Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Their crisis-driven performance of the permutation proves that their perm devolves to just doing the aff as a sufficient framing to check their own impacts

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in feminist review 109: 49-72, spp)

The widespread failure to engage with global finance as ‘everyday’ and the proliferation of conventional accounts of crisis, with their abstracted and dehumanised representations of global finance, have been significant in contributing to a ‘business as usual’ approach for neo-liberal actors and institutions with regard to financial reform. Such an approach has enabled not only an ongoing failure to reform key institutions, practices and mechanisms, but also the reification of global finance as the preserve of a privileged, neo-liberal and masculine elite. In understanding how ‘crisis’ has been harnessed and exploited to sediment power in the hands of an existent (male) neo-liberal elite, it is worth asking what the current state of the global financial industry is and whether anything has changed in financial services ‘after’ the crisis. As a 2009 report from the UN on international monetary and financial reform notes, little reform of the global financial architecture was undertaken at the time of the Asian financial crisis, then described by the IMF as ‘one of the worst financial crises in the postwar period’ (IMF, 1998). Nothing was done to reform international economic institutions, to ensure ‘greater transparency and accountability’, to assess ‘distributive impacts’, to avoid an increase in global imbalances and asymmetries or to ensure ‘intellectual diversity’ (UN, 2009). As for the current era, and despite the longevity of the global financial crisis, money from central banks continues to be extended at relatively cheap and easy levels and banking systems have succeeded in getting ‘risky assets off balance sheets’ and improving ‘tier-one capital ratios’ by simply moving assets around (Ryan, 2013). There is ‘little evidence of chastened behaviour on the part of financial institutions’, with ‘little repentance’ shown by the leaders of financial investment companies when called to testify and women ‘no more visible in finance than they were before the crisis’ (Prügl, 2012: 31). While the IMF claims that it is has become ‘more attuned to the social impact of its programs’, with, since the Asian financial crisis, ‘many of the economies that suffered from the crisis’ performing ‘remarkably well’ (IMF, 2013), it fails to note that economic crisis in Asia had a profound and enduring impact ‘on labour markets, household incomes, social services, work burden and human development’ across the region (Floro et al., 2009: 3). Women in South Korea lost their jobs at seven times the rate of men (Seguino, 2009: 3), while a global recession hit export- oriented sectors such as textiles and apparel in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean particularly badly, each of these being sectors that ‘have a highly feminised labour force’ (Floro et al., 2009: 16). Women’s position in the agricultural sector (as farmers and workers) remains vulnerable without the reduction or elimination of agricultural subsidies in industrialised countries and the presence of government services ‘to help increase output and productivity’ and ‘the impact of trade on the costs of inputs’ continues to be volatile (ibid.). Reading the global financial crisis and governance responses to it through a (feminist) discourse analysis involves examining how ‘crisis’ has been reproduced, and governance enabled, by ideas, assumptions and values that depend both on the positioning of bodies in certain gendered ways and the reproduction of gendered techniques of governance. This includes the prevalence, for example, of governance responses that centralise women’s ‘essential’ domesticity or fiscal prudence, prevailing representations of men as public figures of authority and responsibility, and techniques of governance that exploit these (such as gender quota systems, for example, that presume that the presence of women’s bodies balances out hypermasculine behaviour, or austerity measures that are instituted on the foundational assumption of women’s reproductive work as inferred but unpaid). For many feminists, this author included, the focus in crisis governance discourse on behavioural (human) flaws and institutional weaknesses has erased attention to the broader and fundamental structures of discrimination and elite privilege on which global finance has been built, while further entrenching the hierarchical gender and racial stereotypes of governance discourses. While it is possible for agents in the economy to behave autonomously, the social settings of economic discourse (i.e., the ways in which economic ‘units’ sustain and interact with each other) make it unlikely that agents will consistently do so, particularly in an industry as dependent on group confidence as the global financial industry. Financial services are dominated not just by men but by dominant models of behaviour that have become, over centuries of concentrating historical privilege in the hands of white men, associated with masculine subjectivities. Despite the introduction of quotas and active recruitment strategies aimed specifically at women, global finance remains ‘one of the few bastions of virtually uncontested masculine privilege remaining in the aftermath of feminism’ (Prügl, 2012: 22). A recent survey, for example, conducted by recruitment company eFinancialCareers found that ‘almost two thirds of Australian finance professionals believed gender discrimination was still apparent in the finance industry’, with 84 per cent of women sure that gender discrimination exists in financial services (Pokrajac and Moore, 2013). Women occupy less than 20 per cent of executive or senior level positions in the finance, insurance, securities and investment sectors and less than 30 per cent of senior-level positions in commercial banking. Australian men in finance earn 21 per cent more than women, British men 24 per cent.1 Women may be allowed into the game for as long as they accede to the mechanisms by which the structures of economic power generate capital, profit and expansion, mechanisms that have not changed in any meaningful way since the beginnings of the current crisis.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.