. Robinson 2011; Beattie and Schick 2013; Butler 2004). Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Vaittinen 2015), they also rarely explicitly engage with the body organism and its materiality, which need be recognised if embodied in/security is to be taken seriously. In this chapter, I interrogate the body in more concrete terms. Here, I first show how embodied realities of human life have always been central in feminist security studies, albeit usually in contexts of direct violence and hence in/securities external to the body. I then introduce the concept of the lowest common denominator of embodiment, which emphasises the body’s need of care from other bodies and, while defying essentialism, is applicable to all living bodies at all times (Vaittinen, forthcoming). Unlike in the usual security frames that begin with direct violence, in this conception, embodied in/security becomes defined through to the body’s most basic needs, which necessitate care relations with other bodies at times when we are corporeally incapable of being the liberal individual subjects that we are meant to be.
In the concluding section, I juxtapose my conception of embodied in/security with the conceptions that seem to predominate security discourses more generally. I argue that, sometimes also in feminist security studies, the empirical contexts of direct violence, war, and militarism easily (re)produce perceptions of embodied in/security that begin with the threats that bodies pose to other bodies. Here, in/secure bodies are primarily present as subjects and objects of violence, rather than as caring and in need of care. Consequently, the threats that the body, as an organism, poses to itself remain unaddressed. I argue that ultimately at stake here are two contending gendered ontologies of human relatedness through which security policies can be shaped: feminised dependency on other bodies’ care against masculine perceptions of the bodies of others as primarily threatening. Both the conceptions of embodied in/vulnerability are profoundly relational, yet the security practices that they (re)produce are fundamentally different.
Existential vulnerability and the ethics of care
Feminist literature (e.g. Fineman 2008; Beattie and Schick 2013) has emphasised the necessity to put vulnerability instead of liberal individualism at the centre of political discourses and practices, since vulnerability describes the condition of human life much more realistically than individual, rational autonomy does. This way of thinking is particularly present in the feminist ethics of care tradition, which provides a powerful alternative to liberal individualistic thinking about ethics, morality, and politics. Foregrounding the existential dependency of every human being on each other’s care for survival, feminist accounts of care can also forcefully challenge the conventional security thinking, by presenting the lack of care as a threat to human security (Robinson 2011).
Feminist ethics of care argues that practices of care give rise to an alternative moral thinking, which is capable of realistically accounting for the situatedness of the moral subject (see, for example, Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Ruddick 1990). Feminist care ethicists show how moral decisions are never made in a political void or behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, as in the Kantian tradition, but in concrete relations with particular others. Importantly, emphasising practices of care as a source of moral and political relatedness, feminist ethics of care demonstrates how human existential vulnerability - that is, our dependency on care as well as our capacity to respond caringly - is a powerful site and source of politics rather than a realm external to it (Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999; 2011; Vaittinen 2015).