Representations of Chinese cyberwar creates a false threat of a techno-Orientalized “Other” that cultivates stable, Americanized proponents of hegemony.
Yeats 15 (Dylan Yeats recently earned a doctorate in U.S. History from NYU. He works on how the politics of “culture war” have shaped Americans’ understandings of religion, race, class, gender, and sexuality from the Illuminati Controversy at the founding of the nation to the Islamophobia of today. Yeats co-edited Yellow Peril! An Archive of Anti-Asian Fear (Verso Press, 2014) with John Kuo Wei Tchen and is currently writing Benevolent Empire: Evangelical Politics in the Early Republic, 1790-1840, based on his dissertation. 2015, “Home Is Where the War Is: Remaking Techno-Orientalist Militarism on the Homefront,” Techno-Orientalism, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.36019/9780813570655-011/html?lang=en; accessed 7/18/2022) ng
Homefront illustrates the ongoing mass-market cultural work of reproducing and repackaging aggressive U.S. policy objectives into feel-good defenses of the “American Way.” Many analysts claim that wealthy, industrialized, and technologically innovative South Korea can protect itself, but that tensions with the North provide a convenient rationale for permanently stationing fifty thousand U.S. troops there (Cumings). Aggressive American war games in the Yellow Sea use the supposed threat of North Korea as a stand-in for China, the true target of such military posturing in the region. Homefront’s developers initially sought to cast China as its invading force (Totilo, “China Is Both Too Scary and Not Scary Enough”), but also found in North Korea an easy enemy against which players can justly, and safely, act out their aggression. However, Homefront is also a remake of the 1984 film Red Dawn, where a patriotic band of American teenagers rebel against an occupying Soviet army. MGM Studios literally remade Red Dawn in 2010 with the Chinese in place of the Soviets—but studio executives decided to shelve the project after it was filmed in order to digitally remake the Chinese invaders into North Koreans (Fritz and Horn), releasing a heavily reedited version in November 2012. The “original” Red Dawn was itself something of a remake as part of a broader campaign to fancifully revive the Cold War hysteria of the 1950s. By hailing the perpetual war-(re)making at the heart of the “America” they seem to celebrate, this family of texts expresses a deep ambivalence about the role of screen enemies in this process. Rather than distract from this ideological work, such ambivalence animates their cultural power and political resonance. Excavating the genealogy of Homefront and its imaginative reworking of U.S. foreign policy rhetoric can help elucidate the “techno” in the term “techno-Orientalism.” Techno-Orientalism describes texts that produce visions of the purportedly technologically sophisticated economies and peoples of East Asia as foils for Western anxieties about the digital or information age. Homefront and the 2012 remake of Red Dawn register these anxieties quite precisely. In both texts North Koreans use an electromagnetic pulse to disable the communication systems upon which the U.S. military depends, and the invaders quickly take much of America. This techno-Orientalist peril is reminiscent of James Hevia’s reading of the early twentieth-century Dr. Fu Manchu novels. Hevia argues that the “Devil Doctor’s” ability to repurpose the knowledge infrastructure underpinning the British Empire for his own nefarious plots is what makes the character so scary. Homefront and Red Dawn continue this tradition of reworking anxieties about the reliance on a fetishized notion of information dominance by fixating on Oriental villains who upset the fantasy of Western technological supremacy. In the context of mounting media fixation on cyber-security, driven in part by political projects to depict China (I mean, North Korea) as trying to hack America out of its role as military-technology leader (Singel), the fears expressed in the 2012 Red Dawn in particular illustrate the anxious stakes of techno-dominance. The occupying North Koreans have their own communications network, and the film’s plot is driven by a hunt to retrieve one of the invaders’ radios, so the forces regrouping in Free America can reverse engineer it. However, the film explores the ramifications of this technological upset through the ambivalent specter of the U.S. war in Iraq. Without computer guidance systems or satellite telecommunications, the occupied Americans are reduced to the status of Iraqis, dependent upon a technologically superior invading force that claims to be their friend. The invading North Koreans tout that they have come to liberate Americans from their own failed leaders, but they will not tolerate insurrection. This won’t do for the Wolverines who launch the resistance using the moniker of their high school mascot. Jed, a veteran who has just returned from Iraq, convinces his