Techno-Orientalism is literally hardwired into American politics and security discourse.
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 9: “Home Is Where the War Is””, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
The defense of techno-Orientalist militarism has become literally hardwired into American political institutions. The cultivated need for enemies for Americans to define themselves against was complicated when the supposedly intractable Soviet Union crumbled under its own weight to everyone’s surprise in 1991. Think tanks such as the Center for Security Policy, founded by Reagan’s former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (and CPD member) Frank Gaffney in 1988, and the Middle East Forum, founded in 1990 by Pipes’s son Daniel Pipes, scrambled to find new spectral enemies endangering the world’s largest military in order to maintain their political influence. These think tanks repurposed and remade security discourse rooted in the idea of an intractable civilizational clash between the West and communism into one between the West and the rest—simply recasting new actors into the well-established roles of American strategic drama (Little 226–266). The neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) outlined the necessity for a more aggressive stance against China and Iraq under the title Present Dangers, edited by Robert Kagan and William Kristol (vii) in its bid to revive a “Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity.” When PNAC-supported George W. Bush assumed the presidency later that year, his advisors (including former CPD member Paul Wolfowitz) immediately began strategizing about how to scare the American people and Congress into another round of war against intractable Oriental enemies. However, even the pursuit of this techno-Orientalist fantasy betrayed its own ambivalence. The U.S. military named the December 2003 hunt for deposed Iraqi leader (and former U.S. ally) Saddam Hussein “Operation Red Dawn,” and code named his two suspected hiding places “Wolverine 1” and “Wolverine 2”—as if to suggest that the United States was the overpowering evil occupying force in “Indian country,” and Hussein an Iraqi hiding in the hills to lead a patriotic resistance (Sirota 139–169). Nonetheless, as Americans increasingly equated the mounting failures in Iraq to the failures in Vietnam three decades before, hawkish politicians sought to remake and refocus the war’s goals by founding a short-lived third CPD in 2004 dedicated to channeling American fears of government manipulation toward the threat radical Islamic terrorists pose to the safety of the world (Barry).