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Norms go unenforced behind nuclear cooperation.

Philseo Kim et al 22. Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, KAIST. Jihee Kim is at the School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, KAIST. Man-Sung Yim works at Institute for Basic Science, “Assessing proliferation uncertainty in civilian nuclear cooperation under new power dynamics of the international nuclear trade”, Energy Policy, 2022 https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0301421522000775//SJ

Second, our results suggest that countries have certain military motivations in engaging in the more concrete form of nuclear cooperation: they can leverage higher levels of nuclear cooperation to strengthen their weak military alliance. According to our results from Case 3, the supplier and client countries tend to complement their weak military alliance (such as entente) with concrete nuclear cooperation. This implies that the exporter countries seek other newcomer countries with whom they have not shared a defense pact. In particular, this phenomenon is more evident in Russia, one of the major export countries. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has entered into defense pacts mainly with the former Soviet Union countries or Eastern European countries (Gibler, 2008). Thus, the results imply that Russia, which is currently expanding its nuclear exports, could use nuclear cooperation as an opportunity to expand its international ties with more countries. Turkey, Finland, Bulgaria, and China are such examples of client countries. Russia is now engaged in concrete cooperation with Turkey, Finland, and Bulgaria with whom Russia has only shared an entente pact. In addition, Russia supplied several cases of concrete nuclear cooperation with China (although China is not a newcomer country) whom they share only an entente pact. Moreover, South Korea and UAE is another related example to support this view. These countries committed nuclear power plant construction projects in 2009 while not forming any military alliance (defense or entente). Initiated by this cooperation, however, they are currently looking to strengthen their economic partnership and deepen their military cooperation (Rahman, 2021; YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, 2021). This is in line with our results that concrete cooperation could be leveraged as strengthening the military alliance.

Moreover, this result on military motivations is partly driven by the fact that some countries with the strongest military alliance (such as the defense pact) already had gone through concrete cooperation before 2000, thereby low motivation to form concrete nuclear cooperation. Canada-Argentina and the US-Poland are such examples. These country pairs formed concrete cooperation before 2000 (Fuhrmann, 2009b), but the more recent dataset of ours indicates supportive cooperation only.12

In summary, our analysis indicates that non-proliferation norms have not been strictly enforced in international nuclear cooperation under new market dynamics. Specifically, concrete nuclear cooperation could take place if the same military interest is shared even when the norm compliance levels of the client country are low. Moreover, military motivations may be behind concrete nuclear cooperation. Countries with high military expenditure tend to receive a more concrete form of nuclear cooperation, and countries also seem to use concrete nuclear cooperation to strengthen their military alliance.

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