Arms control is used to dominate other nations and encourages WMD build-up in the name of protection
Wright, 2010. (Susan, Research scientist in history of science and IR in the Institute for research on Women and Gender at the University of Michigan, former research fellow at the UN institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva, “Feminist theory and arms control,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 205-209 - spp)
A feminist deconstruction of arms control: In the second section of this chapter, I argued that despite differences in their conceptual frameworks, arms control played a similar role in Schelling’s and Bull’s theories of International Relations. For Bull, arms control, like war, was a means for “preserv[ing] and buttres[ing] the balance of power” and “it could not be shaped by any such principle as the indiscriminate reduction of armaments.” For Schelling, arms control was an integral part of strategy, another tool in strategic bargaining, like limited war. For both, arms control was “war by other means.” In this section, I use feminist theory to analyze major dimensions of the Bull-Schelling conception of arms control and its application by the British government. At the fundamental epistemological level, Bull and Schellng wrote in an Olympian voice that assumes absolute and universal standards of truth and objectivity, and that claims to rise above the chaos of International Relations (even while being obviously rooted in it). That Olympian voice was pervasive in academic work in the 1960s, even though change was in the air. Peter Novick has described the voices of the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the feminist movement, and the labor movement that were being raised in the 1960s and the challenges to dominant empiricist and rationalist epistemology that would eventually deeply affect academic fields of all kinds. The Olympian epistemology was directly associated with the ontologies of the Bull and Schelling models of the international system. Schelling’s model of the state system was almost Newtonian in conception: states were like mass points that interacted by exerting forces on each other. In this case, the forces were those of military power and the ideal state of the system was “stability” achieved through deterrence and arms control to avoid an “imbalance” that would result in nuclear war. For Bull, similarly, the state was taken as an entity that required no further deconstruction and the goal was order in the state system achieved through “balance of power” exerted through diplomacy and arms control or if necessary through war. In each framework, arms control was depicted merely as an adjunct to the military machinery of deterrence and war. A further fundamental concept used by Bull and Schelling is that of power in the voluntarist sense of “power over,” achieved primarily by force or through threat of force. The basic assumption in both views of arms control is that military power can be used to force another state – usually one seen as hostile-to do something it might not otherwise do. Military power vested in nuclear weapons was used by the United States and its nuclear-armed allies to deter the Soviet Union from contemplating any kind of attack on or incursion into the capitalist world. After the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, the power game shifted to ensuring that neither state would attack the other, through each assuring the other of nuclear destruction. This was a stereotypically masculine form of power-power exerted over the behavior of the Other, linked in this case to an extreme form of violence in the form of a nuclear wrestling match. "Power over" can also be expressed in 'Foucauldian terms. According to Foucault, power is expressed in the discursive practices of social institutions from the prison to the clinic to the school-and he could easily have added military and foreign policy institutions to that list. Foucault saw power as a "productive network which runs through the whole social body." No doubt in the present context, he would have argued that the state exerts its power through the practices and specific discourses that are linked to those practices. In Foucault's words: Truth isn't outside power or lacking in power ... truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world. It is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. In Foucauldian terms, Bull and Schelling produced forms of "truth" that were readily incorporated by the "great powers" into the twin aspects of military strategy: weaponry and military training to use weapons on the one hand and arms control on the other. In their strategic discourses, the full complexity of the state with its factions, interests, processes, traditions, ethnicities, genders, and linkages across the world is reduced to a point source moved, primarily, by threats and coercion. Human beings appear in this picture as a passive, nameless mass protected by the armory of the state. Bull and Schelling justify the use of "power over" states that are treated as adversaries, or potential adversaries, in several ways. First, violence in the state system, and therefore the need to defend against it, are taken as given. As Bull wrote: It is time that strategists take the fact of military force as their starting point ... The capacity for organized violence between states is inherent in the nature of man and the environment. The most that can be expected from a total disarmament agreement is that it might make armaments and armed forces fewer-and more primitive. This claim of the inevitability of violence and the consequent need for military protection have been extensively analyzed by feminist theorists. If violence is inevitable, then someone or something is required to defend against it. Jean Elshtain, Laura Sjoberg, and other feminist theorists have demonstrated that the pervasive tradition of western political thought that claims that the inevitability of violence calls for the services of a Just Warrior (representing variously the state military apparatus or the soldier) who is "engaged in the regrettable but sometimes necessary task of collective violence in order to prevent some greater wrong" to the Beautiful Soul, representing variously patria or the homeland or innocent civilians. Bull’s political philosophy falls completely within this tradition. A second feature that legitimates a state's exercise of "power over" another is the focus in both strategy and arms control on ends rather than means. Schelling and Bull are silent about the nature of the means used to exercise power over other states. The horrific effects of nuclear, chemical, biological, or of war in any form receive no attention except to dismiss those who focus on them. The ends, on the other hand-the security and survival of the state - are all important. As Bull commented: There is a sense in which strategic thinking does and should leave morality out of the account ... if what is being said is that strategic judgments should be coloured by moral considerations or that strategic inquiry should be restricted by moral taboos, this is something that the strategist is bound to reject. This moral silence is related to a further major feature of Bull and Schelling's work: the "psychic numbing" concealing the weapons assumed to guarantee the state's security. As Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk argue, human beings develop powerful psychic walls to protect them from contemplating the effects of extreme violence. 78 "Psychic numbing" is a defense mechanism that represses, denies and excludes contemplation of massive death and destruction. In their analysis of nuclear strategy and arms control, Bull and Schelling enlist this psychological mechanism by focusing on reassuring ends rather than on the weapons providing the means to get there. As Lifton, Falk and Carol Cohn have described in detail, the nuclear strategists' locus on ends is powerfully reinforced by their "domestication" of the weaponry through the use of abstract, familial, religious, or sexual language-radically different metaphors that have a single function: distracting the user and the listener from the reality of the subject matter. Bull used this type of legitimation in his Foreign Office report through an exclusive focus on the strategic features of chemical and biological weapons and complete silence on their effects. A third feature of Bull and Schelling's view of arms control is the distancing of states from each other, with the primary relationship being an adversarial one. Schelling might have argued that his model of strategy in International Relations was politically neutral, that he was concerned only with achieving strategic balance. Bull, on the other hand, explicitly identified with "strategists' greater sense of the moral stature of American and Western political objectives for which war and the risk of war must be undertaken."