Military assistance creates reverse leverage that causes client-state aggression
Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Number 7)//BB
In this model, we anticipate a paradoxical effect of military aid in which powerful donor states become dependent on the recipients of their military aid (Mott 2002). The United States gives military aid to gain leverage and influence. But it is in a competitive market for leverage through aid; it must compete with other states to keep its influence over client states. At the same time, we can assume that the United States chooses to invest heavily in training and equipping the military forces of other countries, with all the attendant risks this entails, because it needs something from these states. Materially weak states can exploit the fact that a much stronger donor relies on them to provide some vital good—and the threat of defection to an alternative supplier—to exert influence over the donor. According to Mott (2002), during the Cold War, US security assistance recipients learned to manipulate the United States ‘‘by putting Moscow and Washington into an aid competition, by diversifying across suppliers, and converting the expected recipient dependence into a perverse sort of supplier dependence’’ (8). Although the Cold War competition with Moscow is no longer central to US foreign policy, other states and even nonstate actors have stepped in to replace the Soviet Union as alternative arms suppliers. Stokke (1995) observes that strong states have typically used foreign aid ‘‘as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor, which the recipient government would not have otherwise agreed to’’ (12). But Singer (2003) argues that the increasingly privatized military market ‘‘fundamentally alters this patron-client relationship’’ (211). Since weaker states can now purchase weapons on the open market, the patron’s ability to influence client behavior is greatly diminished. Generous US military funding runs the risk of creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more willing to ignore US interests (Mott 2002). Recipient states should be more likely to defy the United States if they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to punish them for defection (Walt 2005). US dependence on recipient states for oil, troop basing, over-flight permission, counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations, etc… makes withdrawing aid potentially more costly for the United States than for the aid recipients. It may be easier for aid recipients to find alternative suppliers than it would be for the United States to find an equally valuable place to base its troops.