Turkey’s focusing on non-nuclear ballistic missile capabilities.
Can Kasapoğlu 19, IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), “Turkey’s Nuclear Onset: Military Policy, Techno-Nationalism Trends and Defense Industrial Capabilities”, October 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkeys-nuclear-onset///SJ
Turkey’s ballistic missile program remains solely conventional
A closer look at Turkey’s ballistic missile program gives a hint as to Ankara’s most probable motives with regard to its nuclear rhetoric.
The Bora line forms the core of Turkey’s missile program. The line can be traced back to Ankara’s initial defense cooperation with Beijing in the late 1990s. Based on the Chinese B-611 tactical ballistic missile as a baseline, Turkey has made significant progress, especially in developing the missile’s accuracy. Bora is a road-mobile missile that carries a 480 kg high-explosive warhead, has an operational range of around 280 km and is reported to have a CEP (circular error probable) of 50 meters. Notably, ROKETSAN, the primary manufacturer of the weapon system, claims Bora’s CEP is as small as 10 meters or even less. If true, this would make the missile one of the most precise in its class.
Bora saw its combat debut in May 2019 during Operation Claw in Northern Iraq. Its maiden operational launch was widely publicized in the Turkish press, showcasing yet another milestone for Turkey’s burgeoning defense industries. After all, a road-mobile (enables better survivability on the battleground), solid-fuel (minimizes the launch-cycle, supporting launch at short notice) tactical ballistic missile, carrying half a ton of high-explosive warhead with precision strike capability within 280 kilometers represents a game-changer for Turkish military operations. Now, Ankara must walk a fine line in missile proliferation, as Turkey is a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, a non-binding yet effective exports control regime focusing on systems able to deliver at least 500 kg payload to 300 km and beyond). The Bora line’s further roadmap remains a critical issue. In this matter, only limited open-source input is available. In 2018, the Turkish defense minister spoke of a second batch, Bora 2, without detailing the administration’s plans for areas of improvement. Notably, back in 2012, the Turkish press reported that then Prime Minister Erdoğan had set the bar high for the country’s national research and development efforts and had called on the industry to produce missiles with a range of around 2,500 km, probably with the Middle Eastern military strategic balance in mind.
Technically, unless Ankara opts for adding another stage to Bora, which would mark a burdensome difficulty in terms of know-how and defense economics, it would be safe to assume that the Bora family will remain a short-range system (meaning an operational range of less than 1,000 km). In comparison, Iran’s Sejjil 2 solid-fuel ballistic missile, for example, has a two-stage design (independent rocket stages with engine and propellant), setting its operational range at around 2,000 km which places it in the medium-range ballistic missile category (operational range between 1,000 km and 3,000 km). An educated guess suggests that Turkey would focus on minimizing the launch-cycle and boosting their precision and maneuverability (new generation ballistic missiles, such as the Russian SS‑26 Iskander, can follow unpredictable trajectories and homing maneuvers to strengthen missile defense). Another area of improvement might be to reduce the radar cross-section of Bora by altering its design to prevent it being easily detected by early warning systems. Although such modernization packages might furnish the Turkish Armed Forces with an even more lethal battlefield asset, it would not hint at a program to produce delivery means for nuclear payloads, as there is no visible work on nuclear warhead design, no hint that the Bora line will be adjusted for WMD delivery and, so far, no effort to develop an airburst mode warhead detonation during the tests (airburst above ground level is preferred in ballistic missiles used in WMD dissemination).
In fact, considering the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones surrounding Turkey, which pose an immense threat to manned aircraft, Ankara’s decision to invest in high-precision ballistic missile capabilities for conventional roles, coupled with unmanned aerial platforms with higher payloads, makes perfect sense.