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US power prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear war---China, Russia, Iran, and regional prolif---decline causes transition wars, counterbalancing, and re-intervention---no alternatives

Auslin et al, 17 - Auslin, resident scholar and director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute; Dueck, professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; Bromund, senior research fellow in Anglo-American relations at the Heritage Foundation (Michael Auslin, Colin Dueck, and Ted Bromund, "Reclaiming American Realism," Volume 1, Number 2, American Affairs Journal, May 2017, https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/reclaiming-american-realism/)

Having vanquished both Nazism and Communism in the space of a lifetime, American policymakers were all too eager to accept Francis Fukuyama’s declaration that history was over, even if they interpreted in different ways the license this gave them to remake the world. From Bill Clinton’s “democratic enlargement,” through George W. Bush’s freedom agenda, to Barack Obama’s retreats, we have been too willing to believe that the era of great power politics is over. Our optimism encouraged our interventions and excused our retreats. But geopolitical competition has not disappeared. Nor have our adversaries. The world is now less stable—and above all, less safe for American interests—than it was in 1991. And disorder is rising in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Asia. Today, nearly a generation after the collapse of Soviet Communism and over fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks, it is undeniable that Europe is at greater risk, the Gulf is more war-torn, and the Pacific less secure than they were eight or eighteen years ago. We must arrest these trends, which threaten the central purpose of American foreign policy. The fact that they also threaten the “liberal international order” that many claim has characterized part of the world in the postwar era is merely an incidental fact, for it is our efforts to defend our interests that played the central role in defining that order. Today, focusing on the order, not U.S. interests, merely perpetuates a central fallacy of post–Cold War foreign policy: it emphasizes the waterwheel, not the water that makes it move. We are committed to a leading, though not dominating, American position in the world. But we also believe the United States has dangerously neglected to respect the limits on its vital role in the world. To recognize a world increasingly in disorder is obviously not to assert that all disorder threatens, or has the potential to threaten, American interests. Just as importantly, we recognize that we cannot live by postmortem. An obsessive focus on the past—above all, on the Iraq war—risks paralyzing us today. Much like the post–Vietnam War era, foreign policy is refracted through the prism of Iraq and Afghanistan, and those on both sides who fought the bureaucratic battles of fifteen years ago continue to be shaped by the experience. It is time to move on, however, even as part of the challenge ahead remains responding to the threats the wars were designed to eliminate. Constructive conservative ideas will come from leaders, and a generation, less personally fixated on 2003, or on the post-1989 world, for that matter. If we are to understand what we must do in the world, we must return to the realism of the American political tradition, in which, as Washington put it, our interests are guided by justice. Securing American Freedom To recover that tradition, we should think again about the purpose of American foreign policy. Yes, it is to preserve the sovereign and independent American union. Yes, it is to protect our homeland. And yes, it is to keep us prosperous and at peace. But these are not ends in themselves. They exist to allow Americans, with due regard for the just laws of others when abroad, to be free—free to preach, to trade, to study, to help, to work, whether overseas or at home. That is how we conserve free America: by acting to make sure that individual Americans are free to live their own lives. The true purpose of U.S. foreign policy is to protect and promote the freedom of individual Americans, who by their own actions are remaking our world. We will enjoy that individual freedom more fully the more nations embrace the principles of democratic sovereignty on which our own union was founded. A world of unfree nations, a world divided into spheres of influence controlled by the hostile or the unfree, would be a world in which the freedom of Americans would be curtailed or, at worst, would exist only on the sufferance of others. But freedom for the world begins with freedom for America. The first, irreducible American interest is the preservation of the sovereignty of the United States and the political order of republican government under the Constitution. If we lose those, our other interests will be irrelevant, because we will not have the command of our own fortunes. No regime or idea that seeks to traduce the sovereignty of democratic nations is our friend, because our purposes cannot be realized in a world defined by the unfree. And we should remember one more thing: states that reject democratic sovereignty are implicitly rejecting our legitimacy. Indeed, our challengers today—just as in 1776, or 1917, or 1941, or 1950—are enemies of the