Attempts to sustain soft power are paternalistic and maintain hegemonic masculinity in IR
Claire Duncanson & Catherine Eschle (2008), University of Edinburgh and University of Strathclyde, “Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident , New Political Science, 30:4, 545-563, DOI: 10.1080/07393140802518120
Instead, we want to close with two points. Firstly, although hegemonic masculine forms may shift over time and place, such shifts are not necessarily progressive. Indeed, Charlotte Hooper suggests that the apparent softening of hegemonic masculinity characteristic of Western states in the era of globalisation is not a sign of the imminent demise of male power but rather part and parcel of the adjustment process necessary to maintain power and status.106 More precisely, she argues that changes in “masculinist practices” work to ensure both that hegemonic masculinity remains hegemonic and that it continues to meet the requirements of its elite masculine-identified members (usually white, middle or upper class, heterosexual men).107 If this is indeed how hegemonic masculinity operates, what we are perhaps observing in the White Paper is a shift in the self- image of the British state, but one that enables it to avoid relinquishing the masculine ideal of power and status as measured in nuclear weapons. The construction of the “responsible steward” identity is thus a smokescreen, diverting attention from the lack of substantive change in policy. Having said this, shifts in the masculine identity of the British state remain significant because any disruptions to traditional definitions of masculinity demonstrate the arbitrariness of gendered dichotomies and open up potential for change.108 This leads us onto our second point, that the construction of the “responsible steward” identity remains far from complete. Indeed, as we indicated at several points above, there are several instabilities and tensions in the way in which masculine codes and images are mobilised in the White Paper. Most notably, it appears that the British nuclear state remains attracted to the status and privilege which it believes goes with possession of nuclear weapons, yet it also wants to develop a leadership role based on ethics rather than fear. Further, the role of the British nuclear state as protector of its citizens proves rather difficult to establish in the absence of an obvious enemy Other, and instead we find a problematic reliance on a fear of “weak states” and a contestable characterisation of all states, even current allies, as potential deadly enemies. Finally, we see both an emphasis on the independence of the UK’s nuclear deterrence and a recognition of the importance of interdependence and multilateralism—as well as an effort to avoid drawing attention to the dependent relationship on the United States in nuclear procurement, which means full independence simply cannot be achieved. Such tensions in the UK government’s position are indicative, perhaps, that its masculine underpinnings are less stable than is often assumed. We note that both Hooper109 and R. W. Connell110 suggest that feminists can exploit the contradictions between “softer” and “harder” forms of masculinity, opening up space for alternative identity constructions. The tensions we have exposed in the White Paper should thus give those engaged in the continuing struggle against Trident renewal further fuel for their arguments. It seems to us that exposure and exacerbation of internal instabilities in the gendered discourse of nuclear weapons states remains an important feminist contribution to the struggle for a nuclear-free world.