budding guerrilla troops that they have an advantage. The occupiers, he knows from experience, don’t really want to be there, whereas the Wolverines are fighting for their home and freedom. Jed claims that both the Viet Cong and America’s Founding Fathers knew that guerrilla tactics could drive imperialists away by wearing them down. In this way, the 2012 Red Dawn seems to suggest a deeply ambivalent circular logic. The North Koreans serve as a harbinger for America. Should American military technology fail, America will be occupied the way it has occupied others. But in the hands of the film’s enemy Orientals, America’s own strategy is revealed to be terrifying and immoral; and given the U.S. experience in Iraq (and Vietnam) we know that this occupying technology cannot succeed. The overlapping and contradictory identifications expressed in Red Dawn and Homefront between Iraqis, North Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Russians (and the list could, and does, go on) illustrate the polymorphous Orientalism at play in these texts. This displacement of enmity reflects a broader tradition of American war-gaming. Red Dawn (2012) producer Tripp Vinson stated he was interested in remaking the 1984 original because he had enjoyed it as a kid and thought “the idea of an invading army is something that speaks to the American psyche” (Hasan). However, the American psyche is not static, but continually reproduced, remade, and cultivated by image makers backed by the power of the state. Since World War II, politicians and pundits have used the specter of “Oriental” enemy invasions to scare Americans into defending themselves against a succession of intractable foes by embracing the emancipatory promise of military technology. Defenders and definers of America have replaced Soviet communism with new archenemies across East Asia and the Middle East. Cyberwar has replaced the Space Race. The ease of this transition suggests how the shifting goals of U.S. policy, not any overarching immutable cultural or geostrategic affinity across the “Orient,” shape how Americans understand the implicit “Eastern” threats to an imagined “West.” This complements Edward Said’s central contention that the Orient is not a real place that experts in the West analyze: the Orient is a fantasy, produced by analysts with the power to assert its existence. Adding “techno” to Orientalism registers the embeddedness of such civilizational logic within the sixty-year American struggle for military industrial techno-dominance in the supposedly epic contest over the fate of the world. As remakes, Red Dawn and Homefront hint at their participation in the ongoing reproduction of techno-Orientalist militarism at the heart of the U.S. political culture. These texts hail a tradition of attacking Americans in order to convince them they are, or could be, under attack from so-called Orientals. Key to this tradition of making and remaking techno-Orientalist militarism were a succession of groups named the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). In 1950, a group of establishment elites founded the first CPD to promote the military to foster an “American Century” rooted in free trade by challenging Soviet attempts to close off global markets. To do so, this CPD depicted the Soviet threat to America as a zero-sum game. Behind closed doors in Washington, the CPD stewarded the adoption of the secret NSC-68 memoranda shortly before the Korean War. NSC-68 was the ultimate techno-Orientalist document, describing the Soviet Union as a “fanatical,” “intractable,” “inescapably militant” enemy “antithetical” to the existence of freedom and Western “civilization” (Pietz). NSC-68 advocated removing Cold War strategy from congressional oversight and placing it squarely in the charge of a vastly expanded military to develop a technological supremacy that could bolster freedom and counter communism any- and everywhere. Under the banner of anticommunism Americans launched a program of mutually assured destruction and the development of brutal countersubversive campaigns at home and abroad (Sanders 23–50).
But by the 1970s this techno-Orientalist vision began to crumble under its own weight (Englehardt). All the sophisticated surveillance and targeting seemed unable to win in Vietnam or America. Revelations about the existence of NSC-68 and the extra-legal activities it fostered provoked widespread distrust in the military establishment. The growing sense at that time that the desperate pursuit of anticommunism was neither possible nor healthy for American society led to the embrace of détente with first China and then the Soviet Union. However, hawkish politicians and defense analysts who were being pushed out of the military establishment founded a second CPD in 1976 to remake Orientalist fears, and revive the promise that technology could defend against them, in order to reassert their declining influence (Cahn). This is the all-too-real backstory to Homefront and the Red Dawns.