sovereign democracies. In this most fundamental respect, nothing has changed: from the American Revolution to today, our challengers have always been imperialists, eager to claim the right to rule without the democratic consent of the governed. We have faced empires of power, of race, of class, and of religion—but empire, and the imperial struggle for power, is the constant. The problem is not that there are other great powers in the world with interests of their own. It is inevitable that great powers will not accept neighbors who threaten them; what is not acceptable is for great powers to interpret a desire for independence and good relations with other nations as inherently threatening. To do this is to claim the right to an imperial sphere that is based on a rejection of national sovereignty. The United States rejected one such claim in 1776. It has rejected many other, similar claims in the succeeding centuries. The sovereign democratic republic is not merely the freest form of government ever devised. It also defines the international system into which the United States was born, and on which its system of government is based. But today, supranationalists contemn the nation-state and muse, in the words of the president of the European Commission, that “borders were the worst invention ever.” Others are more malignant: Russia seeks to change borders, or render them meaningless, in order to suborn and dominate its neighbors; China seeks to impose an acceptance of its national interests on its neighbors; and Iran is making its dream of regional dominance into a reality—with the aid of Russia and the U.S.-brokered Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Worst of all, ISIS and al-Qaeda wish to eradicate the sovereign state and replace it with a religious empire. We need not be afraid of our competitors—or, indeed, of our enemies. However, we do need to acknowledge that that is what they are, to take them seriously, and to admit that they want a world organized in ways that are fundamentally antithetical to our principles. At times, it may be possible to find common interests with some of them. But we should entertain no illusions. An example from the past makes the point: We were not wrong to cooperate with Stalin to defeat Hitler. But we were wrong to delude ourselves by calling him Uncle Joe. The Challenges to and Importance of Our Alliances As Americans, we should know what it is to live in a tough, competitive world, because it was the world our nation was born into. That world endures, and no amount of post–Cold War fantasizing will make it disappear. From the start, we made our way in that world thanks to our alliances—for it was a military alliance with France that helped us win our independence. Provided that we retain the power to decide if we will fight—and we do—our alliances today raise no questions of principle. After all, we claimed the right to contract alliances in the Declaration of Independence itself. Nor are our alliances an act of charity. First and foremost, they have mostly been made with strategically important countries, traditionally those that have been able to help uphold order in their regions. Today, there is little disagreement in America that our allies should pay more, so as to do more. Every president since Eisenhower has asked for that, and with rare exceptions—such as Britain under Margaret Thatcher—they have asked in vain. We cannot sustain our alliances unless the American people believe that every member nation is making a fair contribution. But the problem is not that our allies are free riding on us, for when we cut our defenses, they do not increase theirs. It is that the history, culture, and politics of our allies now make them unwilling to accept that military strength is vital to diplomacy and deterrence alike. They have profound incentives to minimize, dismiss, and ignore threats—and hence not to spend enough on defense. For our European allies and Japan, the demands of the social welfare state, mixed with an understandably lingering horror at the memories of war, have combined over decades to make unpalatable most discussion of hard power and the need for martial readiness. The fear that returning to the world of machtpolitik will put at risk all they have built since 1945 is understandable, if unsuited to the current geopolitical environment. Yet we should still appreciate what we have in our allies. Tens of thousands of brave Americans gave their lives to create the alliances we have today. The costs we pay now are maintenance expenses on the peace they won. Of course, our allies benefit from this. But precisely because we are on top, we benefit most from the world as it is today, even if our complacency sometimes allows others to take advantage of the stability we created for their own malignant purposes. Our democratic allies, who wish—a little too hard—only to live in peace, feel the same way about the status quo. That does not mean we need to excuse the failings of our allies, indulge their supranational fantasies, outsource the defense of our interests to them, or allow them to completely outsource theirs to us. Instead, we need to have just as much realism about our allies as we have about our enemies. That means recognizing that what our allies lack is the luck that we in the United States enjoy. We are fortunate to have Canada and Mexico as neighbors; our allies, unfortunately, are next door to China, Russia, autocrats, and