Military aid undermines cooperation with US efforts
Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Number 7)//BB
Our research is relevant to larger academic debates about the utility and limitations of foreign aid as a policy instrument. We attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid, and security assistance more specifically, in terms of its ability to move recipients toward more cooperative foreign policies. We test the conventional ‘‘arms for influence’’ explanation of military aid but find that the relationship between US assistance and recipient state behavior is considerably more complicated. In general, we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of recipient states. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also somewhat counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that increased recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.