Reformism leads to cooption by the elite – must refuse to enter their arena
Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 21-24, SPP)
Behind the present use of the term 'lesser evil' is a rich history and various intellectual trajectories. What may otherwise seem to be a perennial problem, endemic to ethics and political practice, a dilemma that recurs in different moments in time in the same shape and form, might in fact reveal something peculiar about each moment and situation. The various political, theological and philosophical uses of the lesser evil idiom may suggest that it meant different things to different people in different periods and situations. Every political tradition and form of political practice developed its own ways of engaging with the lesser evil argument - and much has subsequently been lost in translation. For example, unlike the tradition of liberal ethics that would invoke him centuries later, Augustine was never content with lesser evils. Indeed, a significant aspect of the idea of the lesser evil has been lost in its process of secularization from early Christian theology into the utilitarian foundations of liberal ethics. For the original Christian toleration of the lesser evil was understood in relation to the telos of redemption that is ultimately in excess of all calculations. For Augustine, the name for this state beyond calculations was 'the kingdom of heaven'. In contrast to the teachings of the Christian theologians that they invoked, and locked within a perpetual economy of immanence, liberal ethics can be interpreted as a drive for the 'optimization' of a system of government. But what is the sense in optimizing those regimes when they perpetuate intolerable injustice? Even those of us without much use for a 'kingdom of heaven' and without much patience for the systems of pastoral government that should guide us to it, can still see in Augustine's argument an important challenge: how to engage in political practice within the complex existing force-fields of the present in a way that also aims to break away from them? This challenge is particularly acute for those who operate within or in relation to situations they deem intolerable and want to fundamentally change rather than reform. The practices of human rights could be used as effective tools against close societies and tyrannies, and were indeed often used in struggles that ended up replacing those regimes, they lend themselves easily for manipulation in the context of liberal democracies. At different times, Marx, Lenin, Kautski, Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci grappled with the problem of the lesser evil in fighting for gains here and now, while also fighting for a different and better world on the other. At various points they advocated struggles for immediate gains - for example, proposing trade unions, whose function was to win a better deal for workers in an exploitative system. None of them, however, thought that trade unions were all that was possible, and none was satisfied with simply winning a better deal within an existing system. Unlike the revolutionary and militant communists who protested the drift towards a timid, reformist politics of choosing the lesser evil and of making compromises with capital, Marx thought that winning a ten-hour day was a considerable victory for the English proletariat. Marx's argument shifted the attention from the ten hours of work to the fourteen hours of non-work time. These he thought provided the opportunity to build an organizational platform, as well as the consciousness and experience needed to take over the means of production. To show that it is futile to object to all lesser evil compromises on principle, we could even enlist Lenin himself. In his attempt to explain the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that lead to Soviet Russia's exit from World War I in 1918 after making an agreement with the western powers, Lenin returned to a scene of a road robbery described by Augustine. 'To reject compromises "on principle", to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind', said Lenin, 'is childishness ... One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and firearms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and firearms to bandits so as to share in the loot.'34 The deliberation of a political thought-practice must indeed insist on uncovering the force-field within which each of the dilemmas of the lesser evil exists, seeking to identify more extended and intricate political connections; looking further into the future, it should insist on political goals and the means of their achievement. At one end of the spectrum, in which the lesser evil argument occupies the middle ground, stand those who believe that every possible gain at present is insignificant in light of the essentially compromised state of the world. Part of the structure of this argument is found the principle of the politique du pire- the politics of making things worse. This line of thought believes in the redemptive potential of misery- or in its theological-political incarnation as dolorism: pain as a spiritual experience that allows people to see more clearly. Every form of improvement is necessarily seen as the normalization of exploitation or the pacification of injustice. Opting for the worst is, therefore, an attempt to undermine the field of alternatives of a pre-given choice and overcome its terms. But are the horrific spectacles of greater evils preferable to the incremental damage of lesser ones? Is the choice only between squabbling with power about the correct measure of its violence, helping to calibrate it and tend to its wounded, or on the other hand a call for its amplification in order to 'expose its contradictions' (contradictions seem only to sustain power's march) to shock a complacent population into rising up? Between refusal and tactical embrace the difficulty of the dilemma of the lesser evil is equally in practising and in avoiding it. The Greeks thought of the dilemma as one of the elements of tragedy. Each of the options that a tragic hero faces necessarily leads to different forms of horrific suffering: the dilemma was presented as a choice between the two horns of an angry bull. But the options must not only be about which of the horns to choose. Robert Pirsig has suggested several ways to subvert this complicity of the opposites: one can 'refuse to enter the arena', 'throw sand in the bull's eyes', or 'sing the bull to sleep' .35 The contemporary forms of power unpacked in this book are no longer so singular and unified. Rather than a bull, they may appear to take on the shape of a multiplicity, a diffuse field of forces simultaneously aggressive and benign. It is a form of power that not only charges forward; it surrounds, immerses and embeds. Political activists must constantly invent new forms of struggle that are recognisant of this paradigm of power, but which also evade and subvert its embrace, attempt to rewire its webs in order to escape its calculation. The characters that inhabit the chapters of this book have stepped right into the thick of this web of forces: their movement through them offer valuable examples and lessons. Some paths must be avoided at all costs; others illuminate possible courses of action within the intricate workings of the humanitarian present.