Islamists. Given our good fortune, and our strength, it is inevitable that we are the ones who are forward deployed, because we are the ones who have the geopolitical freedom to help. But we should remember that our deployments defend our place in the world—and the ability of Americans to be free in it—just as much as they defend our allies. Without our close alliances and the forward yet benign deployment of our forces, we would look out onto an unwelcoming Middle East and an increasingly troubled Asia, where Americans would be seen simply as outsiders, not as welcome partners by some. Moreover, the allies we have, such as the United Kingdom, Israel, Japan, and South Korea, are part of a global network of liberal societies and economies that dynamically interact and add immeasurably to global wealth, not least back in the United States. We cannot avoid becoming involved merely by retreating from our allies. American indifference or perceived weakness can engender instability that is not in our interests, and which forces us to consider more risky forms of involvement. For example, China’s buildup of forces in the South China Sea, and its efforts to dominate strategic waterways and raise doubts about future freedom of navigation, occurred in part due to its perception that America’s lack of active military alliances in Southeast Asia would make the United States unable to counter its expansion. To China, America is an interloper in areas it has traditionally dominated and considered part of its sphere of influence; thus, it believed that U.S. naval and air forces (which currently can only be transiently present in Southeast Asia), were a paper tiger and could be intimidated into eventual withdrawal. Washington, indeed, has struggled with trying to prove its credibility in keeping open vital sea lanes in the South China Sea, without having bases from which it can project a regular presence. That is why offshore balancing is an attractive concept in theory; in the real world, it would be all offshore and no balancing, as our allies and others would doubt our commitment to play a meaningful role during a crisis, and as the costs of “fighting our way back in” would be politically unacceptable at home. Our alliances also help us in another way. Without us, our smaller yet strategic allies would be unable to defend themselves, and our larger ones—Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, to name four—would have to fend for themselves. The cheapest way to do that would be to acquire nuclear weapons, which could lead to a cascade of nuclear proliferation. The resulting regional environments would be tense and unstable, and future crises could well become violent. We therefore need to reassure our friends as we deter our enemies—for the sake of greater stability that reduces the chances of a major conflagration in strategic areas drawing in American forces. Happily, our alliances, backed by our strength, are a means for us to do both at once. Part of the answer to the problems we face with our allies is for the free world to stop doing the things that alienate its publics and make it vulnerable to autocratic blandishments. Above all, we must stop centralizing power in the hands of unaccountable experts, an approach that, as the EU is belatedly discovering, only makes rejecting democracy more appealing. Another part of the answer is for the United States to make clear what side it is on. Starry-eyed “resets” or “open hands” towards aggressive, repressive regimes only confuse those who wish to rally beneath a flag of freedom and liberalism. Trying to win over the whole world risks losing those already on our side. Finally, our first choice should always be to deter trouble where it matters most, not to fight it: the example of Western Europe after 1945 is proof of the value of resolutely holding the line. Thus, the danger in this competitive world is not that we will be too strong. It is our weakness, not our strength, that is provocative, because American weakness makes our allies fearful and encourages our competitors to take chances. Providing strong defenses is both necessary for peace and a charge laid upon Congress by the Constitution. This charge must be fulfilled. A Realist Approach to Expeditionary Power Yet America’s geostrategic position means that we will usually act far from our shores, not least when we employ military power. Being primarily an expeditionary nation is not a limitation: it is a strength that allows us the flexibility to intervene in ways that respect the limits on our power. Going forward, we must emphasize our expeditionary nature, while remaining willing to base U.S. forces in strategic areas for reassurance and insurance purposes. This means, above all, that we must invest in precision airpower to inflict substantial damage, a strong navy to project power while maintaining freedom of the seas, credible land combat power to deter adversaries who threaten our allies, and homeland defense—including the most advanced missile defenses and cyber defenses. We face many perils, but in many cases, if we act rightly, time is on our side. The only thing that could truly hurt the United States in a way that would change us instantaneously and forever is a WMD attack. We must prevent such a catastrophe by any means necessary. But in defending ourselves, we must not be led into rash actions. President Trump is correct that our goal of peace is