Too many factors prevent Turkish prolif.
George Perkovich & Sinan ÜLgen 15. Perkovich is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, “Why Turkey Won’t Go Nuclear”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,4-10-2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/10/why-turkey-won-t-go-nuclear-pub-59756//SJ
Turkey has valid economic arguments for developing the capacity to produce nuclear energy. Primary energy imports comprise almost half of Turkey’s chronic current-account deficit, because the country imports more than 90% of its oil and natural gas. Moreover, unlike in Europe, Turkey’s electricity demand continues to grow at 5-6% per year. Turkish policymakers see nuclear power as an almost indispensable tool for enhancing energy security and reducing the import bill.
These economic interests, combined with national-security considerations, give Turkey an incentive not to seek nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Turkey is prohibited from developing military applications of the technology. If it were perceived to be breaking this commitment, other states, including those that would otherwise contribute to its nuclear energy program, would turn against it and jeopardize its ability to meet growing demand at an affordable cost. This, in turn, would undermine the economic growth that has been central to sustaining the government’s popular support over the past two decades.
Moreover, Turkey is a member of NATO and thus benefits from the security guarantee that the alliance provides, including its nuclear umbrella. Indeed, the US has based nuclear weapons in Turkey for decades. More recently, NATO and the US have deployed ballistic missile defenses in the country. If the Turkish government sought to acquire its own nuclear weapons, it would jeopardize these security guarantees and turn NATO against it.
In any case, Turkey lacks the know-how and technical infrastructure to produce a nuclear weapon quickly, and the country would need a long time – probably more than a decade – to develop this capacity. During this period, Turkey would face severe political, economic, and security pressures not only from the US and other NATO states, but also from Russia, Iran, and others.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s immediate security threats would be exacerbated. Nuclear weapons would do little to reduce the dangers posed by Syria’s violent disintegration, the rise of the Islamic State, and the unresolved challenge of Kurdish separatism. Turkey’s relations with Iran, which heretofore have been manageable, could become more prone to crisis.
All of these considerations point to the serious risks that seeking nuclear weapons would pose to Turkey’s security. These risks could in turn exacerbate internal discord in the country at a time when the ruling Justice and Development Party is struggling to retain popular support.