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The perm leads to bifurcated and incoherent foreign policy, not coordination

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB

There are several challenges of this duplicative security assistance system at the DOD:

The DOD’s authorities duplicate authorities originally granted to the State Department. Congress originally granted long-term efforts to develop another country’s security forces to the State Department and put these efforts under the purview of diplomats. But in the post-9/11 security environment, rather than fix the State Department’s lack of resources to handle counterterrorism issues, appropriators gave the funds to the DOD, contributing to more bifurcation of security assistance policy. This was exemplified by the 2006 creation of Section 1206: a $350 million annual authority for the secretary of defense to support counterterrorism efforts and assist coalition partners. Though it required cooperation with the State Department, it was explicitly designed to empower the DOD, in part because some DOD officials thought the State Department was too slow and lacking expertise to carry out counterterrorism activities.37 In 2014, a Congressional Research Service report found that “government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs.”38

Congressional barriers exacerbated the DOD-State Department imbalance. The 2011 Budget Control Act and a Republican-controlled Congress skeptical of the State Department made giving more resources to the department a nonstarter.39 Senior DOD officials urged Congress to grant the agency new authorities, such as in a 2008 House Armed Services Committee hearing with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.40 Faced with these constraints, the Obama administration opted to create more authorities at the DOD through the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, with jurisdiction only over the State Department’s security assistance programs, did little to correct the imbalance.41 According to one study before the recent consolidation efforts, the DOD managed 48 out of 50 new programs created after the 9/11 attacks.42 Of the 107 existing security assistance programs today, the DOD manages 87—a whopping 81 percent.43

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46

Temporary programs become permanent. The majority of the new DOD security assistance authorities were premised as temporary, operational programs, designed to tackle immediate threats and challenges.47 But in practice, many programs have endured. Once a multiyear, multimillion-dollar program is established, it has a tendency to become entrenched, becoming a permanent assistance program with its own invested bureaucracy to sustain and expand it.48 The Section 1206 authority exemplifies this phenomenon: A 2017 DOD inspector general report found that “DoD officials stated that the temporary nature of the authority made it infeasible to commit the resources necessary to effectively manage Section 1206 as a ‘program’”—despite the fact that it was annually authorized and funded for 10 years until fiscal year 2015. Some $2.2 billion was appropriated for Section 1206 before it became law. Section 333 funding now replicates many of the same functions today.

The DOD’s duplicative security assistance programs complicate overall foreign policymaking. Reforming security assistance by centralizing resources at the State Department—and coupling the move with necessary reforms at the State Department—would go a long way toward improving this policy process.

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