Arms control justification is not distinct from militarizing logic and alliance maintenance which only increases war fighting capability
Krause, PhD, 12 (Keith, IR@Geneva, Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)
So what remains is a set of formal arms control agreements, mostly bilateral, but also a few that were multilateral, designed to manage the potentially most dangerous and destabilizing aspects of inter-state conflict dynamics. They channeled the confrontation between the superpowers into a technical and problem-solving logic that would facilitate decision making about what kinds of weapons to produce and deploy, and under what circumstances to use them. In addition, after some of the conceptual confusions of early nuclear strategy (such as Massive Retaliation), arms control became part of the logic by which decisions over appropriate (rational) strategies could be designed. In the 1960s and 1970s, in context of the East-West conflict and nuclear proliferation, maintaining the conditions of stable deterrence and reducing the risk of war was perhaps a politically and normatively laudable goal. But arms control was thus also linked to deterrence theory and practice, and to the entire functioning of the so-called military-industrial complex, and not something distinct and in opposition to it. This vision would not necessarily be accepted by those – such as researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and other think-tanks – who saw themselves as growing out of the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements, but I think the policy acceptability of SIPRI’s work (for example) came precisely from its progressive acceptance of the underlying rules of the game.19 What were these rules of the game? There are four elements of the Cold War practice of arms control that warrant a deeper exploration in order to illustrate the normalizing and sovereign logic of arms control. The first element was the attempt by proponents of arms control to distinguish it from advocacy of disarmament in any form. Disarmament was associated with the failed attempts to negotiate reductions in armaments during the interwar period. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was associated with the peace and anti-nuclear movements, and was seen as the preserve of impractical idealist efforts – at best politically naïve; at worst politically suspect. As Jeffrey Larsen notes, ‘in the early 1960s international security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the term disarmament, which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal books on arms control published in that era all referred to this semantic problem’.20 So arms control was presented by its practitioners as directed towards controlling or regulating the numbers, types, deployment or use of certain types or quantities of arms, and disarmament was defined as involving the reduction or the elimination of particular weapons and weapons systems, and/or foreswearing of acquisition of new weapons.21 Although occasionally agreements were signed that did eliminate weapons systems or particular classes of weapons, most notably the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, when seen as part of the broader spectrum of nuclear capabilities, such restrictions were tilted more towards the control side of the equation.22 Overall, arms control reinforced, not undermined, sovereign state power. The second, related, element was the technocratic or problem-solving orientation of arms control practices. Its political acceptability came from its claim to operate within the same policy frame as other forms of military-strategic thinking, including of course deterrence theory and strategy, alliance-building, and the entire military-industrial logic that shaped Western (and arguably Eastern) security policy. More importantly, however, it provided legitimacy to a counter-intuitive set of policy prescriptions (such as leaving your own civilian population vulnerable to nuclear attack, or revealing the equivalent of state secrets as part of confidence-building measures). And finally, the technocratic approach also was, in its strongest version, opposed to the irrational and uncontrollable prescriptions of what, as early as President Eisenhower, was called the military-industrial complex. High level proponents of arms control (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for example, as well perhaps as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger), regarded the defence establishment as unable to set limits on its threat assessment and concomitant arms acquisitions. They wished to subject security policy to rational managerial techniques, including such ideas as diminishing marginal returns to investments in new weapons, cost-benefit analysis for weapons systems, and trade offs between competing goals (the guns-versus-butter debate).23 As Henry Kissinger is once purported to have said, ‘What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?’ thus expressing his frustration with the inability of the nuclear defense establishment to provide a rationale for its weapons acquisition plans.24 Even more hawkish arms controllers subscribed to the rational calculus, with, for example, Paul Nitze arguing, with respect to ballistic missile defense (Star Wars), that it had to be cost effective on the margin in order to make strategic sense.25 Arms control was thus more rational – and promised to achieve the same national security goals (including war-fighting dominance) at lower cost. But the actual achievements of arms control negotiations, treaties and agreements are difficult to assess, even if we use some counter-factual analysis. As noted above, arms control failed to stem the technological arms race, failed to reduce spending on weapons, and perhaps played only a marginal role in preventing a violent superpower confrontation. In all of its forms, arms control was not a transformative paradigm – but a techno-managerial project. The transformation of inter-state relations via either nuclear disarmament or nuclear holocaust was to be avoided at all costs, and the management of the superpower arms race was a sort of via media between these two Manichean visions. Parenthetically, some prominent advocates, such as Robert McNamara, or President Barack Obama, who have argued prominently for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, claim implicitly or explicitly that there is a seamless conceptual thread that goes from arms control to nuclear disarmament, and that all that distinguishes one from the other is the relative time horizon or degree of pragmatism of the advocates.26 But this is both conceptually and practically unlikely – if arms control is a set of techno-managerial practices fully integrated into the Cold War logic of national security strategy, then it is unable to make the leap to disarmament – which involves an entirely different idea about the place of violence in social and political life. Recent debates around the ratification of the New START treaty in late 2010 illustrated how it hardly represented a step towards deeper nuclear reductions. The third core element of the arms control paradigm was that the Weberian state’s monopoly over the use of lethal force could not only be used to impose order domestically and to create social peace but that it could also be projected outwards to create a form of international order that reduced the risk of violence. Just as the domestic form of the Weberian monopoly renders the population vulnerable to the predatory state (so much so that scholars such as Rudolph Rummel could argue that democide – state-sanctioned killing of citizens – was a greater risk than war);27 the international form also involved rendering entire populations totally vulnerable to nuclear holocaust. In the name of national security the very survival of the entire population could be put at risk, through policies such as Mutual Assured Destruction or treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. It is difficult to find a better example of techno-managerial logic, instrumental rationality and the assertion of sovereign power at work. Although perhaps an extreme example, this faith in the ability of states to exercise restraint over the use of force, also underlay the entire edifice of nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. The final element was that the arms control paradigm, like the much older balance of power system, was not a mechanism for maintaining order that eliminated war or the use of force from the international system. It assumed that the main risk to be prevented was that of large-scale inter-state war between great powers or the superpowers, and that a trade-off between this risk, and the risk of (or fact of) small and large wars, especially in the postcolonial world, was an acceptable one. The use of violence was either to be part of the logic of so-called limited (nuclear) war or to be confined to the periphery, to such places as Indochina, Angola, and Afghanistan (although this was hardly peripheral to the Soviet Union). This was analogous to the operation of the 19th century balance of power system, which sanctioned the partitions of Poland, the Crimean War, and so forth in the name of maintaining systemic stability. Similarly, the logic of limited nuclear war, as presented by scholars such as Henry Kissinger, rested upon the assumption that the use of force could be carefully calibrated and controlled.28 The neo-colonialist and political implications of pushing the problem of war to the periphery are of course clear, and one could argue that the arms control paradigm sketched above, especially the treaties that stabilized the nuclear confrontation between East and West (SALT I and II), made certain kinds of proxy wars more possible or acceptable by creating escalatory fire-breaks that facilitated the relatively risk-free provision of military assistance to client states and movements. These fire breaks were easier to create in the global South, where American and Russian troops managed to avoid confronting each other directly, but less easy to create in Europe. The history of attempts to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions (the 1975 name for what in the late 1980s became the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), and of debates over the necessity for intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and the problem of extended deterrence (or the nuclear umbrella) all point towards a set of tensions or contradictions within the logic of arms control. (23-6)