That creates shelter for proliferation.
Vipin Narang 22. Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Ph.D. from the Department of Government at Harvard, “Seeking the Bomb”, Princeton University Press, 01-08-2022, Vol. 188, p. 292-337, Project Muse //SJ
How does one stop sheltered pursuers? Major powers make a decision to extend shelter, pricing in the tolerance of the pursuer’s nuclear weapons program to the cost of their broader geopolitical goals. A smart sheltered pursuer—and nuclear aspirants are usually quite smart—will attempt to exploit the shelter to weaponize its nuclear capabilities as quickly as possible, before the shelter potentially disappears. Short of convincing a sheltered pursuer that they do not want or need nuclear weapons after all, the only way to stop sheltered pursuers is to eliminate their shelter from sanctions or military attempts at prevention. In some cases, shelter might evaporate because the patron state independently decides that the nuclear aspirant they are sheltering is no longer worth the hassle or that the price of their future entry into the nuclear club is too steep to bear. This is what Pakistan feared when it benefited from U.S. shelter to develop nuclear weapons in the 1980s. Islamabad understood that U.S. forbearance depended on the continuation of the war in Afghanistan. Without the war, the United States would have had less need for Pakistan and therefore less willingness to protect their nuclear program. It is in fact plausible that Pakistan played a double game with the United States and attempted to prolong the Afghanistan war in order to extend the shelter and largesse it was receiving from Washington for as long as possible. The United States was a willing participant in this game, however. This was a strategic—and not an inevitable—choice, one the United States could have reversed at any time.
If shelter does not evaporate on its own, other major powers might engage the patron state (rather than the nuclear aspirant) to convince them to stop protecting the proliferator. This is the strategy the United States attempted with China over North Korea’s nuclear program during the Six Party Talks—seeking to get Beijing’s buy-in on stopping North Korean proliferation. China was fundamentally unpersuaded and continued to shield Pyongyang and issue denials about its progress while simultaneously appearing to support—but slow-roll—diplomacy and effective sanctions. There are no cases where a third party has successfully coerced or cajoled a patron state to stop protecting a “sheltered pursuer,” but driving a wedge between the nuclear pursuer and its patron if no wedge appears naturally remains the only logical option to reverse a sheltered pursuit strategy. If that can be achieved, the erstwhile sheltered pursuer would be exposed in two ways. First, the existence of a nuclear program would now be implausibly deniable and, second, the proliferator could now be vulnerable to economic or military coercion. But the difficulty of peeling off another major power’s shelter for a proliferator should not be understated, as it would be no easy task, and likely priced in by the shelter prior to extending protection to the proliferator. Major powers have—both under the bipolar Cold War configuration and after—decided that nuclear proliferation is tolerable in pursuit of other geopolitical priorities. It is likely to occur again and identifying where it might be possible provides insight into the future nuclear landscape, as a sheltered pursuit strategy—if it can be selected—has a high probability of leading to a nuclear weapons capability. As such, states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey (American frenemies) that may be able to select this strategy have a high likelihood of becoming independent nuclear states if they ever choose to do so.