The second CPD sought to pathologize the movement away from technoOrientalist militarism by helping popularize a term supposedly coined by Henry Kissinger: the “Vietnam Syndrome.” In the fallout following the retreat from Vietnam, mainstream commenters began to argue that the zealous assault on communism had led analysts to misunderstand the situation in Vietnam and to wrongly imagine that ever escalating carpet bombing and computer-aided strategy could defeat a popular insurgency united against a foreign occupying power (Edwards 113–145). But advocates of the “Vietnam Syndrome” countered that this critique of techno-Orientalist truisms was naïve and even dangerous. Neoconservatives sought to refocus American fears on the Soviet Union to revive the imagined political and moral clarity of the anticommunist and militaristic 1950s. To this end, the second CPD argued that Soviet overtures for détente and arms reduction were in fact strategic deceptions. They claimed that by focusing on the Soviets’ “capabilities rather than his intentions, his weapons rather than his ideas, motives, and aspirations,” even the CIA vastly underestimated the Soviet threat to America (qtd. in Cahn 163). CPD Sovietologist Richard Pipes argued that the American tendency to “mirror image” blinded analysts and the public from realizing that the Soviet “totalitarian mindset” was not “guided merely by self-serving motives,” but instead dedicated to world domination by any means (6–7). Such rhetoric suggested that American obliviousness to the fundamental difference of their Eastern foes left the United States vulnerable to a surprise attack.
The second CPD’s remade Cold War sought to not only rollback Soviet communism but also challenge the various “countercultures” that emerged in response to the Vietnam War. The CPD argued that it was not flawed technoOrientalist policies that left sixty thousand American soldiers and one-fifth of the Vietnamese population dead with no strategic gain, but a fundamental weakness in American resolve. To this end the second CPD celebrated emerging presidential contender (and former CPD member) Ronald Reagan’s campaign pledge to “rearm America.” Reagan and the CPD relentlessly criticized President Jimmy Carter’s embrace of détente and arms reduction as epitomizing the dangerous malaise at the heart of the “Vietnam Syndrome,” and handily won the presidency in 1980. Once president, Reagan installed nearly fifty fellow CPD members into the White House. Reagan appointed Pipes to a staff position on the National Security Council where he argued that revolutionaries from Northern Ireland, Iran, Palestine, and across Africa and Latin America were not the products of local conflicts exacerbated by American and Soviet intervention but were instead all agents of a global conspiracy directed by Moscow. The renewed embrace of proxy wars and nuclear buildup that followed led to some of Reagan’s lowest approval ratings, but CPD-allied advisors encouraged Reagan to whip up excitement for a renewed Cold War (Sanders 277–342). To do so, Reagan delved even further into policies rooted in techno-Orientalist fantasy.
Reagan’s background as an actor and anticommunist crusader gave his administration a perceptive sensitivity to narrative that allowed him to revive the oppositional civilizational logic of Orientalism and the redeeming promise of military technology (Rogin). Speaking at Disney World’s future-oriented EPCOT theme park on March 8, 1983, the president stated, “[W]atch a 12-year-old take evasive action and score multiple hits while playing ‘Space Invaders,’ and you will appreciate the skills of tomorrow’s pilot.” That night, Reagan sought to paint the arms race as a moral act in an address to the National Association of Evangelicals. The president asserted that the world was divided between good and evil and that American disarmament would abandon Christianity to the threat of communism and reward “the aggressive impulses of an evil empire.” Two weeks later Reagan sought to make the revived prospect of nuclear war less terrifying by announcing on television, and without consulting the Defense Department, a billion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to build a computerized shield to protect Americans from Soviet missiles that might be launched in response to Reagan’s renewal of the arms race. The fantastic technology of the SDI would allow the United States to assert global military dominance without risking nuclear annihilation. Most analysts and academics considered SDI (or “Star Wars” as it was termed in the media) scientifically impossible. Many commentators noted that Reagan’s SDI proposals were eerily similar to the plot of one of the president’s earliest films, Murder in the Air (1940), about a weapon that “not only makes the United States invincible in war, but in so doing promises to be the greatest force for world peace ever discovered” (Boyer 205). But this did not stop the administration from opening nearly unlimited funding channels for developing the proposed military technology.