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Security cooperation causes anti-alignment from recipient states. It triggers allied aggression and entrapment

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 7)//BB

The United States spends more than eleven billion dollars per year on direct military assistance to foreign governments and substate groups (USAID 2009). The American government expresses a wide variety of goals motivating their use of military assistance as a foreign policy tool. Frequently, US administrations have explicitly linked military aid or arms transfers to a quid-pro-quo expectation of compliance from a government (Sislin 1994). More generally, military assistance is expected to augment US national security by increasing recipient state cooperation with US objectives. According to the State Department's 2007 Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act:

Security cooperation remains a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national security interests worldwide…. Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the United States to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the war against terrorism (1).

Importantly, the policies that guide the provision of US military aid have changed significantly in recent years. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration sent Congress an antiterrorism bill that would have lifted all restrictions on military aid and arms transfers to foreign governments in cases where such assistance could “help fight terrorism” (Federation of American Scientists 2002, 1). The provision specifically called for lifting bans on counterterrorism aid for states with a history of human rights abuses or noncooperation on counterterrorism.1 The bill was eventually modified to include “sunset clauses” and some requirements for Congressional oversight, but it initiated a year of radical changes in the way US military aid was allocated, restricted, and justified. In 2002, Congress amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, removing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan from a list of states barred from receiving US arms transfers. The United States has also extended military aid to Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, Georgia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, Yemen, Uzbekistan, and Columbia, among others, in the name of rewarding or encouraging cooperation in the fight against terrorism (DSCA News Releases, 2002–2008).

What are the consequences of US military aid in a rapidly changing, unpredictable global security environment? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States between 1990 and 2004. Our analysis improves upon existing studies in several ways. First, we develop three competing, clearly defined, and falsifiable theoretical models of the relationship between military aid and recipient state behavior. These models—Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower, and Reverse Leverage—range from a conventional understanding of US military aid as a way to buy cooperation from the recipient state to a more counterintuitive assessment of US aid as a sign of American dependence on the recipient government for the provision of some foreign policy good. Second, our focus on the post-Cold War era allows us to measure recipient state compliance using events data rather than the UN voting records that most studies rely on. Third, we employ multiple statistical methods in order to match our empirical models to the hypotheses we are testing. For example, a number of our hypotheses predict a reciprocal relationship between military aid and cooperation or anticipate selection effects. To address these challenges, we use both a simultaneous equations model with fixed effects and a two-stage Heckman model. Finally, we control for pre-existing preference similarity between the United States and aid recipients in our empirical analyses, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.

Our research is relevant to larger academic debates about the utility and limitations of foreign aid as a policy instrument. We attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid, and security assistance more specifically, in terms of its ability to move recipients toward more cooperative foreign policies. We test the conventional “arms for influence” explanation of military aid but find that the relationship between US assistance and recipient state behavior is considerably more complicated. In general, we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of recipient states. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also somewhat counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that increased recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.

The results of our inquiry also have implications for US foreign policy. Policymakers and military advisors invariably justify military assistance to foreign governments on the basis of an expectation that providing military aid to these governments will increase US influence over the recipients' foreign or domestic policies. In the 1980s, despite concerns about Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the Reagan administration began providing direct military assistance to Pakistan and funneling money and weapons to Afghan rebels through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The primary objective was to support Islamic insurgents fighting the USSR and the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan. And, in one important sense, the US policy was a tremendous success. The Afghan rebels prevailed and the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan—a result some attribute directly to US assistance and, more specifically, to the highly accurate FIM-92 Stinger Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) the US provided. However, several hundred of the Stinger missiles are unaccounted for, and Osama bin Laden is thought to have procured a number of Stingers and other SAMs with which he could target US military or civilian aircraft (Jane's Intelligence Review). Moreover, the Pakistan Army's Inter-Services Intelligence diverted an unknown quantity of US arms and assistance to groups it considered less threatening to Pakistan than the Afghan mujahedeen—including some radically anti-US Islamic factions (Debate in US House, June 22, 2001). After a total ban on military assistance to Pakistan throughout the 1990s, the United States resumed providing billions of dollars of military assistance and arms to Pakistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Grimmett 2009). And, once again, there are concerns that Pakistan is channeling some of the money to extremist groups on its border with India. Perhaps more seriously, the ISI remains closely linked to the Taliban militants the American military is fighting in Afghanistan (Gopal 2008; Mazzetti and Schmitt 2009; Murphy 2010).

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