best achieved by a “disciplined, deliberate, and consistent foreign policy” backed by a strong America that understands that “caution and restraint are really truly signs of strength.” The restraint that President Trump and many of his liberal opponents praise means that the era of indiscriminate interventions, especially in pursuit of humanitarian objectives or to teach foreigners to elect good men, is over. This means privileging the interests of the American nation—and its people—over the larger, though fictive, international community. The lessons of World War II and the Cold War were too easily transmuted into the argument that our security policies must always be undergirded by morality. Today, we place more emphasis on the unquestioned evil of both Nazism and Communism than on the existential threat their power posed to Western civilization. It follows that for defenders of the supposed “liberal international order,” U.S. involvement in humanitarian crises or efforts at nation-building in inhospitable climates becomes the true measure of the legitimacy and wisdom of our foreign policy. When liberal states reveal their hypocrisy by not intervening in such crises, this delegitimizes them, and thereby makes it harder to advance arguments based on real national interests. The greatest risk of all is that, when do-gooding dominates policy, the American people are more likely to withdraw their support for defending our overseas interests. The path to a sustainable and strong U.S. role in the world does not rest in valorizing the “rules-based international order”: it rests in understanding the value and the limits of our power. Believe what you will about Iraq or Syria. The fact is that there is no public support for such interventions today. It would be an act of folly to press for actions that, for lack of that support, cannot be followed through to victory. It must be an ironclad rule for the United States that we do not start a fight we do not intend to finish. But this does not mean we give up the competitive struggle. Instead, we must find new ways to wage it. While we should not use our national strength to uphold a fictive international community, we should recognize that our interests rest in advancing towards a freer world. Thus, our goal has not changed: it is to help defend, and, where possible, to advance prudently towards a world built on sovereign democracies in which Americans can be safe and free. And the American constitutional order—if we keep faith with it—has great long-run strengths, which we can use in this struggle; it imposes limits on centralized power and the competition it encourages. Principle and prudence alike tell us that we must play the long game. Our method should not be imposed regime change, except in cases of vital national need: it should be the creation of leverage, the use of pressure, and the imposition of costs to constrain our opponents. It is a great mistake to believe that we must always meet our adversaries head on: for example, the U.S. development of hydraulic fracturing, which reduces world oil prices and thus damages the Russian economy, imposes costs on Russia and decreases its strategic influence. Our goal should be to seek out and use such indirect methods to encourage the buildup of opposing forces within other systems, and—as Ronald Reagan did—to build opportunities for negotiations to be conducted on our terms, not theirs. And at times, in part with the aid of this strategy, change may come in another way, preferably through peaceful transitions that reflect a change in culture, and not just a struggle for power. Such a failure to change the culture is why there was no revolution after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but rather the more efficient reorganization of power by a repressive clique. Yet autocracies are brittle: eventually they crack, especially when the people living under them seek to emulate more successful democracies. That is the great fear of the Chinese Communist Party and the reason why it is repressing civil society today. We can win this struggle not primarily through force of arms, but through persistence and flexibility, backed by strength and the preservation of our national power. The greatest strategic challenge we face today is not the strength of our main adversaries: it is the weakness of their neighbors, be they the smaller and still-developing nations of Southeast Asia vis-à-vis China, or the economically challenged and militarily weak nations of Europe facing Russia. By various means—hybrid war, political subversion, or fear induced by threats—these nations, some of them our allies, are being suborned in ways that we find hard to combat and are reluctant even to acknowledge. A world divided up into spheres of influence, largely controlled by our adversaries, would be neither stable nor free. While we cannot prevent powerful nations from having spheres of particular interest, it is not in our interest to allow them to exercise neo-imperial control over their neighbors. We are by instinct and by interest opposed to empires. If illiberal states dominate vital regions, such as East Asia or Central Europe, the result will not be good for the freedom of Americans in the world, or the idea of republican self-government, or for our relative power. It would thus be profoundly antithetical to the true purpose of our foreign policy.

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