Diplomacy is vital to allied cyber policy
Williams 21, PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (BK, et al, “US and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1787217)//BB
Cooperation improves when threat perceptions converge and when the United States exercises thoughtful leadership. It erodes when efforts to promote convergence lapse, when tactical responses take precedence over strategic trust building, and when the United States sets aside the effort to promote cooperation. U.S. leadership is essential, as every U.S. ally faces real restraints and limits in improving cyber security on its own. The United States has an abundance of bureaucratic resources compared to its allies, but it still lacks a clear vision on how to build a collective and collaborative capacity in a domain centered on secrecy and rapid response. Leadership must be built on meaningful engagement and consultation on all these matters and an appropriate modesty about our collective capacity to meet the challenges ahead. Looking to the future of cybersecurity cooperation among the United States and its Indo- Pacific allies, it is easy to identify numerous challenges, usually arising from frictions over threat assessments, desired end-states, doctrine, language, and the different public-private sector relationships in each country. But these challenges also represent opportunities, places where concrete progress can be made and where frictions lend themselves to concerted action. Progress in working one will reinforce progress in working the others. Unity of command may be a bridge too far, near-unity of action is attainable. An achievable goal is to a place where the US and its allies can convey to an adversary that "to beat any one of us, you to have to beat all of us." China's strategy is comprehensive in nature, designed to contest what it perceives a capable, sophisticated, and belligerent cyber adversary in the United States. It begins with defining a central place for cyber in China's development process and military modernization. In the military domain, China pursues improved defenses and the opportunistic pursuit of information dominance. In the economic domain, it prioritizes reduced reliance on externally-sourced technologies and components alongside incentivizing developing countries to purchase Chinese companies' affordable cyber and surveillance products. In the political domain, domestically it pursues deep social control, while internationally it conducts political campaigns to stake its claim to the moral high ground of global governance. The further development of strategic thought about the ends and means of conflict in cyber space and with cyber tools is hostage to the vocabulary and concepts imported from other domains and not yet well tailored for the realities of cyber competition and conflict. This is 2 most evident in the use of the vocabulary and concepts of nuclear deterrence to try to elaborate a strategy to compete effectively in cyber space and reduce or otherwise manage cyber risks. In a strategy of persistent engagement below the lethal threshold, deterrence concepts have little value and the failure to prevent or adequately respond to events only erodes the perception that deterrence or compellence is possible in this arena. We've learned enough to try to set aside misleading concepts but not enough to have consensus around more useful ones. In the long-term, diplomacy is as important for cyber security as deterrence and defense. Diplomacy determines the realm of the possible for political cooperation and the realm of the necessary for global governance and a global ecosystem supporting U.S. and allied values. It is the means by which best practices are shared, norms constructed, and oversteps identified and acted upon. But the United States must refresh and renew its approaches. In doing so, it should be guided by the ambition for a much more competitive cyber diplomacy.